

ABSTRACT

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UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN: 1990-2014

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This study provides an analysis of the United States' foreign policy toward the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan from 1990-2014. This period has witnessed four different American Presidents: the Republicans, George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, and the Democrats, Bill Clinton and Barack H. Obama. Republicans and Democrats have both maintained relatively close relations with Jordan. This study concluded that the most important factors that shaped the United States' foreign policy toward Jordan are the geopolitical location, ideology, moderate regime, regional security dimension, and Arab-Israeli peace process. This study explores the signing of The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of October 26, 1994, which markedly enhanced US-Jordan bilateral relations to unprecedented levels. The United States' foreign aid, Qualifying Industrial Zones, and the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement have dramatically boosted the Jordanian economy and modernized its military weapon systems. This study found that the primary concern of the United States' foreign policy in the Middle East is securing strategic access to oil

in the Gulf region, supporting and protecting Israel's sovereignty, maintaining the United States' military bases, particularly in the Gulf states, defending client-states and friendly regimes, and resisting Islamic movements and terrorist groups.

UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF
JORDAN: 1990-2014

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
LIST OF FIGURES	vii
LIST OF TABLES	viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	ix

CHAPTER

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
	Statement of the Problem.....	1
	Research Questions	4
	Hypotheses	5
	Limits of the Study.....	6
	Major Concepts	6
	Research Methods	11
	Review of the Literature	14
	Significance of the Study	27
	Organization of the Study	28
II.	THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED STATES’ FOREIGN POLICY	31
	The Concept of Foreign Policy	31
	The Concept of the United States’ Foreign Policy	33
	The United States’ Foreign Policy before World War II.....	34
	The United States’ Foreign Policy after World War II.....	36
	The United States’ Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War Era.....	45
	The United States’ Foreign Policy Instruments	49

CHAPTER

1. Public Diplomacy.....	49
2. Foreign Aid	52
3. Military Power	61
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY.....	65
The United States' Foreign Policy toward the Middle East before WWI	65
The United States' Foreign Policy toward the Middle East after WWI	68
The United States' Foreign Policy toward the Middle East after WWII.....	70
The United States' Foreign Policy Interests in the Middle East.....	75
1. Securing Strategic Access to Oil in the Gulf Region.....	75
2. Supporting and Protecting Israel's Sovereignty	80
3. Maintaining the United States' Military Bases	85
4. Defending Client-states and Friendly Regimes	91
5. Resisting Islamic Movements and Terrorist Groups	94
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN IN THE UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY.....	100
Synopsis of the United States and Jordan Relations	100
The Importance of Jordan in the United States' Foreign Policy.....	104
1. Geopolitical Location.....	104
2. Ideology	109
3. Regime	114
4. Security	118
5. Peace Process	128

CHAPTER

V.	THE UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN	134
	The United States' Foreign Policy toward Jordan during the George H. W. Bush Presidency (1989-1993)	135
	The United States' Foreign Policy toward Jordan during the Bill Clinton Presidency (1993-2001)	146
	The United States' Foreign Policy toward Jordan during the George W. Bush Presidency (2001-2009)	154
	The United States' Foreign Policy toward Jordan during the Barack H. Obama Presidency (2009-2014)	162
VI.	THE UNITED STATES' FOREIGN AID TO THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN	173
	The United States' Foreign Economic Aid to Jordan	174
	The United States' Foreign Military Assistance to Jordan	183
	The US-Jordan Military Cooperation	188
	The United States, Jordan, and Terrorism	195
	The US-Jordan Trade Agreements.....	200
VII.	CONCLUSION AND THEORIES.....	206
APPENDICES		222
A.	Address to the Nation by His Majesty King Hussein, February 6, 1991.....	222
B.	International Contributions to the War against Terrorism, June 7, 2002.....	226
C.	The United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338	228
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....		230

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

1. Map of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan..... 10
2. Map of the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility 88
3. Map of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and its Neighbors..... 107

LIST OF TABLES

Table

1. Depicts Where the United States' Foreign Aid Was Spent 1965-1995 57
2. Depicts the Sectors on Which the United States Spent Foreign Aid 1965-1995 57
3. The United States' Foreign Economic Aid to Jordan 1990-2014..... 182
4. The United States' Foreign Military Assistance to Jordan 1990-2014..... 186
5. The United States' Foreign Military Sales to Jordan 2006-2010 190

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM:	Anti-Ballistic Missile
AMRAAM:	Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles
AOR:	Area of Responsibility
AUB:	American University of Beirut
CENTCOM:	Central Command
CENTO:	Central Treaty Organization
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
CPA:	Coalition Provisional Authority
CSH:	Child Survival and Health Programs
DA:	Development Assistance
DSCA:	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EDA:	Excess Defense Articles
ESF:	Economic Support Fund
FDI:	Foreign Direct Investment
FMF:	Foreign Military Financing
FMS:	Foreign Military Sales
FSA:	Freedom Support Act
FTA:	Free Trade Agreement
GATT:	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product

GHAI:	Global HIV/AIDS Initiative
GID:	General Intelligence Directorate
HKJ:	Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
ICT:	Information and Communication Technology
IMET:	International Military Education Training
INA:	Iraqi National Accord
ISAF:	International Security Assistance Force
ISI:	Inter-Services Intelligence
ISIL:	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS:	Islamic States of Iraq and Syria
JIPTC:	Jordan International Police Training Center
KASOTC:	King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center
MAP:	Military Assistance Program
MCA:	Millennium Challenge Account
MCC:	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MENA:	Middle-East-North African
MIRV:	Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicle
MNNA:	Major Non-NATO Ally
NADR:	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs
NAFTA:	North America Free Trade Agreement
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC:	National Security Council
OCO:	Overseas Contingency Operations
OPEC:	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OTEXA:	Office of Textile and Apparel

PLO:	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNA:	Palestinian National Authority
QIZ:	Qualifying Industrial Zone
RDJTF:	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
RJAF:	Royal Jordanian Air Force
SALT:	Strategic Arms Limitations Talk/Treaty I and II
SEATO:	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SEED:	Support for East European Democracy
SIGINT:	Signals intelligence
TI:	Transition Initiatives
TIFA:	Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
“FA”:	Food Assistance
UNSCOP:	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development
USDA:	United States Department of Agriculture
USIA:	United States Information Agency
USJFTA:	US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USTR:	United States Trade Representative
WMD:	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO:	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

The League of Nations granted Britain mandates over Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan while France was given the mandate over Lebanon and Syria as a result of the San Remo Conference of April 1920. The Emirate of Transjordan was created by Britain and established its own government on April 11, 1921. Transjordan's defense, finances, and foreign affairs were regulated by the British.¹ Two years later, Transjordan's independence was recognized, albeit with certain restrictions imposed by the British,² and established Abdullah ibn Al-Hussein as its emir, in May of 1923.³ Abdullah's negotiations with the British concluded with the new Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty on March 22, 1946. Under this treaty, Transjordan was officially acknowledged as a sovereign state and continued a friendly and peaceful relationship with Britain. Additionally, the treaty gave Britain access to Transjordan's military facilities in exchange for British subsidies and support of the Arab Legion.⁴

¹ Karen Wills, *Jordan, Modern Nations of the World* (San Diego, CA: Lucent Books, Inc., 2001), 30.

² Robin Surratt, ed., *The Middle East*, 9th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000), 288.

³ Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Jordan* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993), 108-10.

⁴ Ibid., 152-53.

On May 22, 1946, the British mandate over Transjordan ended. Three days later, the country gained full independence as the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan and Prince Abdullah ibn Al-Hussein was proclaimed its king. Transjordan continued to have a special defense treaty relationship with Britain until 1957. On May 14, 1948, the British mandate over Palestine ended and the Jewish leaders declared the independence of “Israel.” Transjordan aligned with its Arab neighbors to assist Arab Palestinian nationalists opposed to this new development. The first Arab-Israeli War of 1948 continued until the armistice agreement between Jordan and Israel was signed on April 3, 1949, which effectively transferred control of the Palestinian West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem (East Jerusalem) to Jordan.⁵

In April 1949, the regime in Amman renamed Transjordan the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (HKJ; referred to as Jordan for simplicity going forward), following King Abdullah ibn Al-Hussein’s annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem.⁶ Just a year later, the Jordanian parliament approved the annexation. Despite this formality, only Britain and Pakistan acknowledged the annexation.⁷ Jordan continued administering the West Bank and East Jerusalem until Israel gained control of it during the Six-Day War of 1967. From 1970-1971, Jordan was ruined by fighting between the government and guerrillas of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a struggle that finally ended with the PLO’s ejection from Jordan. On July 31, 1988, King Hussein renounced all Jordanian claims to the Palestinian West Bank in favor of the PLO and signed a peace

⁵ Surratt, *The Middle East*, 288.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Wills, *Jordan, Modern Nations of the World*, 34.

treaty with Israel on October 26, 1994. Upon the death of King Hussein in February 1999, his eldest son, Prince Abdullah (later renamed King Abdullah II) assumed the throne of Jordan.

Jordan is a small state with few valuable natural resources in the heart of the Middle East. Since its creation in the aftermath of World War I, Jordan has been challenged by powerful neighbors Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, and shares the longest border with Israel of any Arab state. Despite its lack of natural resources, Jordan has been the beneficiary of foreign aid from the world's great powers (Britain and later the United States). Given its crucial role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Jordan also benefited from the response of other Arab states, especially during the height of the Arab oil industry.⁸

The long relationship between the United States and Jordan dates back decades. Diplomatic relations between Amman and Washington, DC were initiated on January 31, 1949. Since then, the United States has continued its interest in strengthening and consolidating its relations with Jordan. In fact, the two nations celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of continuous diplomatic relations in 2009.

The focus of this study is to examine the United States' foreign policy toward Jordan from 1990-2014. The year 1990 was pivotal as it represents a dramatic change in the world system, changing from bipolar to unipolar. The United States became the sole world power in the aftermath of the Cold War. The year 2014 represents the end of this study as it is the most recent historical year. In addition, this study explores what shapes and sustains the American-Jordanian relationship, in spite of a succession of American

⁸ Surratt, *The Middle East*, 285.

administrations and the political transformations that have taken place in the Middle East and around the world.

Research Questions

The researcher poses a primary question and numerous secondary questions for review. Primarily, this study strives to answer:

What factors contributed to the shaping of the United States' foreign policy toward Jordan during the period of this study, 1990-2014?

Additionally, the researcher will answer the following secondary questions:

- i. What is the significance of Jordan's geopolitical location in the Middle East to the United States' foreign policy?
- ii. What is the significance of Jordan's ideology in the context of the Middle East to the United States' foreign policy?
- iii. What is the significance of Jordan's regime in the Middle East to the United States' foreign policy?
- iv. What is the significance of Jordan's security in the Middle East to the United States' foreign policy?
- v. What is the significance of Jordan's role in the Arab-Israeli peace process in the Middle East to the United States' foreign policy?
- vi. What is the importance of Jordan's role in fighting terrorism in the Middle East to the United States' foreign policy?
- vii. Do the Congressmen of the United States influence the special relationship between the United States and Jordan?

- viii. What are the primary objectives of the United States' foreign policy in the Middle East?

Hypotheses

The foreign policy of the United States toward Jordan is primarily shaped by a widespread belief among successive American administrations that maintaining Jordan's security and stability is significant to the United States' national security interests in the Middle East region and instability of Jordan would lead to the spread of radical Islamic movements that might threaten the United States' national security interests in the region. The contemporary belief among American decision-makers is that Islamist movements aim to liberate Palestinian territories that now comprise Israel through military force, violence, and terrorist means. Thus, Jordan's instability might pose a substantial threat to the United States and its allies in the Middle East.

Based on the above statement, the researcher proposes the following three exploratory hypothesis statements:

Hypothesis One: Jordan's stability is crucial for the United States to maintain its national security interests in the Middle East.

Hypothesis Two: Jordan's instability might lead to the spread of radical Islamic movements, which might pose a substantial threat to the United States' national security interests in the Middle East.

Hypothesis Three: Foreign aid and economic agreements have been utilized as principal instruments of the United States' foreign policy to exercise influence over Jordan to achieve certain political objectives.

The diverse research data collected for the purpose of this study will test each hypothesis. The supported hypotheses will be accepted and confirmed, while those not supported will be rejected.

Limits of the Study

The year of 1990 represents the beginning period of this study due to the dramatic changes that took place in the world and the Middle East. At that time, as previously mentioned, the international system changed from bipolar to unipolar, resulting in the United States becoming the sole world superpower after the end of the Cold War. This change has had a profound impact on the international system and the way it is governed, particularly in the Middle East. Further, the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 had a substantial impact on Jordan, as did the announcement of the “New World Order,” and the final collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The year of 2014 will represent the end of the period of this study as the most recent in history. On occasion, the researcher will discuss events before the period of this study as well as afterward to enrich essential elements of this study. The spatial domain will include the general region of the Middle East, Jordan, and the United States.

Major Concepts

The fundamental concepts pertinent to this study are foreign policy, the foreign policy of the United States, national interest, Jordan, and the Middle East. The concepts presented below will be defined either by a relevant source or by the author of this study and will be followed by a brief discussion.

Foreign Policy

Foreign policy includes a range of political actions such as conducting negotiations, writing position papers, establishing bilateral-multilateral security agreements, initiating trade boycotts, and waging war that are taken by governments to achieve goals and shape relationships with other nations. Foreign policy may require political, economic, cultural, or military resources.⁹

The Foreign Policy of the United States

The foreign policy of the United States is a plan that outlines the interactions between the country and other nations. The ideas within those plans shift from time to time depending on what is happening in the globe. The President, advisors, and cabinet members establish and implement the country's foreign policy.¹⁰

In current times, the foreign policy of the United States has had the following objectives:¹¹

- i. To protect the United States' geographic borders
- ii. To protect the United States' global interests
- iii. To protect the geographic borders of the major worldwide allies
- iv. To increase the United States' sphere of influence around the globe

The United States has used multiple approaches to achieve these foreign policy goals. Specifically, it has worked diligently to oppose communism, promote peace,

⁹ Susan Welch et al., *American Government*, 6th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1996), 623.

¹⁰ Jack R. Fraenkel, Frank T. Kane, and Alvin Wolf, *Civics Government and Citizenship* (Needham, MA: Prentice Hall Inc., 1990), 455.

¹¹ Welch et al., *American Government*, 623.

democracy, and capitalism, as well as increasing the standard of living globally and increasing empathy between the United States and other countries.¹² Techniques to increase understanding include promoting knowledge and education through a maintenance of public libraries around the world and funding international cultural and academic communication.¹³

National Interest

The HarperCollins Dictionary of American Government and Politics defines national interest as “i. Those policy aims identified as the special concerns of a given nation. Violation of them either in the setting of domestic policy or in international negotiations would be perceived as damaging to the nation’s future, both in domestic development and in international competition.... ii. In the context of foreign policy, [national interest is] the security of the state.”¹⁴

From the realist perspective, “the national interest is the important guide to wise statesmanship. The concept of national interest contains two elements: “minimum requirements,” involving the nation’s physical, political, and cultural identity and integrity; “variables,” depending on the political circumstances and traditions, the “total cultural context” within which a nation formulates its foreign policy.”¹⁵

¹² Fraenkel, Kane, and Wolf, *Civics Government and Citizenship*, 455.

¹³ Welch et al., *American Government*, 624.

¹⁴ Jay M. Shafritz, *The HarperCollins Dictionary of American Government and Politics*, 1st ed. (New York: HarperPerennial, 1992), 382.

¹⁵ Joseph Dunner, ed., *Dictionary of Political Science* (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1964), 367.

The concept of the national interest is very significant to international relations as national interest is one of the essential pillars of the realist school. The United States' national interest represents its goals and ambitions whether political, economic, military, or cultural. These interests change, however, depending on what is happening around the world.

Jordan

The 1952 Constitution made Jordan a sovereign independent Arab state. The constitution highlights that the citizens of Jordan are an integral part of the Arab Nation. Jordan was set up as a monarchy with a parliamentary system of government. Under the constitution, the city of Amman was established as the capital of the country. The religion of the state is Islam. Arabic is its official language;¹⁶ however, for business, education, and tourism, English is the most often spoken language.

Jordan is a relatively small and resource-poor state in the heart of the Middle East surrounded by powerful neighbors: Syria to the north; Iraq to the east; Saudi Arabia to the south and southeast; and Israel and the occupied Palestinian West Bank to the west. Jordan is about the size of the state of Indiana covering approximately 34,495 square miles (89,342 square km).

Jordan was named after the river that delineates its western borders. It has access to the Red Sea through the port city of Aqaba at the northern end of the Gulf (*see Figure 1*).

¹⁶ *The Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of 1952* (Amman: Publications of the Jordanian House of Representatives, 2011), 5.




Figure 1. Map of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. *Source:* Map adopted from Jordanian Alternative Solutions, accessed July 2, 2014, <http://jordansolarpower.net/main/images/jordan-map.png>.

Note: As a result of the Six-Day War of June 1967, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, the Palestinian West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem (East Jerusalem), and Syria's Golan Heights. On November 22, 1967, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 242 in an attempt to end the ongoing conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

The Middle East

The term “Middle East” is relatively new. In 1902, the name appeared in a series of articles in a British daily newspaper, *The Times*. After World War II, the term “Middle East” became widely accepted, especially in academic institutions and government agencies.¹⁷

The geographical boundaries of Middle East vary and it is also called the Near East or Southwest Asia. Among institutions of higher education, Middle East refers to the Arab states of Asia; the Arab states of North Africa; Israel; and the non-Arab states of Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.¹⁸

Research Methods

This study is dependent on the historical and descriptive analysis methods. The historical approach is applicable in this study in order to link past events with the present and understand the roots of the liaison between the United States and Jordan by explaining its policies and positions. To that end, the researcher will use the historical approach to describe and analyze the major events that have impacted the relationship between the two countries including the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and others. Additionally, the researcher uses other independent approaches to present a complete picture of the foreign policy of the United States toward Jordan. For example, the national interest approach helps in reviewing and examining the national interests of

¹⁷ Don Peretz, *The Middle East Selected Readings* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968), 1-14.

¹⁸ Surratt, *The Middle East*, 4.

the United States in the Middle East region in general and Jordan in particular. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the realist school assumes that “the key factor prevalent in all international relationships is power. The wise and efficient use of power by a state in pursuit of its national interest is, therefore, the main ingredient of a successful foreign policy.”¹⁹ The decision-making approach is also applicable and allows a better understanding of the most important decisions that took place during the period of this study, most notably, the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, the United States’ foreign aid to Jordan, and the US-led global war on terrorism. Finally, the researcher will use a systemic approach to examine the impact of the internal political environment of the United States on Jordan to understand the effects of the internal political environment interaction of the United States on its foreign policy toward Jordan.

This study will use both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include the United States and Jordan’s government documents:

- i. The United States’ official government publications
- ii. The United States’ Department of State bulletins and supplements
- iii. The United States’ Department of Defense bulletins and supplements
- iv. Weekly compilation of Presidential documents
- v. Public papers of Presidents of the United States
- vi. The United States Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee bulletins
- vii. The United States House of Representatives’ Foreign Relations Committee bulletins

¹⁹ Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, *The International Relations Dictionary*, 4th ed. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio Inc., 1988), 7.

- viii. The United States' foreign treaties and agreements with the government of Jordan
- ix. Jordan's official documents and publications
- x. Jordan's Prime Ministry official documents and publications
- xi. Jordan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates official documents and publications
- xii. Jordan's Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation official documents and publications
- xiii. Jordan's Ministry of Finance official documents and publications
- xiv. Jordan's foreign treaties and agreements with the government of the United States
- xv. The United Nations' official documents and publications related to the subject matter
- xvi. The World Bank's official documents and publications related to the subject matter

Secondary sources will include the following:

- xvii. Published works dealing with the subject matter, such as books, studies, documents, and data
- xviii. Scholarly and journalistic articles
- xix. Newspapers reports
- xx. Autobiographies of the important people related to the subject matter

In this study, the researcher will also gather information relevant to the foreign policy of the United States toward Jordan through personal research obtained via broadcast and print media, audio-visual, formal, informal, and social networking sites.

The combination of the primary and secondary source materials mentioned above would help to provide information to examine the questions of the study.

Many important materials were available at the Robert W. Woodruff Library of the Atlanta University Center, Emory University, the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, and the University of Jordan. Other materials and data were compiled from the Presidential libraries of the United States such as George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. Finally, other information related to the subject matter was acquired from professional research institutes in Washington, DC, such as The Foreign Policy Institute, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, United States Institute of Peace, and The Brookings Institution.

Review of the Literature

A tremendous amount of literature has been written on the United States' foreign policy toward the Middle East from both American and Arabic perspectives, as well as from third and independent parties. The enormous task of sifting through this daunting amount of literature for relevant data is further complicated by different views presented in the biases of the authors. It is not the intent of the researcher in this study to chronicle every aspect of the foreign policy of the United States toward the Middle East. The primary purpose of this work is to examine and assess what shapes the United States' foreign policy toward Jordan during the period of 1990-2014. In addition, since the

subject of this study is specific, the primary focus is on the literature employing the micro view approach to the area of study rather than the macro view approach, which examines the whole foreign policy of the United States from a historical perspective.

To that end, the researcher will discuss some works that examine the United States' foreign policy toward the Middle East and Jordan. Then, the researcher will examine the impact of the considerable economic difficulties that the Jordanian state faced before and during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and how these difficulties consequently negatively impacted the foreign policy of Jordan and the United States.

The United States' foreign policy toward the Middle East has grown steadily after World War II. The United States recognized that its traditional allies (Britain and France) were unable to play their previous roles in the Middle East. Therefore, the foreign policy of the United States during this period centered on three key interests: controlling energy supplies (oil) of the Gulf states, protecting Israel's borders, and containing the Soviet Union's possible expansion in the Middle East region.

Supporting the above statement, Richard Cottam, in his article, "U.S. Policy in the Middle East," (1993), explains the feeling of the time:

American policy makers concerned with the Middle East came to understand early three interests must be taken into account in the formulation of an integrated American policy toward the area. These interests were central to the American foreign policy process, and American policy as it took form would have to reconcile the three. The first of these interests was that emanating from a broad public consensus that emerged in the United States shortly after world war II: that the Soviet Union was an expansionary power and, if not contained, would expand deeply into the Middle East and such expansion would be highly deleterious to American security interest ... The second interest related closely to the first. The dependence of Western industry on Middle Eastern oil was a matter of early concern ... The third interest reflected the terrible history of the Jewish people in World War II and indeed throughout their diaspora in Europe ... the American government and people were sympathetic with this feeling, and American policy

makers responded positively to requests that the American government make a concerted effort to gain approval in the United Nations and in the community of nations generally for independence of Israel.²⁰

Louis J. Cantori, in his article, “The Middle East in the New World Order,” (1994), describes the following about the impact of the end of the Cold War and the new unipolar international system that resulted:

The end of the cold war in 1989 prepared the way for a U.S.-dominant unipolar international system in the 1990s. The political dissolution of the USSR reinforced that outcome. Concomitant with this, U.S. foreign policy needed to readjust from one attuned to the global activities and ambitions of the Soviet Union to one with new definitions of security and political interests.²¹

Melani McAlister, in her book, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000* (2001), explains the United States’ goals of protecting the flow of oil and the benefit of a stable Saudi Arabia:

In the early fall of 1990, the United States –led coalition against Iraq began what would become one of the largest military operations of the post–world War II period. The multinational coalition of troops was initially mobilized in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; the official goal was to defend the border of Saudi Arabia and also to protect U.S. and Western “interests” in the Gulf. Operation Desert Storm involved almost seven hundred thousand troops, including more than five hundred thousand Americans, in the task of avenging what President George Bush described as the “rape” of Kuwait. Ensuring the continued “flow of oil” was the most common argument for massive military response; protecting the “friendly” and “stable” monarchy in Saudi Arabia was another.²²

²⁰ Richard Cottam, “U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” in *The United States and the Middle East: A Search for New Perspectives*, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), 36-37.

²¹ Louis J. Cantori, “The Middle East in the New World Order,” in *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East*, eds. Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 451.

²² Melani McAlister, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 235.

Kamel S. Abu Jaber, in his article, “Jordan and the Gulf War,” (1994), explains that Jordan’s location left it isolated and a secondary target of the economic blockade in 1990:

Caught between powerful conflicting poles-its traditional pro-Western policies, its friendship and strong ties with the Gulf regimes and Saudi Arabia, and its equally strong relations with Iraq-Jordan decided to stand in the middle. Doing so, it hoped to influence the course of events in such a way as to avoid military conflict. Underestimating and perhaps unaware of the undercurrents of Western (principally Britain-U.S. and Israeli) long-term strategy, Jordan found itself in the unusual situation of being isolated with Iraq. In effect, the economic blockade applied to Jordan as well, making it a secondary target; its very survival hung in the balance for the entire duration of the crisis, from 2 August 1990 to March 1991.²³

In his book, *Global Security Watch-Jordan* (2010), W. Andrew Terrill, reports that Jordan tried to avoid war and maintain relations with Iraq:

Jordan condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, but it also opted to remain outside of the U.S.-led multinational coalition against Saddam Hussein, instead urging a peaceful solution to the crisis. Jordan also tried without success to find a formula to avoid war and continue acceptable relations with Iraq and at least some of the major states opposing Iraq. The mutually exclusive demands of Baghdad and the U.S.-led coalition nevertheless made such compromise impossible. After war broke out on January 16, 1991,... king [Hussein] continued efforts to work with all parties to end the conflict, and on February 6 he made a particularly tough speech denouncing U.S. policy toward Iraq. This speech followed the U.S. destruction of several large Jordanian fuel trucks mistaken for military targets entering Iraq along the Amman-Baghdad highway. In his remarks, King Hussein condemned the war and called for a renewed effort to seek a diplomatic solution. The King’s harsh tone was widely viewed as excessively pro-Saddam, although it was extremely well-received by the Jordanian public. After the war, Jordan paid a high price for this approach and had to cope with extremely strained relations with the United States and the Gulf Arab states that had opposed Saddam in the war. Aid to Jordan was strongly disrupted and trading relationships severely damaged.²⁴

²³ Kamel S. Abu Jaber, “Jordan and the Gulf War,” in *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East*, eds. Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 368.

²⁴ W. Andrew Terrill, *Global Security Watch – Jordan* (Santa Barbara, CA: An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2010), 19.

In the economic arena, Jamil E. Jreisat and Hanna Y. Freij, the authors of “Jordan, the United States, and the Gulf crisis,” (1991), review the economic impact of the Gulf crisis:

In 1985, Kuwait indicated that it was unwilling to renew the contracts of 15,000 Jordanian workers who, with their families, totaled 50,000. But after Jordan exerted pressure on the Kuwaiti government, 90% of the contracts were temporarily renewed. Despite this, some Jordanian economists were predicting that by 1990 unemployment could reach 200,000. The Gulf crisis has realized such predictions. Furthermore, excessive consumer consumption of imports and a lack of domestic productivity has fueled a destructive inflationary spiral that has penalized low income citizens. In the midst of this, public debt increased from \$119 million in 1970 to \$5.5 billion in 1988 94% of the GNP.²⁵

Supporting the Jreisat and Freij analysis, Warwick Knowles, in his book, *Jordan since 1989: A Study in Political Economy* (2005), expands on the economic woes of this period:

In late 1988, the economy finally collapsed under the weight of inappropriate government policy responses to three events: the oil-revenue slump, the Iran- Iraq War and the renunciation of the claim of sovereignty over the West Bank.... The effects of the drop in oil earnings of the OPEC countries impacted negatively upon the Jordanian economy. Firstly, the return of migrant labour from the Gulf [states] increased unemployment rates, increased the need for extra welfare spending by the state and reduced the income of the families of the returnees. Secondly, higher prices in the oil-producing countries resulted in the migrants having fewer funds to repatriate adding to the recession. In addition, the oil-producing countries were no longer able to provide high levels of economic assistance. Finally, exports to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait fell from JD50.3m in 1984 (19.3% of exports) to JD40.7m in 1988 (12.5% of exports).²⁶

²⁵ Jamil E. Jreisat and Hanna Y. Freij, “Jordan, the United States, and the Gulf Crisis,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 1/2 (Spring 1991): 106.

²⁶ Warwick Knowles, *Jordan since 1989: A Study in Political Economy* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2005), 77-78.

Further, it is important to emphasize that the interaction between Iraq's financial debt to Jordan and Jordan's economic dependence on Iraq stressed Jordan's finances in the late 1980s.²⁷

Adam Garfinkle's article, "Jordanian Policy from the Intifada to the Madrid Peace Conference," (1993), explains the region's economic strife at that time:

As the Bush administration began, Jordan was in the midst of a serious structural crisis that affected most aspects of national life. The economy was sputtering, Islam was increasingly militant and joining with romantic Palestinian nationalist extremism, and the East Bank constituency, which has ever been the backbone of the regime, was showing signs of changing direction on the future of the Hashemite rule. Moreover, ... king [Hussein] seemed tired and sick, the Israeli political scene was increasingly unfriendly to pragmatic moderation, and world attention was focused not on Jordan but on dramatic events in Europe and the Soviet Union.²⁸

In addition, Garfinkle hypothesized that there were numerous regional and domestic political changes, economic problems, and fall out from politics centered on Palestinian political problems.²⁹

In the political arena, several factors impacted Jordan's position in the late 1980's and early 1990's: the 1987 eruption of the Palestinian Intifada (*uprising*) in the West Bank, the decline of foreign aid from the Gulf states and the United States, the continuing expense of assisting the West Bank, King Hussein's relinquishment of the claim of sovereignty over the West Bank in July 1988, the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, and, finally, the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991.

²⁷ Knowles, *Jordan since 1989*, 78.

²⁸ Adam Garfinkle, "Jordanian Policy from the Intifada to the Madrid Peace Conference," in *The Middle East after Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait*, ed. Robert O. Freedman (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 298.

²⁹ Ibid.

Daniel C. Diller, the editor of *The Middle East: Revised to Include a Persian Gulf*

Crisis Supplement (1991), explains King Hussein's motivation:

The Intifada also affected the Arab-Israeli peace process by inducing Jordan's King Hussein to renounce his government's claims to the West Bank. He announced on July 31, 1988, that the PLO was "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestine people." He severed Jordan's administrative and legal links to the West Bank and declared later that Jordan would no longer pay the salaries of about twenty-one thousand West Bank civil servants. Hussein's renunciation appeared to be motivated primarily by his desire to insulate Jordan's Palestinian population from the destabilizing effects of the intifada and his recognition that Palestinians in the West Bank did not favor a federation with Jordan.³⁰

Garfinkle noted that Arab aid to Jordan waned. During the 1978 Baghdad Summit, promises of continued support were made, but not fulfilled. In each subsequent year, Jordan received less money than the previous. In fact, by the end of 1986, it was evident that the "Arab oil boom" had ended, as well as the influx of Arab oil funds to Jordan. Finally, between 1988 and 1989, foreign aid fell by a third (a total of \$178 million); in 1988 Jordan had received \$536 million, falling to \$377 million in 1989. Funds from Jordanian expatriates also dwindled due to the changes in the oil market. This source once comprised nearly one-third of Jordan's income.³¹

On the other hand, Thomas L. Friedman, in his article, "War in the Gulf: Washington; U.S. Says it is Reviewing Aid to Jordan," (1991), points out that Jordan received millions of dollars in aid from the United States:

The Bush Administration announced ... that it was reviewing all of its economic aid to Jordan after a speech by King Hussein in which he seemed to abandon his professed neutrality in the Persian Gulf War and threw his support behind Iraq. In fiscal 1990, Jordan received \$102 million in economic and military aid from the

³⁰ Daniel C. Diller, ed., *The Middle East: Revised to Include a Persian Gulf Crisis Supplement*, 7th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1991), 2.

³¹ Garfinkle, "Jordanian Policy," 298.

United States. In fiscal 1991, which began last October, it received \$57.2 million - \$20 million in military assistance, \$35 million in economic assistance and \$2.2 million in training programs.³²

In the security arena, it should be noted that the Jordanian regime, since its inception, maintained close relations with the Western nations (especially Britain and later the United States) to defend the national integrity and interests of the Jordanian state. Since the eruption of the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, the Jordanian government has taken several steps to enhance its national security interests. Prominent among those were the deployment of thousands of troops on its vast borders with Iraq and Syria to prevent Iraqi smugglers and others from entering the country illegally. In addition, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel on October 26, 1994, supported the US-led international campaign against the “War on Terror” in 2001, sustained the US-led constructions efforts to rebuild Iraq in 2003, and joined the US-led international coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014. Furthermore, as part of its commitment to fight terrorism, maintain security, and stabilize the region, Jordan provided training to Afghani, Yamani, and Iraqi security troops to boost their capability to fight terrorist groups. Finally, Jordan provided training to prescreened moderate Syrian rebels in May 2015.

In their article, “Foreign Policy as a Strategic National Asset: The Case of Jordan,” (2008), Ali E. Hillal Dessouki and Karen Abdul Kheir state the nature of the Jordanian foreign policy:

Jordan’s foreign policy role, as defined by [King] Hussein, was linked to the “Hashemite vision”-a vision of a new Arab renaissance, an Arab world

³² Thomas L. Friedman, “War in the Gulf: Washington; U.S. Says it is Reviewing Aid to Jordan,” *New York Times*, February 8, 1991.

characterized by democracy, cooperation, and “above all, open to the outside world.” Close relations with the West played a central role in the pursuit of this vision. First Britain, then the US, provided the economic and military requirements necessary to establish Hashemite rule, and to maintain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Jordanian state.³³

Supporting the preceding perspective, Curtis R. Ryan, in his article, “Jordanian Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring,” (2014), summarizes Jordan foreign policy goals, noting that:

[To Jordan,] [m]aintaining and deepening its relationship with the United States remains a top foreign policy goal. Today, Jordan remains dependent on foreign aid, both economic and military. For King Abdullah II, who has pursued a series of neoliberal economic policies that have endeared the regime still further to Washington, the U.S. relationship provides the economic underpinnings of both the state and the regime. These include not only extensive foreign aid, but also U.S. investment in the development of the kingdom, as well as trade relations (which have increased, particularly since the establishment of the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement in 2002)... Jordan’s close relations with the U.S. government also link the Hashemite kingdom to the many very unpopular American policies toward the Middle East and are something of a liability, in terms of domestic and regional legitimacy. But for the regime itself, the benefits far outweigh any cost and are, in fact, essential to the economic development as well as the national security of the state.³⁴

Scott Lasensky, in his report, “Iraq and its Neighbors: Jordan and Iraq between Cooperation and Crisis,” (2006), explains the impact anti-American sentiment among Palestinians:

Jordan’s interest in a stable Iraq relates not only to traditional national security concerns but also to internal dynamics. Jordan, perennially anxious about instability and turbulence on its borders, also needs to avoid a situation where events in Iraq might upset the delicate balance of political, social, and economic forces at home. Because of its high Palestinian population (50–70 percent by various independent estimates), and with anti-American sentiment particularly

³³ Ali E. Hillal Dessouki and Karen Abdul Kheir, “Foreign Policy as a Strategic National Asset: The Case of Jordan,” in *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization*, eds. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2008), 263.

³⁴ Curtis R. Ryan, “Jordanian Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring,” *Middle East Policy* 21, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 146-47.

high among Palestinians, Jordan has had to contend with a large, restive internal constituency that opposed the removal of Saddam [Hussein of Iraq] ... In many respects, the Palestinian factor—both the situation west of the Jordan River and the role of Palestinians within Jordan—looms larger than Iraq. The same can be said for Islamism in Jordan. The Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections resonates far more strongly in Jordanian politics than does Iraqi Islamist politics. To be sure, from a security perspective the Jordanian regime worries about Zarqawi-style Salafist radicalism emanating from Iraq, but politically Hamas poses a much greater challenge—to Jordan's peace with Israel and to the balance between secular and religious forces at home.³⁵

Robert J. Bookmiller, in his article, “Abdullah's Jordan: America's Anxious Ally,” (2003), notes Washington enthusiastically supported King Abdullah II:

... King Abdullah II has sought to reposition Jordan closer to the United States, while at the same time expand Amman's contacts and participation in multilateral international forums.... his active backing of Washington's war against terrorism and tacit support for the US military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq has placed Jordan at odds with many other Arab states.... Behind the scenes, Jordan shared valuable intelligence information with the US and publicly, Abdullah backed the Bush Administration's “war on terrorism”.... The Bush Administration rewarded this high-level cooperation in a number of ways. Chief among the rewards was a final White House push to secure Senate ratification of the US-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement (FTA).³⁶

W. Andrew Terrill, in his book, *Jordanian National Security and the Future of Middle East Stability* (2008), elaborates on Jordan's role:

In the years prior to the 2003 Iraq War, Jordanian Special Forces troops played a leading role in securing the Iraqi border where almost nightly clashes took place between Jordanian forces and Iraqi smugglers. Training Special Forces was also an important way for Jordan to contribute to fighting terrorism in the region in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. In April 2002, Jordan sent a special forces training unit to Yemen to assist U.S. military instructors training the Yemeni military to fight terrorist groups in that country. Additionally, the Jordanians have trained

³⁵ Scott Lasensky, *Iraq and its Neighbors: Jordan and Iraq between Cooperation and Crisis*, Special Report 178 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 4.

³⁶ Robert J. Bookmiller, “Abdullah's Jordan: America's Anxious Ally,” *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 174-75.

around 100 officers and soldiers from the post-Taliban government of Afghanistan in special operations and counterterrorist procedures.³⁷

A review of the above body of literature shows that the United States' interests in the Middle East date back to World War II when the United States emerged as a world super power and recognized the economic importance of the Middle East to Western society. During the Cold War era, the United States' foreign policy toward the Middle East focused on containing the Soviet Union, controlling oil in the Gulf states, and protecting Israel's borders.

In the last decade of the twentieth century, several dramatic changes took place in the Middle East. On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied its oil-rich neighbor Kuwait. This action completely changed the vision of the United States' foreign policy toward the Middle East. Moreover, this action paved the way for proposing a new era in the international system, the era of the "New World Order," which almost coincided with the complete collapse of the Soviet Union, the major supporter of the Arab concerns during the Cold War.

The literature review also reveals that Jordan faced substantial economic and political crises in the late 1980s. According to several authors, these crises arose from domestic and regional political changes. In the economic arena, assistances from neighboring Arab states given to Jordan declined, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In the political arena, Jordan was affected by the Palestinian Intifada of 1987-1993, renouncing legal and administrative claim of the West Bank in 1988, and the Gulf crisis of the 1990-1991.

³⁷ W. Andrew Terrill, *Jordanian National Security and the Future of Middle East Stability* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 56.

As a result of the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, Jordan's relations significantly cooled with the Gulf states and the United States, although Jordan condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait from the beginning and sought to resolve the crisis within the Arab League. King Hussein's attempts to resolve the crisis diplomatically failed and he was perceived as pro-Saddam Hussein. Also, the Bush administration was disappointed by the King's position during the Gulf crisis. This resulted in the suspension of United States foreign aid to Jordan and increasing tensions between the two countries.

The literature review reveals that the relationships between the United States and Jordan aligned after the Gulf War of 1991 ended. Subsequently, the Bush administration recognized the crucial role of King Hussein and allowed him to be involved in the Madrid Conference for Peace in the Middle East as well as the peace process between the PLO and Israel. After King Abdullah II assumed power, the United States and Jordan's relations remained strong. Immediately after the September 11, 2001 events, King Abdullah II pledged support for the George W. Bush policy against terrorism. Since 2001, Jordan has strategically partnered with the United States in its war on terrorism in the Middle East. Additionally, the review of literature shows that maintaining close relations with the United States would ensure the influx of economic and military foreign aid, allowing for Jordan's security and stability in the turbulent Middle East region.

Finally, the literature review shows that the United States' foreign policy toward Jordan, specifically, was not discussed. However, the literature review showed that several authors examined the United States' foreign policy toward the Middle East. Some authors focused on the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 and its impact on the Jordanian economy; others discussed the Arab and American foreign assistance to Jordan. Other

authors examined Jordan's role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and some discussed Jordan's support of the United States' policies on fighting terrorism in the Middle East region.

The researcher did not find any comprehensive study in the current time that discusses all aspects of the foreign policy of the United States toward Jordan in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. Thus, this study will present a contemporary, holistic, and systematic analysis of factors that shaped the United States' foreign policy toward Jordan from 1990-2014. Furthermore, this study aims to update the existing literature related to the subject matter by including an analysis of current President, Barack H. Obama's policy toward Jordan.

Significance of the Study

This study seeks to understand the United States' foreign policy toward the Middle East, in general, and Jordan, in particular. Specifically, this study explores factors that shaped the United States' foreign policy toward Jordan during 1990-2014. The period of this study is significant given the magnitude of historical events: the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991; the announcement of the "New World Order" of 1991; the international system change from bipolar to unipolar, the United States becoming a sole world superpower, the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States, the American war in Afghanistan in 2001, the Iraq War in 2003, the Arab Spring of 2010-2011, the Syrian Civil War of 2011, and , finally, the US-led international airstrike campaign against ISIS.

Additionally, this study is an attempt to understand how these substantial changes affected the United States' foreign policy toward Jordan. The analysis and data of this study are expected to enrich the existing literature and should be useful to students, scholars, and policy-makers who are involved in international affairs and foreign policy issues, especially in the Middle East.

The researcher further believes that this study will enhance the reader's knowledge by adding information about the United States' foreign policy determinants toward Jordan and the Middle East. Moreover, this study provides students and researchers insight into the history of American-Jordanian relations and may suggest a roadmap for the future relations.

Organization of the Study

This study will be divided into seven chapters:

Chapter I — Introduction

In this chapter, the author discusses the statement of the problem, research questions, hypotheses, limits of the study, major concepts used in this study, what research methods will be adopted to fit the study, and what kind of data this study will need. A comprehensive literature review will answer the research questions. In addition, this chapter will discuss the significance of the study, why this study is important and how it differs than the previous studies.

Chapter II — Theoretical Framework of the United States' Foreign Policy

Chapter II will provide a discussion about the concept of foreign policy, its meaning, origin, and developments. The chapter will also discuss the concept of the United States' foreign Policy and its foundation and purposes. The United States' foreign policy before World War II, after World War II, and in the post-Cold War Era will be explained in order to form a clear picture about its natures, objectives, and motivations, and how it developed during these periods. Finally, the chapter will discuss the United States' foreign policy instruments - notably public diplomacy, foreign aid both economic and military, and military power.

Chapter III — The Importance of the Middle East in the United States' Foreign Policy

This chapter will shed light on the United States' economic and political presence in the Middle East region before and after World War I and after World War II to understand how United States' presence has developed in the region and what motives were behind its presence. Chapter III also explores and discusses the United States

primary interests in the Middle East including securing strategic access to oil in the Gulf region, supporting and protecting Israel's sovereignty, maintaining the United States' military bases, defending client-states and friendly regimes, and resisting Islamic movements and terrorist groups.

Chapter IV — The Importance of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the United States'

Foreign Policy

Chapter IV will provide a synopsis of the United States and Jordan relations. Moreover, this chapter will deliberate the roots of the relationship and when the alignment between the two countries emerged. The author discusses why Jordan was an important state to the United States since the early years of the Cold War until today. Also, the most crucial factors that shaped the United States foreign policy toward Jordan between 1990 and 2014 are reviewed, including the geopolitical location, ideology, regime, security, and the peace process. These factors contributed to enhanced and the mutual relationship between the two nations ever since.

Chapter V — The United States' Foreign Policy toward the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

This chapter will discuss the United States' foreign policy toward Jordan from 1990-2014. Specifically, the United States' foreign policy toward Jordan during the presidencies of both the Republican and the Democratic administrations is explored: the United States' foreign policy toward Jordan during the George H. W. Bush Presidency (1989-1993); the Bill Clinton Presidency (1993-2001); the George W. Bush Presidency (2001-2009); and the Barack H. Obama Presidency (2009-2014) will be discussed in

depth. Finally, in this chapter, the author reviewed the events, dimensions, and aspects that have shaped the relationship between the two nations.

Chapter VI — The United States' Foreign Aid to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Chapter VI will discuss the United States foreign aid toward Jordan from 1990-2014; the United States' foreign economic aid to Jordan and foreign military assistance will be tracked, discussed, and examined. In this chapter, the author explains the role and impact of the United States' foreign aid on the Jordanian economy. Also, the US-Jordan trade agreements will be reviewed. How foreign aid and the mutual economic agreements have developed and enhanced the trade relations between the United States and Jordan will also be explained. Finally, in this chapter, the US-Jordan military cooperation will be examined, besides the US-Jordan role in fighting terrorism in the Middle East.

Chapter VII —Conclusion and Theories

Chapter VII presents an analysis of the findings in the study and shows support for the hypotheses around which this study built. In addition, this chapter will present some theories about the future of the relationship between the United States and Jordan. Several scenarios were discussed.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY

The Concept of Foreign Policy

There is no specific definition of “foreign policy” in political science literature. Like many concepts in social sciences, there is still much debate due to the absence of a consistent theory in the humanities. However, this does not prevent a fresh discussion of the definitions and endeavor to reach an understanding of foreign policy.

A good definition of foreign policy is provided by the former United States Ambassador Hugh Gibson in his book, *The Road to Foreign Policy* (1944). He defines foreign policy as “a well-rounded, comprehensive plan, based on knowledge and experience, for conducting the business of the government with the rest of the world.”

The goal of the foreign policy is to protect and promote national interests. It requires a thorough understanding of those interests as well as identification and creation of the resources that can be used to achieve these goals. He goes on to note, “Anything less than this falls short of being a national foreign policy.”¹

Felix Morley, in his book, *The Foreign Policy of the United States* (1951), defines foreign policy as “the governmental conduct of the relations of one political sovereignty with others.” Morley views foreign policy as more of an art than as a science and is easily affected by emotional factors that may not necessarily be strictly logical. Morley views

¹ Hugh Gibson, *The Road to Foreign Policy* (New York: Doubleday, Doran, and Company, Inc., 1944), 9.

foreign policy as more of an art than as a science that is easily affected by emotional factors that may not necessarily be strictly logical. He states that foreign policy is also a science, in that and the policy should reliably cause an outcome that can be predicted by the government. The people in the nation may not be aware of or even support the outcome.²

According to Michael Sheehan, foreign policy “occurs at the meeting point of the state and its international environment.” The international environment and domestic arenas can influence each other; this definition is what some refer to as “international relations” or political relations between nations.³

The *Dictionary of Political Science* has defined the concept of foreign policy as “courses of action in pursuit of national objectives beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the state. It includes objectives in the sense of specific goals, principles or guides to action and conduct, commitments or specific undertakings, and the strategy and tactics suitable to the attainment of the ends sought.”⁴

The *Dictionary of Government and Politics* defines the foreign policy as a “policy followed by a country when dealing with other countries.”⁵

In light of the foregoing discussion, it can be argued that foreign policy is a plan set by a state to organize its foreign relations with other states and international

² Felix Morley, *The Foreign Policy of the United States*, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1951), 7.

³ Michael Sheehan, “International Relations: Foreign Policy Analysis,” in *Elements in Political Science*, Frank Bealey, Richard A. Chapman, and Michael Sheehan (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 328.

⁴ Dunner, *Dictionary of Political Science*, 189.

⁵ P.H. Collin, ed., *Dictionary of Government and Politics*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1998), 121.

organizations. The foreign policy of a state depends very much upon its traditions, principles, prestige, and culture on how to conduct its foreign policy with other nations. In addition, it is important to understand that the foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy, meaning that domestic policies, to some extent, shape a foreign policy of a state. Nowadays, many governments consider foreign policy as a segment of their public policy. Thus, it is clear that a successful foreign policy of a state cannot ignore its domestic policies.

The Concept of the United States' Foreign Policy

The basic United States' foreign policies were gradually developed from a series of decisions often expressed in public statements by foreign affairs officials that date back to the formative years of the country. These decisions were often in response to events of international significance, external threat, warfare, commerce agreement, peace treaties, or were attempts to protect the national interests of the United States at the time. Consequently, many of these decisions shaped the development of foreign policy.⁶

Werner J. Feld, in his book, *American Foreign Policy: Aspirations and Reality* (1984), indicated that Marian D. Irish and Elke Frank offer the following definition of the United States' foreign policy:

The foreign policy of the United States refers to the courses of action which official U.S. policymakers determine to take, beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in order to secure and advance the national interests of the American people, and to enhance the power and prestige of the United States in world affairs.⁷

⁶ Feliks Gross, *Foreign Policy Analysis* (New York: Philosophical Library Inc., 1954), 46.

⁷ Werner J. Feld, *American Foreign Policy: Aspirations and Reality* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984), 2.

The purpose of the foreign policy of the United States is to protect, advance, and strengthen its national security interests around the world. To that end, the United States government has sought to build distinguished diplomatic relations, missions, and contacts with almost all nations in the world. In addition, the United States also established many relations with international governmental organizations such as the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Common Market, and the Organization of American States, and other international organizations such as the International Chamber of Commerce and the International Red Cross.⁸

Based on the above discussion, it is clear that the foreign policy of the United States is a complex process that is influenced by both constitutional law and pressure from private parties and the public at large. Traditionally, foreign policy is developed and implemented by both the President and Congress working in concert, but in practice can be initiated by either Congress or the President.⁹

The United States' Foreign Policy before World War II

In his famous, "Farewell Address" on September 17, 1796, President George Washington advised the following about how to conduct foreign affairs:

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her

⁸ Feld, *American Foreign Policy*, 3-4.

⁹ Ernest Simone, ed., *Foreign Policy of the United States*, vol. I. (Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2000), vii.

politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.¹⁰

Americans accepted Washington's isolationist advice for over one hundred years and opposed undue involvement in European, Asian, and African politics. The fact that the United States is also geographically removed from these regions made isolationism an even more attractive approach to foreign policy, especially during the first four decades of the Twentieth Century. In addition, at that time, the United States' military was still developing and thus opted to focus on developing its domestic affairs.¹¹

However, in contrast to its isolationist approach toward countries outside of the Western Hemisphere, during the early 1800s, the United States instituted a different foreign policy with regard to South America. On December 2, 1823, President James Monroe, in his Seventh Annual Message introducing his Monroe Doctrine to Congress stated:

... the American continents ... are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.... we should consider any attempt on [the European's] part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.¹²

The Monroe Doctrine instructed the European powers to stay out of the Western Hemisphere. In return, the United States would not meddle in European affairs. During

¹⁰ George Washington, "Farewell Address, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, September 17, 1796," in *Speeches of the American Presidents*, 2nd ed. eds. Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin (Bronx, NY: The H.W. Wilson Company, 2001), 24.

¹¹ Walter E. Volkmer, *American Government*, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1979), 370.

¹² James Monroe, *James Monroe, 1758-1831: Chronology, Documents, Bibliographical Aids*, ed. Ian Elliot (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1969), 60-69.

this period, the United States' foreign policy focused on protecting its national security interests by limiting European influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Succeeding the Spanish-American War of 1898, "the United States emerged as one of the imperial powers of the world, its territorial dominion and spheres of influence extending into the Pacific and Caribbean regions."¹³ As a direct result of the war, the United States gained Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands (which later achieved independence in 1946). In the years following the Spanish-American War, the United States returned to the isolationist policy which lasted until World War I.¹⁴ Thereafter, the United States temporarily left its traditional isolationist policy when it declared war against Germany on April 6, 1917. Although many Americans opposed the war and wanted to remain neutral, the United States joined its allies (Britain, France, and Russia) to fight in World War I. After the Great War, the United States returned to the isolationist tendencies until the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

The United States' Foreign Policy after World War II

On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked the American naval fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. This attack not only led the United States to be involved in the World War II, but also marked the end of American isolationism in foreign policy. As a result of their involvement in the war, the United States won the Second World War and emerged as a major world power.

¹³ Marian Doris Irish and Elke Frank, *U.S. foreign policy: Context, Conduct, Content* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 409.

¹⁴ Steffen W. Schmidt, Mack C. Shelley, II., and Barbara A. Bardes, *American Government and Politics Today* (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1985), 581.

At the end of World War II, delegates from fifty countries met in San Francisco, California at the United Nations Conference on International Organization to draft the United Nations Charter, signed on June 26, 1945. The United Nations then was officially formed on October 24, 1945. The United Nations Charter was ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States and by a mass of other signatories.¹⁵ The purpose of the United Nations was to create an international organization in which countries cooperated and problem-solved together to maintain international peace and security and to improve relationships between nations.¹⁶

During World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union were allies; however, this alliance and the cooperation during wartime ended with the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 12, 1945. Roosevelt's successor, Harry S. Truman, became the next President of the United States. By the end of April, the new administration quarreled with the Soviet Union about their sway over the United Nations and in Eastern Europe. Further, the spread of the Soviet armies into Hungary, Poland, Romania, and others created a military threat to the other countries in Western Europe. Truman's administration viewed this as a threat to the United States and its allies by extension. This period of unease between the two great powers in the post-World War II era is referred to as the Cold War.¹⁷

¹⁵ "History of the United Nations," United Nations, accessed September 5, 2014, <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/index.shtml>.

¹⁶ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice* (Mount Vernon, NY: The Peter Pauper Press, 1977), 7.

¹⁷ Volkomer, *American Government*, 371-72.

In response to these developments, Truman's administration adopted the policy of containment, which was articulated by American diplomat George F. Kennan, in Moscow, in February 1946. The primary goal of the containment policy was "to prevent any further expansion of the Soviet Union beyond the postwar boundaries of that nation and its satellites in Eastern Europe and Asia."¹⁸

Walter E. Volkomer, in his book, *American Government* (1979), states that "Kennan contended that communism expands by both military action and through the use of elections, propaganda, subversion, and other nonmilitary means where nations are politically, socially, and economically weak." Accordingly, the United States needed to address overt and subversive expansion methods. The United States' military was capable on the fighting front, but not so well prepared to fight propaganda and other non-military approaches used in politically and economically unstable countries.¹⁹

In this context, it is essential to point out that the policy of containment was the first major policy adopted by Truman's administration during the Cold War era to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union and the spread of international communism abroad. This policy continued to characterize the American foreign policy until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s.

In his speech before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman states:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own

¹⁸ Volkomer, *American Government*, 396.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 372.

destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid, which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.... Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East.²⁰

In this speech, which became known as Truman Doctrine, he asked Congress to support Greece's government in its civil war against the Greek Communist Party. At the same time, Truman asked Congress to provide economic assistance for Turkey as well.

Subsequent to the Truman Doctrine, in a famous speech at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, George C. Marshall, the Secretary of State in the Truman administration, proposed a plan in which the United States would provide immediate economic assistance to help restore the devastated economies of Western Europe following the close of World War II. Thereafter, in March 1948, the United States Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act (known as the Marshall Plan or the European Recovery Program), providing \$15 billion to rebuild Western European economies between 1948 and 1952. The Marshall Plan successfully enabled several Western European countries to reach their pre-war economic levels.²¹ It is important to note that the Marshall Plan was also designed to limit the expansion of communism in Western and Central Europe by shoring up weaker nations.

Following the implementation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the United States and its European allies founded NATO to counter the increasing threat of the Soviet Union's military in Europe. NATO created an alliance for collective defense as

²⁰ Harry S. Truman, "The Truman Doctrine, Washington DC, March 12, 1947," in *Speeches of the American Presidents*, 2nd ed. eds. Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin (Bronx, NY: The H.W. Wilson Company, 2001), 614.

²¹ Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, *The International Relations Dictionary*, 4th ed. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1988), 392.

defined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Furthermore, NATO was based on collective defense principle stated in Article 5: “The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”²² The NATO treaty was signed in Washington, DC on April 4, 1949, by the twelve founding members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. After the treaty was signed, Greece, Turkey, Germany, Spain, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, and Croatia became members.²³

The United States continued to use its containment policy to prevent the expansion of Soviet communism in Asia. Specifically, in the 1950’s the United States supported South Korea in its war against North Korea. After the Korean War ended, the United States turned its attention and efforts toward Vietnam to prevent it from falling under communist influence as well.

On January 5, 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed a joint session of Congress regarding his foreign policy toward the Middle East. As a result, Congress adopted a resolution that came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. Under this doctrine, the President was authorized to provide economic and military assistance to any Middle Eastern country threatened by “international communism.”

²² The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Facts and Figures*, 2nd ed. (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1969), 239.

²³ “Member Countries,” NATO, accessed September 23, 2014, <http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html#members>.

Additionally, in his “Special Message to Congress on the Situation in the Middle East,” President Eisenhower built on the notion of international communism:

... It would, first of all, authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence. It would, in the second place, authorize the Executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid. It would, in the third place, authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.²⁴

By April 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine was utilized when the United States believed that the life of King Hussein was being threatened by both international communism and nationalist opposition. In a swift response, President Eisenhower dispatched the United States’ Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean and announced a \$10 million emergency financial aid grant to Jordan.²⁵ This financial assistance paved the way for long-term relationship between the two nations.

In the following decade, mistrust between the United States and the Soviet Union increased significantly within the context of the Cold War. While there were no major incidents in the Middle East at that time, other events associated with the nuclear arms race, including the Soviet building of the Berlin wall, the United States’ unsuccessful

²⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower: “Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East,” January 5, 1957, The American Presidency Project, accessed September 30, 2014, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11007>.

²⁵ Michael A. Genovese, *Encyclopedia of the American Presidency: Revised Edition* (New York: Facts on File, 2010), 168.

invasion of Cuba in 1961, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, dominated John F. Kennedy's presidency.²⁶

In the early 1970s, the United States adopted a new pattern of foreign policy to cope with the Soviet Union, which shifted from a focus on containment to that of détente. Détente is a French word that means “relaxation of tension between two or more countries.”²⁷ The policy of détente was formalized by Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, to describe the improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the Moscow Summit of 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, signed several agreements to limit the development and deployment of the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs). As a result of these negotiations, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), was signed on May 26, 1972. Kissinger believed that if the United States and the Soviet Union became equal in acquiring nuclear weapons, then the chance of war between the two nations would be reduced. He also believed that establishing political, economic, social, and scientific relationships would help to further reduce tensions.²⁸

Following the policy of détente and avoiding a substantial nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union, the United States adopted the policy of deterrence. Deterrence “is based on the idea that a government, in calculating whether or not to undertake a certain foreign policy or a certain action, will not act if the probable outcome involves costs that

²⁶ Surratt, *The Middle East*, 87.

²⁷ Collin, *Dictionary of Government and Politics*, 87.

²⁸ Barbara A. Bardes, Mack C. Shelley, II., and Steffen W. Schmidt, *American Government and Politics Today: The Essentials* (Saint Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1991), 486.

will be too high compared to the anticipated gains.”²⁹ It can be argued that the policy of deterrence was successful in holding back the Soviet Union until its final collapse in the early 1990s. Today, deterrence marks the foreign policy of the United States.

In the context of the current policy of deterrence, Walter E. Volkomer, in his book, *American Government* (1979), explains that a war was not completely out of the question:

Most policy makers believe the threat of deterrence has made a planned war highly unlikely between the superpowers. But there remains the possibility that an attack might occur as a result of human error or accident.³⁰

During the era of President Jimmy Carter, negotiations over the limitations of offensive missiles continued. On June 17, 1979, Carter and Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II) in Vienna. SALT II limited both nations’ nuclear forces and placed a variety of other restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces, including Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs). However, this treaty was not approved by the United States Senate given the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in late 1979. Shortly thereafter, Carter’s doctrine was announced in his State of the Union address on January 23, 1980. In this doctrine, Carter states:

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.³¹

²⁹ Dunner, *Dictionary of Political Science*, 143.

³⁰ Volkomer, *American Government*, 375.

³¹ Jimmy Carter, “The Carter Doctrine: Third State of the Union Message, Washington, DC, January 23, 1980,” in *Speeches of the American Presidents*, 2nd ed. eds. Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin (Bronx, NY: The H.W. Wilson Company, 2001), 857.

President Carter warned that the United States would use military forces if necessary to protect its national interests in the Gulf region. It was also clear that Carter's policy was a direct response to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 and attempt to control the Soviet Union's possible expansion in the last decade of the Cold War. From the Soviet perspective, the invasion of Afghanistan significantly affected its vital interests in the Middle East region, especially within the Muslim nations.

To this point, Robin Surratt, the editor of *The Middle East* (2005), expounded upon the Soviet relations with the Arab states:

Islamic nations, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, regarded the invasion as proof of Soviet aggressiveness and lack of respect for Islam. The Soviet Union retained influence with some Arab states through its arms sales and its ability to act as a counterweight to the United States, but Soviet creditability was severely damaged. Saudi Arabia and the small Gulf states, in particular, moved toward a closer relationship with the United States in response to the Soviet invasion.³²

In January 1981, President Ronald Reagan entered office deeply suspicious of the Soviet Union. Two years later, in his famous "The Evil Empire" speech on March 8, 1983, President Reagan took a hardline stance against the Soviet Union.³³ On February 6, 1985, in his State of the Union address he said "... we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives---on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth....

³² Surratt, *The Middle East*, 99.

³³ Ronald Wilson Reagan, "The Evil Empire, Orlando, Florida, March 8, 1983," in *Speeches of the American Presidents*, 2nd ed. eds. Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin (Bronx, NY: The H.W. Wilson Company, 2001), 882-88.

Support for freedom fighters is self-defense and totally consistent with the OAS and U.N. Charters.”³⁴

President Reagan’s famous speech came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine, in which he supported the “Freedom Fighters.” It resulted in limiting Soviet-backed communist governments in Latin America, Asia, and Africa through overt and covert assistance. In Asia, Reagan’s administration provided Afghani rebels with American support to challenge Soviet occupation, to refute the Brezhnev Doctrine, and to reaffirm the military power of the United States.³⁵

In this regard, Reagan’s administration recognized Soviet Surrogates as ‘terrorist states’ as part of his vision for the Cold War security.³⁶ The administration then viewed North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, Iran, and Libya as nations breaking the international law and posing a substantial threat not only to world security but the United States’ national security interests as well.

The United States’ Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

The post-Cold War era began when the Soviet Union completely collapsed on December 31, 1991. The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union ended, the communist empire collapsed, and the Berlin Wall fell. While in office,

³⁴ Morgan James Publishing, 2004, *The State of the Union: A Tribute to Ronald Reagan*, n.p.: Morgan James Publishing, 112.

³⁵ James M. Scott, *Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 14.

³⁶ Alex Miles, *US Foreign Policy and the Rogue State Doctrine* (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 19.

American Presidents' George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton witnessed these post-Cold War era changes.

At the end of the Cold War, the Bush administration decided to keep America fully engaged in international affairs. The threat of so-called "Outlaw States" had been used as a justification for continued United States entanglement and leadership in the world arena. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 supported Bush's vision of a "New World Order" that required the United States to take a primary leadership role in world affairs in order to stand against countries that invade or violate other countries. The United States stepped up to provide global security, stability, and peace for the rest of the international community.³⁷

Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, in their book, *U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (1997), state the following about Presidents Bush and Clinton:

... each president has had to downsize the military and focus more attention on trade and commercial issues.... The major cuts in both the Bush and Clinton administrations were in strategic weapons systems and warheads and in theater weapons systems. Reductions in force, especially in Europe, have also followed. To a considerable extent, under both presidents attention has been given to high-technology conventional weapons systems and mobile forces. On the whole, the new posture is a sort of defense lite—mobile, conventionally armed, but high-tech forces.³⁸

Rather than an emphasis on foreign affairs, President Bill Clinton's priorities were on domestic issues including deficit reduction, health care, and welfare reform.³⁹

However, Clinton did have some success in foreign affairs. These successes included

³⁷ Miles, *US Foreign Policy*, 20.

³⁸ Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, *U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 34-35.

³⁹ Ripley and Lindsay, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 37.

trade agreements with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 and a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994. In the Middle East, Clinton was also able to promote compromise between Israeli and Palestinian leaders, albeit with marginal success, and the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic Republics of Estonia and Latvia in 1994.⁴⁰

Magid Shihade, in his article, “War on Terror, or Interests and Ideology? Reframing U.S. Foreign Policy before and after 9/11,” (2009), states:

Since September 11, the U.S. has been involved in a global “war on terror” mainly in Arab and Muslim countries. Not much has been altered in U.S. foreign policy despite the rhetoric of and hopes put on the new U.S. administration. Both U.S. administrations, the Republican and Democrat alike, have been using the carrot and the stick policy (or what is called in the academy, soft and hard power) to make sure that everyone falls in line with U.S. foreign policy agenda.⁴¹

After September 11, 2001, the nature of the United States’ foreign policy changed. The United States formally declared a “War on Terrorism.” President George W. Bush argued, in many speeches, that America has a right to defend itself from countries that host or support terrorism. After that, the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003--all in an attempt to get rid of terrorist organization and their leaders and to bring about stability to a region that is significant to continued, secure national interests.

⁴⁰ “Bill Clinton: Foreign Affairs,” Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, accessed October 13, 2014, <http://millercenter.org/president/biography/clinton-foreign-affairs>.

⁴¹ Magid Shihade, “War on Terror, or Interests and Ideology? Reframing U.S. Foreign Policy before and after 9/11,” *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences* 1, no. 3 (December 2009): 883.

Henry R. Nau, in his article, “Obama’s Foreign Policy,” (2010), states the following about President Barack H. Obama’s foreign policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan:

Obama put it bluntly in March 2009 when he announced his first new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan: America has “a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.” He narrowed this goal even further when he announced his second new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in December 2009: “We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government.” The goal is no longer *defeating* al Qaeda but *denying* it a safe haven and denying the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government.⁴²

Martin S. Indyk and others, in their article, “Scoring Obama’s Foreign Policy: A Progressive Pragmatist Tries to Bend History,” (2012), indicate that Obama’s foreign policy focused on the following:

He would refurbish the United States’ image abroad, especially in the Muslim world; end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; offer an outstretched hand to Iran; “reset” relations with Russia as a step toward ridding the world of nuclear weapons; elicit Chinese cooperation on regional and global issues; and make peace in the Middle East. By his own account, Obama sought nothing less than to bend history’s arc in the direction of justice and a more peaceful, stable world.⁴³

Finally, it is worth noting that the United States’ policy against terrorism has continued during the Obama presidency. The Obama administration has achieved some accomplishments in foreign affairs notably: killing the Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden (May 1, 2011), ousting the Qaddafi regime in Libya (October 20, 2011), withdrawing the United States’ military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, enabling the

⁴² Henry R. Nau, “Obama’s Foreign Policy,” *Policy Review*, no. 160 (April/May 2010): 30.

⁴³ Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Scoring Obama’s Foreign Policy: A Progressive Pragmatist Tries to Bend History,” *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 3 (May/June 2012): 29.

Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to take control of the Egyptian government, and increasing the United States' military assistance to Israel.⁴⁴

The United States' Foreign Policy Instruments

In order to achieve its national interests, the United States has used a number of foreign policy instruments to influence and control the behavior of other nation-states. The most notable foreign policy instruments: public diplomacy, foreign aid (economic and military), and military power.

Public Diplomacy

The International Relations Dictionary defines diplomacy as “the practice of conducting relations between states through official representatives. Diplomacy may involve the entire foreign relations process, policy formulation as well as execution. In this broad sense a nation's diplomacy and foreign policy are the same.”⁴⁵

Harold Nicolson, an English diplomat, defined diplomacy as “the ordered conduct of relations between one group of human beings and another group alien to themselves.”⁴⁶

Werner J. Feld, in his book, *American Foreign Policy: Aspirations and Reality* (1984), states:

Embassies as we know them now date from the middle of the fifteenth century and had their origin in northern Italy where, in 1455, the Duke of Milan announced his intension to establish the first permanent embassy abroad. The

⁴⁴ “Obama' Foreign Policy Successors,” Center for American Progress Action Fund, November 10, 2011, accessed October 31, 2014, <http://thinkprogress.org/report/obama-foreign-policy-successes/>.

⁴⁵ Plano and Olton, *The International Relations Dictionary*, 241.

⁴⁶ Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), 17.

legal bases for modern diplomatic practice, including the rules for the classification of ranks, came into being with the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and were finalized in their present form by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations in 1961.⁴⁷

As an aside, it should be noted that although diplomacy dates back millennia, the term “public diplomacy” is a comparatively new term that came into use during the 1960s. In the United States, public diplomacy is understood as “the means by which governments seek to advance their nations’ interests through understanding, informing and influencing broader publics in foreign countries.”⁴⁸

Michael Sheehan, in *Elements in Political Science* (1999), notes that public diplomacy is comprised of four key functions:⁴⁹

- i. To enable communications between political leaders and other entities engaged in international relations
- ii. To allow for the negotiation of agreements when the divergent interests of states seem to intersect, however slightly
- iii. To make it easier to gather intelligence or information about other countries
- iv. To temper differences between national interests in international relations

The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy defines public diplomacy as it “seeks to inculcate others with American values, promotes mutual understanding between the United States and other societies ... reduces the potential for

⁴⁷ Feld, *American Foreign Policy*, 138.

⁴⁸ “Public Diplomacy,” Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training, accessed November 9, 2014, <http://www.usdiplomacy.org/diplomacytoday/contemporary/public.php>.

⁴⁹ Sheehan, “International Relations,” 336.

conflict-military, political, and economic and dispels negative notions about the United States.”⁵⁰

On August 1, 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower fashioned the independent United States Information Agency (USIA) tasked with streamlining the government’s foreign information programs.⁵¹ From 1953 to 1999, the USIA was in charge of the United States’ public diplomacy efforts to obtain a better understanding of, and support for, American society and global foreign policy. The USIA made information accessible to the full range of citizens via a worldwide network of radio, television, films, libraries, and exhibitions. The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 ended the USIA and its activities were distributed to Department of State and a newly created independent International Broadcasting Board of Governors. The White House, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Defense (DOD), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are also considered as members of the United States’ public diplomacy community.⁵²

Secretary of State, Colin Powell viewed public diplomacy as a good way to promote the United States’ values and interests after the Cold War, especially considering technological advances in communication and information. The importance of public diplomacy increased exponentially following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

⁵⁰ United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Consolidation of USIA into the State Department: An Assessment after One Year* (Washington, DC: U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2000), 5.

⁵¹ John W. Henderson, *The United States Information Agency* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969), 52-53.

⁵² Eugene R. Wittkopf, Christopher M. Jones, and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, 7th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008), 135-36.

President Bush's administration and State Department officials felt they had "no choice but to be involved in the battle to win the hearts and minds of the world's people, particularly those living in places like the Middle East."⁵³

Foreign Aid

Foreign aid can be defined as assistance given to other countries to secure world peace, security, and humanitarian relief to further develop and advance both the receiving and giving countries. Foreign aid is viewed as vital to national security service as a strategic, economic, and moral necessity.⁵⁴ It promotes stability and at the same time serves as a means for influencing the development of other countries. Assistance includes technical support in addition to financial grants and loans. Financial aid then serves to create or expand global markets for the United States, as the grants are often used to buy American products or to repay American loans.⁵⁵ Thus, foreign aid is an important foreign policy instrument.

Many countries obtained their independence during the 1950s, but were unable to overcome existing economic deficiencies. Therefore, foreign aid was commonly used to gain an advantage in the Cold War by enticing economically fragile countries to support either the Western or the Communist World. Similarly, newly independent countries also expertly pitted the United States against the Soviet Union and China to maximize the amount of aid they could procure. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the competition for

⁵³ Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley, Jr., *American Foreign Policy*, 136.

⁵⁴ "What is U.S. Government Foreign Assistance?," ForeignAssistance.gov, accessed November 21, 2014, <http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/>.

⁵⁵ Welch et al., *American Government*, 653.

foreign aid waned and became available from all economically advanced countries. Some politically motivated foreign aid continues to be doled out to maintain relationships that could influence voting support within the United Nations or other international situations.⁵⁶

Economic Aid

Foreign aid can include economic aid and military assistance. The first United States' economic aid program took shape after World War II, when George C. Marshall provided significant aid to Europe after the war to rebuild the economic, social, and political infrastructures.⁵⁷ The motive was to restore a market for American products and enhance Europe's ability to resist communist subversion. During the Korean War, the emphasis shifted from recovery to containment and from Europe to Asia.⁵⁸

This led to the creation of other foreign assistance programs that spun off the achievements of the Marshall Plan. The next landmark for United States' foreign economic aid was in 1961, when President John F. Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act into law. This act allowed for the creation of the USAID, marking a significant increase in United States' foreign economic aid and enabled a focus on long-term global economic and social development.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Feld, *American Foreign Policy*, 151.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 131.

⁵⁹ ForeignAssistance.gov, "U.S. Government Foreign Assistance?."

Joan M. Nelson, in her book, *Aid Influence and Foreign Policy* (1968), perceived foreign aid as a major instrument:

Foreign aid has become a major instrument of U.S. foreign policy throughout the underdeveloped world. In many countries, it is the primary instrument relied upon to protect and promote central U.S. interests. As a result, the economic assistance program has come to serve and to reflect the full range of U.S. interests in the developing countries. These interests are as humanitarian as relieving poverty and disease; as manipulative as attempting to influence the outcome of an election; as ephemeral as concern over the tenor of remarks of tomorrow's U.N. General Assembly session; as long-run as investment in a country's capacity to maintain growth without external aid.... This multipurpose nature of [foreign] aid is a major cause of uncertainty about its goals and its effectiveness.⁶⁰

In the post-Cold War era, the Soviet Union threat declined and subsequently so did the level of foreign aid. The consensus about efficacy and necessity of foreign aid waned, and, therefore, doubts about the continued utility of foreign economic aid as a tool grew. Even without the Cold War as a reason to provide aid, remaining security concerns are a primary motivator for continued use of foreign aid.⁶¹

Early in President Bush's administration, the United States' approach began to change. However, the Bush administration did not use foreign aid to firm up its tactical plan against terrorism until after the events of 9/11. Israel and Egypt have been the most consistent beneficiaries, but other countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Colombia, Jordan, Kenya, and Sudan benefitted from the United States' foreign aid in 2004. Foreign aid to these additional countries has continued to increase since 1995 to the point that it has exceeded Japan regarding providing aid around the

⁶⁰ Joan M. Nelson, *Aid, Influence, and Foreign Policy* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), 1.

⁶¹ Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley, Jr., *American Foreign Policy*, 119.

world.⁶² This shift in provision of aid over the course of nearly two decades highlights the increased awareness of the utility of aid as a tool for fighting terrorism.

Foreign aid has clearly rebounded from its low levels in the mid-1990's, but how foreign aid will be doled out in the future will primarily depend on the United States' focus on the war on terrorism and how important it is to American interests and security as well as Middle Eastern stability. Without clear unrest, a threat to the United States or one of its allies, foreign aid may well drop off again in the future. It remains to be seen.⁶³

Eugene R. Wittkopf and others, in their book, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process* (2008), linked foreign aid to antiterrorism efforts after the events of 9/11:

More recently, [US foreign] aid policy has been linked with antiterrorism policies around the world, as donors try to address the roots of terrorist causes by promoting development and increasing political stability.⁶⁴

Post-September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush administration increased the foreign aid budget and started a wide bureaucratic reform that included assuring Department of State and USAID's control over all foreign aid programs and the creation of other foreign aid projects, innovating operational models. In order to provide foreign economic aid, a number of different agencies since World War II have been engaged. Most prominently, the USAID administers American economic aid programs. By 2005, the USAID was separated into nine programs: Child Survival and Health Programs (CSH); Development Assistance (DA); Economic Support Fund (ESF); Transition Initiatives (TI); FREEDOM Support Act (FSA); Support for East European Democracy

⁶² Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley, Jr., *American Foreign Policy*, 123.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 118.

(SEED); Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI); Millennium Challenge Account (MCA); and Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR).⁶⁵

In 2010, President Obama signed the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development, which sought an integrated national security approach of promoting development, diplomacy, and defense. The directive governed United States' efforts to support development worldwide and directed all United States government agencies responsible for managing and implementing foreign assistance.⁶⁶ Through this directive, over 100 countries received foreign aid from such government agencies. These investments promoted the American interests of free market expansion, combating extremism, stabilizing democratic governments, and eliminating poverty. This was all done while fostering an ideal of good will throughout the world.⁶⁷


Additionally, it is important to point out that the United States' foreign aid has been directed to the following region of the world: Africa north of Sahara, Europe, Far East Asia, Middle East, North and Central America, Oceania, South America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.⁶⁸ (*see Table 1*).

⁶⁵ Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley, Jr., *American Foreign Policy*, 119-21.

⁶⁶ ForeignAssistance.gov, "U.S. Government Foreign Assistance?."


⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Judith Randel, Tony German, and Deborah Ewing, eds., *The Reality of Aid 2000: An Independent Review of Poverty Reduction and Development Assistance* (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2000), 80.

Table 1. Depicts Where the United States' Foreign Aid Was Spent 1965-1995

Source: Data adapted from Randel, German, and Ewing, *Reality of Aid 2000*, 80.

Finally, the United States' foreign aid was spent on the following pivotal sectors: agriculture, basic education, education, health, population, emergency aid, government and civil society, other, program assistance, transport and industry, and water supply and sanitation.⁶⁹(see Table 2).

Table 2. Depicts the Sectors on Which the United States Spent Foreign Aid 1965-1995

Source: Data adapted from Randel, German, and Ewing, *Reality of Aid 2000*, 80.

⁶⁹Randel, German, and Ewing, *Reality of Aid 2000*, 80.

Military Assistance

Military assistance includes grants, credits, or loans offered by the United States to other friendly countries to purchase arms, defense equipment, services, and training. In this context, it is important to note that since the early days of the Cold War, the United States' military assistance programs to less-developed countries have become a major instrument for America to enhance national security interests abroad.

Marian D. Irish and Elke Frank, in their book, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Context, Conduct, Content* (1975), stated:

The Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, terminated the traditional policy of U.S. neutrality with regard to foreign wars. It embraced the new principle, that American security could and should be promoted by supplying military assistance to nations at war with potential enemies of the United States.⁷⁰

Chester J. Pach, Jr., in his book, *Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1950* (1991), indicated:

... after the end of the Second World War, American officials had made ambitious plans to provide military assistance to several foreign nations. In the spring of 1946 President Harry S. Truman asked Congress to approve long-term arms aid to the Philippines, China, and Latin America. He also requested authority to send military advisers to any foreign country whenever he thought that such help would advance the national interest.⁷¹

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 was established a legal foundation for economic and military assistance. In 1961, the Foreign Assistance Act authorized military assistance and since that time, the Military Assistance Program (MAP) has served as the

⁷⁰ Irish and Frank, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 476.

⁷¹ Chester J. Pach, Jr., *Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1950* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 7.

main way that countries receive military assistance. Also, this military assistance was provided for through grants that did not require repayment by recipients.⁷²

The United States' military assistance program contained three distinctive variations: (i) Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS) that provided loans and grants to foreign countries in order to buy military arms and training from the United States; (ii) Military Assistance Program (MAP) that provided funds in the form of grants for the purpose of buying American-made arms; and (iii) International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) that provided military training for foreign countries' armed forces. It should be noted that many underdeveloped countries have received multiple kind of military assistance.⁷³

Today, the FMS program represents one of the most important components of the United States' military assistance program to other nations as evidenced by reports from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). In FY 2014, out of a total of \$34.2 billion in sales, government-to-government sales were more than ten times greater than non-FMS cases, with government-to-government sales totaling \$31.2 billion compared to only \$3 billion for sales managed under other security cooperation authorities.⁷⁴ Thus, this is a highly utilized tool for building relationships with other foreign nations, achieving national security interests and foreign policy goals, facilitating sales of United

⁷² Feld, *American Foreign Policy*, 153.

⁷³ Frances Moore Lappé, Rachel Schurman, and Kevin Danaher, *Betraying the National Interest* (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1987), 28.

⁷⁴ "Fiscal Year 2014 Foreign Military Sales Exceed \$30B," Defense Security Cooperation Agency, accessed November 29, 2014, <http://www.dsca.mil/news-media/news-archive/fiscal-year-2014-foreign-military-sales-exceed-30b>.

States arms, defense equipment and services, and finally providing military training to foreign nations.

The United States has extended its military assistance to its allies in order to build a greater military coalition of allies and thereby minimize threats to its national security interests abroad. Moreover, this also can help promote and enhance the United States' economic interests through defense industry sales. The World Policy Institute concluded that more money is spent providing loans and grants for arms purchased from American sellers: "One-half billion dollars of U.S. tax dollars are spent each year to promote arms sales, while \$3.2 billion in grants, \$800 million in loans, and additional millions in foreign aid are used to fund arms purchases from U.S. sellers."⁷⁵

In the Middle East, Israel remains the largest recipient country of the United States' military assistance since the end of World War II. "To date, the United States has provided Israel \$124.3 billion ... in bilateral assistance. Almost all U.S. bilateral aid to Israel is in the form of military assistance, although in the past Israel also received significant economic assistance."⁷⁶ The 1979 Camp David peace agreements between Israel and Egypt provided security and economic support to each country. In the Middle East, past recipients include Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. In fact, since the Camp David agreement, the Middle East has received approximately half of the United States' financial assistance, security, and economic benefits.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ World Policy Institute, quoted in Welch et al., *American Government*, 648.

⁷⁶ Jeremy M. Sharp, *U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel*, CRS Report RL33222 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, June 10, 2015), n. pag.

⁷⁷ Eric J. Labs, *The Role of Foreign Aid in Development* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 1997), 10.

It is essential to note that the United States' foreign aid began in World War I with a United States contribution of 6% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) toward the war in Europe. The foreign aid program continued with the "Lead-Lease" in World War II, providing as much as 5% of the nation's GDP in 1945. The rescue of Europe via the Marshall Plan and the Korean War kept foreign aid at or above 2% of United States' national GDP. Later, aid to those nations fighting the Soviets kept foreign aid at above 1.4% of the GDP during the 1950s. It was not until 1962 that the federal budget data began presenting economic and military aid separately, and the data shows a sharp decline in the GDP from 1% to 0.4% in 1970. In the 1970s and 1980s, foreign aid hovered around 0.4%. After 1985, foreign aid to other countries further fell to 0.2% of the GDP. Finally, in 2010, foreign aid ticked up a bit to 0.3% of the GDP.⁷⁸

Military Power

Michael Sheehan, in *Elements in Political Science* (1999), states that military power is a strong foreign policy tool:

Military power is an important foreign policy instrument. It can be used to back up threats, to demonstrate strength ('showing the flag'), to intervene in, if not to actually instigate, international or civil war, to support allied or client states and to subjugate foreign populations. It is a contributor to national [security] prestige and a shield behind which other [foreign] policy instruments can come into play.⁷⁹

In April 7, 1950, the National Security Council (NSC) issued its famous, top-secret memorandum (NSC-68). "This document set in motion the militarization of

⁷⁸ "US Defense Spending History: Foreign Aid," [usgovernmentsspending.com](http://www.usgovernmentsspending.com), accessed December 7, 2014, http://www.usgovernmentsspending.com/defense_spending.

⁷⁹ Sheehan, "International Relations," 339.

American foreign policy and the containment strategy that would persist for decades.”⁸⁰ 62

The (NSC-68) was written by the United States’ Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff at the beginning of the Cold War. The authors of (NSC-68) indicated in their report on the substantial threat of the Soviet Union to the United States’ national security and interests around the world. They also informed the United States’ policymakers that the Soviet Union was building up its military arsenal capacity, including nuclear weapons, and would soon be a great power house. Furthermore, they contended that “the best course of action was to respond in kind with a massive build-up of the U.S. military and its weaponry.”⁸¹ Finally, they suggested that the United States should build a superior military strength, but not actually use it. Rather, a nonmilitary countermeasure against the Soviet Union was recommended.

During the Cold War, military power emerged as an important instrument of American foreign policy. Since that time, the United States has been heavily dependent on military power to defend its national security interests from the threat of Soviet communism. To that end, the United States has deployed its military forces in many regions including Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, South Vietnam, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Also, the United States sought to ensure the security of its allies around the globe.

In this regard, it is important to point out that there were 226 mobilizations of American troops between 1946 and 1976, most of which were in the Near and the Far

⁸⁰ Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley, Jr., *American Foreign Policy*, 75.

⁸¹ “NSC-68, 1950,” US Department of State Office of the Historian, accessed December 19, 2014, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NSC68>.

East and Western Hemisphere to achieve its political objectives.⁸² Further, in the first decades of the Cold War, the United States heavily relied on nuclear deterrence “to achieve the ultimate goal of avoiding defeat or destruction by a foreign power.”⁸³ The best example of this is the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Thereafter, during the Carter and Reagan eras, spending on nuclear weapons increased, generating a nuclear race between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States’ defense spending declined during the 1990s, but increased in the 2000s during the “War on Terrorism” during the George W. Bush administration.

At the height of the Arms Race during the Regan administration, 6.8% of the GDP was allocated to defense spending. This began to trend down prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and, following its collapse, spending subsequently dropped further at 6% of the GDP in 1990; just under 4% in 1996; and bottoming out at 3.5% in 2001. This was nearly half the level of that in 1985. This trend would once again reverse itself with the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, when there was an increase to 4.6% of the GDP in 2005 up to 5% during the intensification of operations during the “surge” of 2008 in the Iraq War. Unsurprisingly, this increased further with the renewed efforts in Afghanistan throughout 2011, topping out at 5.7%. Considering the expected reduction in forces and the downsizing of the

⁸² Paul E. Johnson et al., *American Government: People, Institutions, and Policies*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), 734.

⁸³ Welch et al., *American Government*, 642.

United States' military, spending is expected to decline to 4.5% of the GDP by the close of 2015 and continued gradual reduction of spending to 3.8% of the GDP by 2020.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ "US Defense Spending History: Recent Defense Spending," [usgovernmentpending.com](http://www.usgovernmentpending.com), accessed December 31, 2014, http://www.usgovernmentpending.com/defense_spending.

CHAPTER III

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY

The Middle East has continued to be a primary attention of the United States' foreign policy since World War II. Culturally, the region has numerous similarities with the West, dating back to the time of the Crusades in the Middle Ages and continuing through modern history with the efforts of the Western missionaries and their educational activities. The Middle East consists of portions of three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. The land possesses vital resources including oil and waterways.¹

In this chapter, the researcher will divide the United States' presence in the Middle East into three distinct periods: the first ends in 1914; the second begins after 1919, and the third begins after 1945.

The United States' Foreign Policy toward the Middle East before World War I

American trade with the Middle East dates back more than two hundred years. In fact, commercial contacts between Smyrna (an ancient city in Turkey) and Boston began as early as 1767, when Smyrna products (most notably figs) appeared in America.

¹ George Lenczowski, "U.S. Policy in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects," in *To Promote Peace: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Mid-1980s*, ed. Dennis L. Bark (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), 163.

Thereafter, an American trading house was established in Smyrna in 1811, laying the groundwork for the first American Ottoman treaty that was signed on May 7, 1831.²

Supporting the above-mentioned argument, Julius W. Pratt, in his book, *A History of United States Foreign Policy* (1972), stated the following about the United States' interests in the Middle East region before World War I:

Prior to World War I American interest in the Middle East—the land of the Bible and of the origins of the Christian religion—had been chiefly religious and archeological. American traders, too, had early found their way to the eastern Mediterranean and the ports of the Persian Gulf, but such trade had never been large.³

American religious groups, especially Presbyterians, conducted multiple missions in the Middle East that were not only religious, but charitable and medical as well. The American missionaries in the Middle East appeared as early as 1820, when the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions established the first American religious mission in the region. The American missionaries and philanthropic organizations began going to the Middle East to carry out their ministries to the population.

These missionaries, however, were unable to convert many Muslims or Jews to Christianity, but instead influenced and modernized education in the region; establishing outstanding institutions such as Robert College in Turkey founded in 1863, Syrian Protestant College, later renamed American University of Beirut (AUB) founded in 1866, Istanbul Women's College founded in 1871, and The American University of Cairo

² Harry N. Howard, "The United States and the Middle East," in *The Middle East in World Politics: A Study in Contemporary International Relations*, ed. Tareq Y. Ismael (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1974), 117-18.

³ Julius W. Pratt, *A History of United States Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), 514.

founded in 1919.⁴ The AUB “became (at least in some fields) the most outstanding institution of higher learning in the Middle East. By the end of the nineteenth century, AUB was a highly influential center for the emergence and promotion of Arab nationalism.”⁵ Contributions to higher education made America popular in the eyes of the local populace, and the lack of the American political motivation strengthened the general goodwill toward American democracy.⁶

In light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that before World War I the United States’ contact with the Middle East region was limited to commercial, missionary, and educational activities. The demise of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I placed the entire region of the Middle East under European influence. Egypt, Iraq, Palestine, Sudan, and Transjordan were under the British mandate, while the North African states, Lebanon, and Syria were under the French mandate. The Gulf region was under the British influence as well. In this context, it is important to point out that, during the period between the two world wars, some states in the region achieved a nominal independence with the Europeans maintaining only some influences until the end of World War II. The European colonialism significantly delayed the Arab dreams to establish their own independence under one unified nation-state. In contrast, the United States showed little interest in international affairs in general during and after World War I. This was especially the case in the Middle East region, as ‘isolationism’ was the

⁴ Howard, “United States and the Middle East,” 117.

⁵ Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., *American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age*, 4th ed. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1983), 399.

⁶ George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 4th ed. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1980), 792.

predominant feature of the United States' foreign policy until Japan bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

The United States' Foreign Policy toward the Middle East after World War I

During and after World War I, the American political thoughts, ideas, and principles were appealing to the Middle East. In addition, President Woodrow Wilson's concept of "self-determination" of nations was essential and supportive to the rights of peoples to decide to have their own political destiny. These concepts were very attractive to the Arabs nationalists' dreams to attain independence. Moreover, the Wilsonian ideas "... provided a stimulus to Arab nationalism in the years ahead. Until the creation of the State of Israel (in 1948), the United States enjoyed widespread prestige and admiration in the Arab world."⁷

In 1917, President Woodrow Wilson's administration endorsed a letter that was sent from the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, to Lord Lionel Rothschild, a British Zionist leader, to establish a "national home" for Jewish people in Palestine. Then, in 1922, a joint resolution of Congress voted unopposed for this "Mandate for Palestine." This mandate validated Jewish claims to settle Palestine anywhere from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. Nearly two months later, on September 21, 1922, President Warren G. Harding signed the joint resolution to confirm the establishment of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine.⁸

⁷ Crabb, Jr., *American Foreign Policy*, 400.

⁸ Eli E. Hertz, "The U.S. Congress in 1922," Myths and Facts Inc., March 7, 2008, accessed January 1, 2015, http://www.mythsandfacts.org/article_view.asp?articleID=100.

In the aftermath of World War I, even though the Middle East region was under heavy European influence, American contacts, especially petroleum companies, with the region increased steadily. While American companies gained only a partial interest in companies in Iran and Kuwait, they attained full control in Saudi Arabia and the Bahrain Island.⁹

Gaddis Smith, in his book, *American Diplomacy during the Second World War, 1941-1945* (1966), notes that the United States' interest in the Middle East between the two world wars was not political:

Between the [two world] wars American economic and humanitarian interests in the [Middle East] region grew, but politically the United States remained only slightly involved. Meanwhile, the Arabs countries, recent appendages of the Ottoman Empire, acquired varying degrees of nominal independence while chafing under British or France Control.¹⁰

George Lenczowski, in his book, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (1980), describes the important role the United States' involvement played in the Middle East during the period of 1941-1945:

During the ... period (1941-1945) the United States suddenly developed multiple contacts with the Middle East as a result of the war emergency.... American troops appeared in Iran to handle the supplies to Russia; they also came to Egypt and Palestine, mainly to accomplish various technical tasks connected with the American armor with which the British army was being equipped. The American navy and merchant marine played a vital role in conveying supplies to the Middle East theater.... This military tie with the area was strengthened by several economic measures: the United States extended lend lease to most of the Middle Eastern countries, gave active support and guidance to the Middle East Supply Center, and took an active interest in the interim arrangements concerning oil production.... The government also grew more alert to the political problems of the Middle East.... The United States had shown friendly helpfulness to Saudi

⁹ Pratt, *A History of United States Foreign Policy*, 516.

¹⁰ Gaddis Smith, *American Diplomacy during the Second World War, 1941-1945* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), 100.

Arabia at the time of her economic crisis, and to Syria and Lebanon in their struggle for emancipation.¹¹

Based on this source, the period between the two world wars shows that the United States remained only slightly involved in the Middle Eastern affairs from a political standpoint; on the other hand, the United States had established multiple economic contacts within the Middle East region. The American petroleum companies negotiated a number of concessions in Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. During World War II, the United States' presence in the Middle East increased. In addition, the United States government paid closer attention to the region's significant oil reserve and began to reevaluate its importance to American and Allied security interests but, "It was not until the end of the [Second World] war that the area came to assume any real significance in U.S. foreign policy."¹²

The United States' Foreign Policy toward the Middle East after World War II

The United States' political presence in the Middle East did not intensify until the end of World War II. Prior to that, three indirect occurrences may be cited in this regard: "(i) Iran was used as a transit route for the sending of Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union from 1941-1945; (ii) Aramco, the Arabian-American Oil Company, was

¹¹ Lenczowski, *The Middle East*, 793-94.

¹² Tareq Y. Ismael, *International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East: A Study in World Politics* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 135-36.

established in Saudi Arabia in 1938; (iii) America influenced the Arab nationalist movement in the early 1920s through its domestic ideals.”¹³

Tareq Y. Ismael, in his book, *International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East: A Study in World Politics* (1986), states that:

The United States began to develop a political presence in the Middle East during World War II. Even before the American entry into the war, President Roosevelt expressed his concern over the protection of Turkish territorial integrity from possible German encroachment. Later, U.S. troops took part in the occupation of Iran and in the North Africa campaign.¹⁴

At the end of World War II, a new balance of power prevailed in the international arena. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the only two superpowers in the international system. The main European powers (Britain and France) faced substantial economic difficulties and were no longer capable of playing their traditional leading roles in the Middle East. In the early 1940s, President Roosevelt and his administration initially expected that Britain would remain the security chief in the region. However, by the spring of 1944 observers reported, “Soviet policy in the Arab world appears to be aimed at the reduction of British influence in that area and the acquisition of the balance of power.” Then, on May 8, 1945, State Department personnel determined that Britain was unable to maintain the Soviet Union and realized the United States might have to take charge of “fostering the economic advancement of the Middle East people” and “facilitating freedom from external interference and exploitation.”¹⁵

¹³ Alan M. Jones, Jr., *U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1973), 184.

¹⁴ Ismael, *International Relations*, 135-36.

¹⁵ Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 119-20.

After World War II, the Kremlin wanted to spread its influence along Russia's southern border. In 1941, Josef Stalin, who had held power in Moscow for nearly twenty years, ordered Soviet troops into Iran and increased diplomatic pressure on Turkey, which had previously refused the "Red Navy" to cross the Dardanelles (the channels between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean). By the fall of 1945, the United States' policymakers expected the worst. "The British publicly admit that they are no longer able to keep the Middle East in order without ... [US] help," The State Department cautioned the President that "Soviet Russia is showing marked interest in the area." If the United States did not respond "firmly and adequately," another world war might result. Washington, responded by issuing the Truman Doctrine in 1947 that indicated that the United States would take over Britain's commitment to Greece and Turkey.¹⁶

In the mid-1950s, concern regarding possible Soviet expansion in the Middle East region motivated Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to seek out allies in the states closest to the Soviet Union.¹⁷ In February 1955, the United States' efforts resulted in formation of the Baghdad Pact Organization (also known as the Middle East Treaty Organization [METO]). METO was formed by Iraq, Turkey, Britain, Pakistan, and Iran. The main purpose of METO was to limit possible Soviet Union expansion in the Middle East region.

¹⁶ Little, *American Orientalism*, 119-20.

¹⁷ Lenczowski, "U.S. Policy in the Middle East," 164-65.

After ten years of Anglo-Arab confrontations, the United States' policymakers presented the Eisenhower Doctrine, making Washington a high-ranking member of the Anglo-American association in 1957.¹⁸ The Eisenhower Doctrine was made in response to the 1956 Suez War, the Soviet Union's infiltration of the Arab states, and to limit Nasser's broad pan-Arabism. Following the 1958 Lebanon crisis, Baghdad Pact members, except Iraq, endorsed American intervention in Lebanon. In 1959, Iraq withdrew from METO resulting in METO to be renamed as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and its headquarters to be moved from Baghdad to Ankara. The United States' support to CENTO continued as a non-signatory associate until it completely dissolved in 1979.¹⁹

Through the 1960's, Britain continued to experience financial difficulties and was eventually forced to give up its remaining imperial stations in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf region. It was at this time that American officials began moving toward what would come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine, which appointed countries in the region, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, to join in the opposition against the Soviet Union. However, when the appointed Middle Eastern countries proved they were ultimately unable to effectively fill this role, Jimmy Carter created his own doctrine and "informed the world in January 1980 that the United States had vital security interests in the Middle East for which it was willing to fight, whether it had dependable partners or not."²⁰

¹⁸ Little, *American Orientalism*, 119-20.

¹⁹ "The Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)," US Department of State Archive, accessed January 4, 2015, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/98683.htm>.

²⁰ Little, *American Orientalism*, 119-20.

George Lenczowski, in his article, “U.S. Policy in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects,” (1984), states:

Since World War II, three major issues have compelled the United States to pay close attention to the [Middle East] region: the Soviet [Union] threat, oil [reserves proven], and [the] Palestine [Question].²¹

It is important to point out that since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States had developed several policies, strategies, and tactics to limit possible Soviet expansion in the world and in the Middle East region in particular. Containment, détente, and deterrence were among the most notable policies during the context of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, the Cold War era came to an end and the Soviet Union threat to the region ended, with the impact of international communism at its lowest in decades. As a result of the Cold War, the United States remained as the sole dominant superpower in the post-Cold War era. Hegemony, leadership, primacy, and military power clearly marked American foreign policy in international affairs in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century.

The goal of ensuring secure access to oil resources in the Middle East region, especially in the Arab oil-rich states and the Palestine Question, motivated the United States’ presence in the region since early in the twentieth century. These incentives just scratched the surface of what would be a much deeper involvement in the Middle East from the fall of the Soviet Union to the present.

²¹ Lenczowski, “U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” 163.

The United States' Foreign Policy Interests in the Middle East

John W. Amos II, in his article, "The Middle East: The Problem of Quarantine," (1976), summarized the United States' interests in the Middle East, expressed at various times by different American officials:

Avoidance of a superpower confrontation over the Middle East; Securing strategic access to the Mediterranean; Preservation of access to the area's oil resources; Preservation of the stability of the area; Prevention of outside influence from penetrating the area, especially Soviet and, secondarily, Chinese influence; Defending the integrity of Israel and those Arab states that are pro-Western in outlook and policy.²²

Following the end of World War II, United States' interests in the Middle East grew exponentially, and this involvement continues today. American interests in the region include: securing strategic access to oil in the Gulf region; supporting and protecting Israel's sovereignty; maintaining the United States' military bases, especially those in the Gulf states; defending client-states and friendly regimes; and resisting Islamic movements and terrorist groups such as Hamas, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and many others that might affect American and their allies' interests in the region.

Securing Strategic Access to Oil in the Gulf Region

The primary interest of the United States in the Middle East region is to assure American access to oil. Oil, however, was not considered important until the end of the nineteenth century. The First Industrial Revolution that began in the last decades of the eighteenth century was fueled by water power and then by coal. The Second Industrial Revolution was driven by the surge of readily available and comparatively cheap oil that

²² John W. Amos II, "The Middle East: The Problem of Quarantine," in *Foreign Policy and U.S. National Security Major Postelection Issues*, ed. William W. Whitson (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1976), 76.

became a growing necessity in the world's rapidly expanding petroleum based economies. This spurred an insatiable thirst for fresh supplies of crude and new markets in which to expand. In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the petroleum industry and the consumption of oil-based products developed rapidly across the world and particularly in Europe and North America. At the time, the main sources of oil were Russia, the United States, Mexico, and Romania.²³

Further expounding upon the rapid growth of the oil industry in the 1900s, Dankwart A. Rustow, in his book, *Oil and Turmoil: America Faces OPEC and the Middle East* (1982), reports that the oil industry advanced rapidly:

Since the days of the First World War, the petroleum industry has advanced rapidly. The Global automobile fleet increased sixteenfold from 1924 to 1978. In the First World War, the battleships began to run on oil, and planes and tanks made their debut.... between 1880 and 1970, the world's petroleum consumption doubled approximately every ten years. [In the Middle East, the] Western governments, too, showed an active [concession] interest. In 1913, as the Royal Navy was rapidly converting its boilers from coal to oil, the British Treasury acquired a majority interest in the petroleum concession earlier obtained by an Australian in Iran. In the peace settlement of 1919, the British agreed to transfer the German one-quarter share in the concession covering Iraq to the French; and in 1922, in response to State Department pressure for an "open door" to Americans, a further one-quarter to two United States oil companies.²⁴

In this context, it should be noted that in the early twentieth century, the petroleum industries flourished all over the world, but most especially in Europe and North America. During World War I, major world powers began to prioritize oil as a vital military asset; modern warfare caused a constant need for oil and its subsidiary petroleum based products which were a necessity for ships, airplanes, tanks, submarines, and the

²³ James L. Gelvin, *The Modern Middle East: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 247-48.

²⁴ Dankwart A. Rustow, *Oil and Turmoil: America Faces OPEC and the Middle East* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1982), 93.

lubrication of modern rifles. This heavy use of oil during World War I created a severe shortage in 1917-1918.²⁵

Following World War I, several Western companies gained mutual concession in the Middle East, especially in Iran, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The idea behind these joint concessions was to negotiate solutions to incompatible political and business agendas and to make entrepreneurial explorations safer. At the close of the Second World War, the United States government became wary about cutbacks in oil production and the possible economic hiccups that would stem from a fuel shortage. To prevent a fuel shortage, the United States made economic demands for concessions with multiple Middle Eastern countries. This requirement started in the pre-war years with concessions in Bahrain (1929), Kuwait (1934), and Saudi Arabia (1947). These concessions were shared by multiple oil companies.²⁶

In 1948, following American demands, several companies were developed to exploit these concessions. The Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) was created by Esso (now Exxon), Texaco, Standard Oil of California (Socal), and Mobil all came into existence to develop the Saudi concessions. These companies soon surveyed and developed large production fields that allowed them to harvest massive profits from low-cost oil that would be used to rebuild the economies of Europe and Japan that had been destroyed during World War II. The boom eventually brought this cheap oil to United States shores and stimulated the growth of the post-war American economy, which

²⁵ James A. Paul, "Great Power Conflict over Iraqi Oil: The World War I Era," *Global Policy Forum*, (October 2002), accessed January 5, 2015, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/185-general/40479-great-power-conflict-over-iraqi-oil-the-world-war-i-era.html>.

²⁶ Rustow, *Oil and Turmoil*, 92-93.

reiterated the desire for more United States companies to seek concessions in Kuwait, Iran, and other oil producers in the region.²⁷

Meanwhile, as the development of the Middle Eastern concessions increased, the United States oil production began to decrease in ratio to its increased consumption. This grew to as much as 30% of the world's total consumption of crude oil with only an estimated 6% of the world's reserves.²⁸

Supporting the analysis above, Roy Leblicher and other authors, in their book, *Aramco Handbook* (1960), indicate that the United States was unlikely to produce enough oil to meet their needs:

... the United States, is unlikely to produce enough oil to meet its own future requirements, it must look to other parts of the free world for sources of supply to meet rising demand.... the possibility that the United States ... might have to look abroad for a portion of its petroleum requirements became a matter of concern to the Government and to American oil companies.²⁹

Following World War II, the United States began looking for alternative sources of oil abroad to meet its own future demands. The Middle East was very attractive to both the United States government and American petroleum companies due to its proven long-term oil reserves. Arab oil reserves were shown to potentially have much more than the originally estimated 60% of the world oil reserves. In fact, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi possessed more than 50% of the known reserves amongst themselves

²⁷ Diller, *The Middle East*, 109.

²⁸ Marwan Iskandar, *The Arab Oil Question*, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Middle East Economic Consultants, 1974), 55.

²⁹ Roy Leblicher, George Rentz, and Max Steineke, *Aramco Handbook* (New York: Arabian American Oil Company, 1960), 106.

alone.³⁰ To attest to this high quality Middle Eastern oil was known to flow freely of its own pressure. This circumstance allowed for much cheaper production costs; the Middle East per production barrel ranged between \$0.10 and \$0.22 cents in comparison to \$0.39 cents in Venezuela, and as much as \$1.51 per barrel in the United States. This is a considerable difference when it comes to the bottom line.³¹

James L. Gelvin, in his book, *The Modern Middle East: A History* (2005), indicates that among the most notable objectives of the United States in the Middle East region is to assure Western access to oil. The reasons for this are twofold: first, economic reasons are primary, and second, strategic policy is dictated by the fact that the United States must supplement its domestic output of oil from the Middle Eastern resources. This is demonstrated by the fact that in 1973 as much as a third of the United States' oil imports came from the Middle East just prior to the Oil Embargo Crisis. Even today the amount of oil remains at one-fifth of American imports. From a strategic perspective, the post-war economic recoveries of Europe and Japan were fueled by cheap Middle Eastern oil. Ever since the Oil Embargo Crisis, American policy has viewed oil as a strategic resource, as does much of the world. In fact, more than 40 years later, even Europe gets more than a third of its oil from the Middle East, and Japan gets nearly 80% of its oil from Middle Eastern trade partners.³²

Throughout the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Arab members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) led an embargo against the United States in

³⁰ Iskandar, *The Arab Oil Question*, 33-45.

³¹ Rustow, *Oil and Turmoil*, 93.

³² Gelvin, *The Modern Middle East*, 260.

response to the decision to re-supply the Israeli military. The embargo also applied to other countries that braced Israel including South Africa, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Petroleum exports were barred, and manufacturing reductions were made, straining the United States' economy that was extremely reliant on foreign oil.

Supporting and Protecting Israel's sovereignty

The second interest of the United States in the Middle East region is to protect the state of Israel and to ensure its stability in the often troubled region. In fact, maintaining a strong Israel in the Middle East solidifies American national security interests there. This perspective has dominated American foreign policy since the mid-twentieth century and continues to shape the current policy.

The historical land of Palestine was under the authority of the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I, when Britain assumed control of Palestine as a mandate under the League of Nations. During World War I (1914-1918), secret agreements were made between the British government and the British Zionist community leaders, leading to the Balfour Declaration and establishing a "national home" for the Jewish people in Palestine.

The United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour, in his November 2, 1917 letter to Lord Rothschild, the leader of the British Zionists, explains:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish

communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.³³

Before Britain announced the Balfour Declaration, the British government tried to persuade President Woodrow Wilson to endorse the proposed statement (Balfour Declaration). Initially, Wilson was reluctant to do so as he thought that such a declaration would worsen US-Ottoman relations. Finally, under pressure by Louis D. Brandeis, an influential Zionist leader in America and Wilson's close friend and confidant, President Wilson showed sympathy with the Balfour Declaration. The British saw Wilson's approval of the draft declaration as de facto support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine and support for British control of this area as protectorate following the war. This tacit support went against Wilson's agenda of self-determination put forth in his Fourteen Points and undermined the Palestinian Arab's right to self-determination, but this would not stop the United States from adopting the Balfour Declaration.³⁴ In September 1922, Congress adopted a resolution approving the Balfour Declaration, and thus formalized the United States' foreign policy toward Palestine. From then on, the United States continued to support Jewish migration to Palestine.

Then in late 1947, the Truman administration supported the "Partition Plan" of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) that proposed partitioning Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. On November 29, 1947, the "Partition Plan" was approved by the United Nations General Assembly. After the "Partition Plan" was passed, the Truman administration continued to promote Jewish emigration to Palestine

³³ Arthur James Balfour, "The Balfour Declaration Letter to Lord Rothschild," (London: Foreign Office, November 2, 1917).

³⁴ John W. Mulhall, CSP, *America and the Founding of Israel: An Investigation of the Morality of America's Role* (Los Angeles: Deshon Press, 1995), 64-65.

and the establishment of an egalitarian commonwealth. Congress adopted a resolution in December 1947 for this explicit purpose. On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel announced its independence.

From that point on, the historical land of Palestine has been known as Israel. Minutes after Israel declared its independence, the United States became the first country to recognize their independence. Shortly after that, the Soviet Union and other countries also recognized the independence of the Jewish state. Following the announcement of the independence of Israel, the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948 began, and Egypt led Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, and Saudi Arabia in launching attacks on the territory in support of the Arab Palestinians. As a result of this war, Israel acquired land that was previously given to Palestinian Arabs according to the November 29, 1947 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181. Continuing their policy of supporting Jewish immigration to Palestine, following the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the Truman administration explicitly facilitated this process. Truman's policies reveal his sympathy for Jewish aims in Palestine. After the war, a small number of Palestinian Arabs remained in Israel while most of them retreated to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that remained under Jordanian and Egyptian control respectively until the Six-Day War of 1967. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs were exiled and permanently moved out to the United Nations' refugee camps in surrounding Arab states.³⁵ Many Arab officers felt they had been "stabbed in the back" by their governments, who had entered the war unprepared and without the fortitude to fight a determined foe. They also criticized their

³⁵ "The Arab-Israeli War of 1948," US Department of State Office of the Historian, accessed January 7, 2015, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/arab-israeli-war>.

governments for not developing the military infrastructure necessary to claim victory on the battlefield.³⁶

Following the Six-Day War of 1967, the United States voted and endorsed the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. The succeeding American presidents have sponsored some initiatives, agreements, and treaties with some Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to assure the sustainability of Israel. The most preeminent arrangements are the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of March 26, 1979; Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo I) of September 13, 1993; The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of October 26, 1994; and The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II) of September 28, 1995.

Then United States Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, in his address, “U.S. Interests in the Middle East,” (1980), before the Economic Club of New York indicates that security was an overriding factor in ensuring the stability of Israel:

A second overriding American interest is in the security, the strength, and the well-being of the State of Israel. The commitment of the United States to Israel is irrevocable. It has been sustained and intensified by President Carter.... [US] provided almost half of the American aid Israel has received in all of her 32 years.... Israel should have the most advanced and effective defenses we could supply—including modern surface-to-air missiles, the M-60 tank, and the F-15 and F-16 aircraft.... [US] will veto any attempt to impose sanctions upon Israel.... will veto any change in [UN] Resolution 242. By all available means we will reject any effort to deny Israel its place in the United Nations ... Our support for Israel is founded ... Israel's security is a matter of America's national interest.... Israel's security is essential to us because it is indispensable to the achievement of a comprehensive Middle East peace ... Such a peace, in turn, is central to all of our interests in the region and many beyond. So there is the most

³⁶ Gelvin, *The Modern Middle East*, 214-15.

direct relationship between Israel's strength and our ability to pursue our most basic interests.³⁷

In another work written by Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock, "Friends with Benefits: Why the U.S.-Israeli Alliance Is Good for America," (2012), the authors state Israeli is a "true friend":

At the final presidential debate of the 2012 campaign season, President Barack Obama and Governor Mitt Romney mentioned Israel some 30 times, more than any other country except Iran. Both candidates called the Jewish state "a true friend," pledging to stand with it through thick and thin.³⁸

As noted earlier, it is clear that the US-Israeli relationship dates back decades and includes provision of \$115 billion of diplomatic, economic, and military support since 1949. From the onset of the Cold War, Israel is viewed as a close ally to the United States in a turbulent Middle East region and critical to American national security interests. Since the height of the Cold War, Israel has served as a safeguard against Soviet communism and Arab nationalism in the Middle East. Despite many political changes, this logic remains true to this day, with Israel serving as a protection against political Islam and other extremists. This policy has also served to reduce the propagation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the region by destroying Iraq and Syria's nuclear programs.³⁹

³⁷ Edmund S. Muskie, "U.S. Interests in the Middle East," (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, October 28, 1980), 2.

³⁸ Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock, "Friends with Benefits: Why the U.S.-Israeli Alliance Is Good for America," *Foreign Affairs*, (November 2012), accessed January 11, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-11-07/friends-benefits>.

³⁹ Ibid.

Maintaining the United States' Military Bases

The third interest of the United States in the Middle East region is maintaining its military bases, especially in the Arab oil-rich states along trade routes and pressure points that will allow the United States' policy to, directly and indirectly, influence the entire region. The United States' military bases can be defined as military places that are used for training purposes, preparation, and stocking of military equipment for American military assistance or operations throughout the world. These military bases are not open to the public and usually, take different shapes according to the military purpose for which they were established. The United States' military bases can be classified into four primary categories: Air Force; Army or Land; Navy; and Communication and/or Spy.⁴⁰

Kenneth Partridge, the editor of *U.S. National Debate Topic 2010–2011: The American Military Presence Overseas* (2010), states the following about the United States' military bases:

The United States began amassing its global network of military bases in the aftermath of World War II. Between 1938 and 1948, the number of foreign installations jumped from 14 to 30,000. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. military used as justification for this expansion the threat of communist aggression.⁴¹

Before World War II, the number of United States' military bases overseas was limited. However, with the onset of the Cold War, the number of bases and military installations increased rapidly around the world. According to Alexander Cooley's description of the United States' Department of Defense's 2006 *Base Structure Report*,

⁴⁰ Jules Dufour, "The Worldwide Network of US Military Bases," *Global Research*, (July 2007), accessed January 14, 2015, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-worldwide-network-of-us-military-bases/5564>.

⁴¹ Kenneth Partridge, ed., *U.S. National Debate Topic 2010–2011: The American Military Presence Overseas*, The Reference Shelf vol. 82, no. 3. (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 2010), 3.

“the United States officially maintains 766 military installations overseas and another 77 in noncontinental U.S. territories. Fifteen of these facilities were estimated to be worth more than \$1.6 billion each, whereas an additional 19 were valued at between \$862 million and \$1.6 billion.”⁴²

Prior to 1980, the United States maintained a minimal military presence in the Middle East. In the early 1970s, the United States concluded an agreement with Bahrain for intermittent use of its naval facilities by the United States Navy for a stipend of \$4 million a year. However, following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Bahrain, no longer supportive of the American military presence, terminated the lease.⁴³ Then, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 1979 Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan constituted a substantial threat to America’s vital interests in the region, especially considering the location of an estimated 40–70% of the world’s oil reserves. In his 1980 State of the Union address, President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States would defend its interests in the Gulf region from outside force by any means necessary, including military action. In March 1980, Carter ordered the formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF).⁴⁴ In order to promote a long-term solution to the region, President Ronald Reagan unified the command structure of the RDJTF and became more involved in its relationship with the region. This act, combined with the creation of the

⁴² *Base Structure Report*, quoted in Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 5.

⁴³ C.T. Sandars, *America’s Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2000), 293.

⁴⁴ “2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed January 17, 2015, <http://index.heritage.org/militarystrength/chapter/op-environment/middle-east/>.

United States Central Command (CENTCOM) on January 1, 1983, established and enhanced the command structure to better accommodate its mission in the region.⁴⁵

The United States CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) covers the central proximity of the world, the Middle East. It includes countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, most notably Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. The primary mission of the United States CENTCOM is to secure conditions for the region's stability, security, and prosperity by stimulating cooperation between nations, responding to crises, limiting and preventing aggressions, and supporting development and reconstruction (*see Figure 2*).⁴⁶ Through combined military operations, education, and human service, CENTCOM serves to maintain access to facilities in the Middle East as well as to develop relationships with local leaders.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ "About U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)," US Central Command, accessed January 19, 2015, <http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom-en>.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ "Military: Exercises - Central Command," GlobalSecurity.org, accessed January 24, 2015, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/ex-centcom.htm>.




Figure 2. Map of the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility. *Source:* Map adopted from U.S. Government Accountability Office, accessed January 21, 2015, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-45>.

Four service components and one subordinate unified command make up the United States CENTCOM: the United States Naval Forces, Middle East located in Bahrain, the United States Army Forces, Middle East based in Kuwait, the United States Air Forces, Middle East in Qatar, the United States Marine Forces, Middle East established in Bahrain, and the United States Special Operations Command, Middle East based in Qatar.⁴⁸

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the Saddam Hussein regime began posing a new and substantial threat to the United States' national security interests in the region. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United States began assembling a coalition of more than 30 countries to oust the Iraqi military from Kuwait in January 1991. The United States CENTCOM directed more than 532,000 United States' military personnel that made up the coalition armed forces (a total of more than 737,000), the apex of the United States' deployment in this region. In 1991, there was a Gulf War ceasefire, but there were persistent Iraqi conflicts over the next ten years.⁴⁹

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States CENTCOM's AOR was central to the global War on Terrorism and engaged in operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere in the AOR.⁵⁰ Specifically, at that time, the George W. Bush administration insisted that the Iraqi regime did not cooperate with the United Nations' arms inspectors to confirm that any

⁴⁸ The Heritage Foundation, "2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength."

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ "Military: US Central Command (USCENTCOM)," GlobalSecurity.org, accessed January 27, 2015, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/centcom.htm>.

WMD were destroyed and that it was supporting terrorism. As a result of these factors, America invaded Iraq in 2003. Initially, 150,000 United States' military personnel were deployed to join personnel from coalition powers. This number increased by 30,000 in 2007, but the United States' forces in Iraq have otherwise typically remained between 100,000 and 150,000. It was not until December of 2011 that the United States officially withdrew its troops, leaving only 150 personnel remaining at the American embassy in Iraq.⁵¹ Since this time, the remaining troops in the Middle East (roughly 35,000 American military personnel) are primarily based in the Gulf states.⁵²

Based on this research, it is clear that the early United States' military presence in the Middle East was limited before World War II. However, during and after World War II, the United States maintained a minimal military presence in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United States intensified its military presence and expanded its military base footprint in the Gulf states. Furthermore, the United States' military presence in the region has helped to guarantee safe access to oil for America and its allies, to ensure stability and security of the friendly regimes, to provide quick response to internal and external crises, to counter radical forces and Islamic extremist groups that might threaten American interests in the region, and, finally, to support the short and long-term strategic foreign policy agendas of the United States.

⁵¹ The Heritage Foundation, "2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength."

⁵² Ibid.

Defending Client-states and Friendly Regimes

The fourth interest of the United States in the Middle East region is maintaining a close relationship with its “client-states” and friendly regimes. The *Dictionary of Government and Politics* defines client-state as a “country which depends on another country for such things as defense, trade, etc.”⁵³

The *Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy* defines client-state as a “country that is economically, politically, and/or militarily dependent upon another state.... The relationship is a bilateral, and normally beneficial one, with mutual, although different, obligations. The client state ... is often militarily powerful but economically weak.... client states during the Cold War were Israel and South Korea for the United States, and Syria, Iraq ... for the Soviet Union.”⁵⁴

Eric Hooglund, in his review of *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran* (1991), discusses the patron-client relationship:

In international affairs, relationships in which powerful states serve as protective patrons for weaker states, or clients, have been common for centuries. In theory, both parties in a patron-client relationship derive tangible and intangible security benefits from their association. In practice, however, clients are not equal partners, and they typically must sacrifice some measure of autonomous behavior in order to maintain the support of patrons, although a skillful client regime sometimes can manipulate relations to the overall disadvantage of its patron. Patron-client relationships inevitably affect domestic politics in client states, but a dearth of scholarly literature pertaining to this important aspect has hindered an understanding of the various ways the influence of foreign patrons impacts the political processes in client countries.⁵⁵

⁵³ Collin, *Dictionary of Government and Politics*, 50.

⁵⁴ Michael Graham Fry, Erik Goldstein, and Richard Langhorne, eds., *Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy* (London: Continuum, 2002), 9.

⁵⁵ Eric Hooglund, review of *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran*, by Mark J. Gasiorowski, *Iranian Studies* 26, no. 1/2 (Winter-Spring, 1993): 182.

At the beginning of the Cold War, several Middle Eastern countries were divided into two respective camps. In one camp, countries such as Egypt and Syria supported the Soviet Union and were adopting international communist ideas. In the other camp, countries such as Greece, Turkey, and Israel backed the United States and adopted capitalist ideas and style. Both parties, however, were getting economic, military, and diplomatic support from either Washington or Moscow. In addition, to some extent a few states were able to use their diplomatic skills to gain support from both parties. Protecting client-states has been essential to the United States' foreign policy for many decades. However, since the United States has expanded its interests overseas, it has used a system of revolving maintenance of particular regimes and has needed to take on additional clients from time to time to affect its interests.⁵⁶

Following the demise of the world's traditional powers (Ottoman, British, and French) in the Middle East, most newly independent countries in the region faced substantial economic difficulty and were heavily dependent on foreign assistance. During the Cold War rivalry, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the chief providers of foreign aid. Both superpowers recognized the importance of the region for their national security interests and thus sought to reinforce their relationships with the countries of the region and build what came to be known as client-states. Division among countries of the region rapidly appeared with some states giving support to the Soviet Union and other states supporting the United States.

⁵⁶ David Sylvan and Stephen Majeski, "An Agent-Based Model of the Acquisition of U.S. Client States," (paper prepared for presentation at the 44th annual convention of the International Studies Association, Portland, OR, February 25-March 1, 2003), 1.

In the aftermath of World War II, the United States recognized the Soviet Union's interests in the region and thus sought to deny its possible expansion through several policies including containment, détente, and deterrence; building defensive organizations and alliances such as NATO in 1949, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954; METO in 1955, and CENTO in 1959; and aggressively pursuing many agreements, accords, and treaties of mutual cooperation and friendship.

Since the early 1940s, the United States has pledged to provide economic, military, and protective assistance to several countries in the Middle East to maintain its national security and strategic interests there. Specifically, the following countries became "client-states" of the United States dating back to the mid-1940s: Saudi Arabia (1945), Greece and Turkey (1947), Israel (1948), Iran (1953), Pakistan (1954), Lebanon (1957 and ends in 1975), Jordan (1963), Tunisia (1974), Egypt (1976), Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman (in 1991-1992).⁵⁷

The patron-client relationship within the Middle Eastern countries has achieved success in maintaining American and Allied security interests in the region. However, throughout this process, an uneven relationship was fashioned between the United States and the Middle Eastern countries. This uneven patron-client relationship has enabled the United States to gain full access to proven energy supplies. Also, this relationship opened the door for establishing more military bases and installations that consequently have increased the presence of American personnel in the Gulf. Specifically, as previously noted, in 2014, as many as 35,000 United States' military personnel operated in the

⁵⁷ Sylvan and Majeski, "An Agent-Based Model," 5.

Middle East; however, precise numbers are not available given the sensitive politics of the region.⁵⁸

Finally, economic, military, and diplomatic support has been extended to friendly regimes in the Middle East. However, with the onset of the 2010-2011 Arab Spring, the United States' foreign policy changed toward these regimes as the United States decided to support individuals in revolution instead of supporting their regimes. This decision stands in contrast to the United State's previous approach in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. This decision has proven to be a double-edged sword that may have created more long-term confusion and chaos to the indigenous population than keeping the previous regimes in power might have done.

Resisting Islamic Movements and Terrorist Groups

The fifth interest of the United States' foreign policy in the Middle East region is countering the Islamic resistance movements and terrorist groups. Following the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States and its allies condemned the Soviet action against Afghanistan. Then, the United States government developed a number of measures to enforce the Soviets to withdraw their forces. As previously referenced, President Carter, in his State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, said "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."⁵⁹

⁵⁸ The Heritage Foundation, "2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength."

⁵⁹ Carter, "The Carter Doctrine," 857.

As a direct result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States, China, and Arab states both openly and subversively supplied money and military assistance through arms and training to the Mujaheddin. The United States itself committed \$4-\$5 billion during the years 1980-1992. Between the United States, Saudi Arabia, and European and Islamic countries, the Mujaheddin received over \$10 billion in aid. The majority of this support came to the Afghan rebels in the form of modern lethal weaponry like Stinger Missiles to shoot down Soviet aircraft. Following the insurgency, these same weapons would find their way to the next generation of Afghan rebels, who would come to be known as the Taliban.⁶⁰

In the early 1990s, an Afghan faction of Mujaheddin formed the Taliban, Islamic forces who opposed Afghanistan's occupation by the Soviet Union (1979–1989). Covertly, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its Pakistani counterpart, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI) backed this group.⁶¹ As a result of this war, the Soviet Union lost billions of dollars and, ultimately, this provoked the economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.

Afterwards, the Taliban emerged as one of the strongest Islamic factions in Afghanistan during the 1990s. The Taliban ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. The Taliban regime was isolated and not initially recognized internationally; only Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan acknowledged it. In the late 1990s, the United Nations Security Council passed two resolutions: first urging the Taliban regime

⁶⁰ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 13-18.

⁶¹ Zachary Laub, "The Taliban in Afghanistan," *Council on Foreign Relations*, (July 2014), accessed January 31, 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551>.

to stop treating women abusively and second, imposing sanctions on the Taliban regime for sheltering Al-Qaeda and its leaders. The Taliban refused to respond to the United Nations. In fact, in 1998, Al-Qaeda was responsible for bombing the United States embassies in East Africa. As a result, the United States accused the Taliban regime of providing a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden.⁶²

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government declared global “War on Terrorism.” The George W. Bush administration accused Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime of harboring Al-Qaeda forces. Moreover, the Bush administration also accused many countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria of sponsoring and supporting terrorists. In this regard, President Bush stated that “... Syria and Iran continue to harbor and assist terrorists.... The United States lists both countries as state sponsors of terrorism because of their support for Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.”⁶³ On October 7, 2001, the United States, supported by British and other NATO member forces, began its combat mission “Operation Enduring Freedom.” This combat mission was intended to invade Afghanistan and topple the Taliban regime for harboring Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda leader accused of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.

⁶² Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan.”

⁶³ “Bush: Syria, Iran Harboring Terrorists,” CNN, July 21, 2003, accessed February 3, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/07/21/bush.terror/>.

On May 24, 2011, John F. Kerry, in his opening statement to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations entitled, “Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other Extremists Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” states:

Terrorists and insurgents work together against coalition forces and to indiscriminately murder innocent civilians, aid workers, civil servants, and children. Their motivation, which should offend all faiths, is to destabilize the region and to establish a safe haven where they can, and plot attacks against the United States and our allies. People ask why we are still in Afghanistan. This is the reason.⁶⁴

On December 28, 2014, President Barack Obama and his Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, issued concurrent statements that signified the end of combat in Afghanistan. Although this marks the end of the longest American military campaign in its history, even after 13 years, arguably there is still much work that could be done from a combat mission perspective in Afghanistan.⁶⁵ However, the success, or lack thereof, of the combat missions remains debated.

Following the September 11, 2001 events, the “War on Terrorism” became a major concern of American foreign policy. The United States subsequently attacked several Islamic groups, the majority of whom are Sunni Muslims, such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, in order to defend its national security interests around the globe. The United States remains convinced that these Islamic groups are carrying out a radical interpretation of Islam and that they profoundly oppose the West. In addition, the United

⁶⁴ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other Extremists Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 2011, S. Hrg. S. HRG. 112–70, 2.

⁶⁵ “Obama, Hagel Mark End of Operation Enduring Freedom,” US Department of Defense, December 28, 2014, accessed March 5, 2015, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123887>.

States believes those terrorist groups are posing a substantial threat to America, its allied security interests, and the entire region's stability and security.

Following the Afghanistan invasion in 2001, President Bush accused Iraq of supporting terrorism. Bush claimed that there was a relationship between Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and Al-Qaeda, as well as Iraqi intelligence personnel meeting with Osama bin Laden in Sudan.⁶⁶

In February 2003, the George W. Bush administration developed a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism in order to counter terrorism around the world. The comprehensive plan included strategies to defeat terrorists and their organizations, to deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists, to minimize social and economic conditions that terrorists exploit, and to defend United States' citizens and wellbeing at home and abroad.⁶⁷

On March 19, 2003, the United States invaded Iraq and collapsed the Saddam Hussein regime. The Bush administration accused the Iraqi regime of violating human rights, possessing WMD, and harboring terrorist leaders. Moreover, the United States' officials argued that the Iraqi regime threatened the security and stability of the entire Middle East region.

During August-September 2014, the United States formed an international coalition against ISIS. On September 23, 2014, the United States and other countries, including several Arab states (Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab

⁶⁶ Dana Milbank, "Bush Defends Assertions of Iraq-Al Qaeda Relationship," *Washington Post*, June 18, 2004.

⁶⁷ "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," US Department of States, February 2003, accessed February 10, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60172.pdf>.

Emirates), began air strikes against ISIS targets in Syria “to take out the militant group’s ability to command, train and resupply its fighters.”⁶⁸

Based on this research, it seems that the United States is concerned that if extremist Islamic militants gain control over WMD (nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological), there would be a real threat to American national security interests, especially those in the Middle East region, perhaps leading to a rapid destabilization of the entire region.

⁶⁸ Ashley Fantz and Michael Pearson, “Who’s Doing What in the Coalition Battle against ISIS,” CNN, last modified February 28, 2015, accessed March 1, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/06/world/meast/isis-coalition-nations/index.html>.

CHAPTER IV

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN IN THE UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY

Synopsis of the United States and Jordan Relations

From the dawn of antiquity, Jordan had been acquired and lost by numerous empires and civilizations until it finally became an independent nation following World War I. Even from the earliest Biblical sources in the Old Testament, the settlement of present day Jordan is recorded by such names as Gilead, Ammon, Moab, Edom, and the Hebrews led by Joshua. Consecutive settlements in the thirteenth century B.C. included Arab Nabataeans, Greeks, Romans, Muslim Arabs, and Crusaders until the Ottomans held sway over Jordan from the fourteenth century until the close of the First World War.¹

After World War I, for the next few years, the status of Transjordan fluctuated. In 1918, British and Arab forces removed the Turks from Palestine and Transjordan. King Faisal I of Syria, briefly ruled the area, but was eventually removed by the French before the area began being governed by the British under the League of Nations mandate for Palestine and Transjordan. Then, Abdullah ibn-Hussein, King Faisal's brother, threatened to attack the French in Syria. In response, the Emirate of Transjordan was created in 1921. Two years later, Britain recognized the independence of Transjordan in May 1923.

¹ Michael D. Wormser, ed., *The Middle East*, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1981), 173.

Under the rule of emir (later King) Abdullah ibn Al-Hussein, the Emirate of Transjordan developed economically and politically. Transjordan received financial backing from Britain and consented to accept guidance on fiscal and foreign affairs. Transjordan also permitted Britain to station forces in the country. In addition, it was during this period, that the Arab Legion (eventually renamed Jordan Armed Forces [JAF]) was formed as the mainstay of the regime with British officers and Jordanian Bedouin forces under British command. The British mandate over the Emirate of Transjordan ended on May 22, 1946. Three days later, the Emirate of Transjordan announced its full independence as the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan on May 25, 1946, and installing Abdullah ibn Al-Hussein as its King. After Transjordan and Israel signed the armistice agreement on April 3, 1949, the West Bank and East Jerusalem came under the governance of Transjordan.² In April of that year, the country was renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

On July 20, 1951, King Abdullah ibn Al-Hussein was assassinated while entering Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem for the Friday prayers. His eldest son, Crown Prince Talal, was proclaimed his successor on September 6, 1951. In August 1952, due to mental illness, King Talal abdicated the throne in favor of his eldest son, Crown Prince Hussein, who was recognized as the King of Jordan on August 11, 1952. A Council of Regency was created to hold power in trust until King Hussein's formal accession to the throne on May 2, 1953 when he secured full reign of his constitutional powers upon reaching the

² Wormser, *The Middle East*, 173.

age of eighteen.³ King Hussein ruled Jordan from 1953-1999. He represented the fortieth generation of direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Among Jordanians, King Hussein was considered the “builder” and the “father” of modern Jordan. Upon his death, his compatriots, as well as many heads of state, heralded his accomplishments. Those who paid tribute at this time were part of what was described as “one of the greatest events in modern Middle East history.”⁴ Hussein’s legacy promised to guide Jordanian policy for many years to come. After King Hussein’s death, his eldest son, Prince Abdullah, was proclaimed his successor on February 7, 1999. After he had assumed the throne, became known as King Abdullah II and he endeavored to introduce moderate economic, social, and political reform. These modest reforms took on new significance during the “Arab Spring” of 2010-2011 when Jordanians vocally called for more political, economic, and governmental reforms.⁵

Since its inception as a political entity in the aftermath of World War I, the Jordanian state has been heavily dependent on Britain’s economic and military subsidies. The special relationship between Jordan and Britain remained strong until the Anglo-Jordan Treaty ended in 1957. The United States substituted Britain as the main de facto Western source of political and monetary aid but without the entanglements associated with treaties. Beginning with the establishment of diplomatic relations with Jordan in 1949, the United States’ policy has been aimed at ensuring Jordan’s independence and

³ “Biography: King Hussein bin Talal (1935-1999),” The Royal Hashemite Court, accessed February 13, 2015, <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/biography.html>.

⁴ As quoted by Dessouki and Abdul Kheir, “Foreign Policy as a Strategic National Asset,” 253.

⁵ “The World FactBook: Jordan Background,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed February 15, 2015, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html>.

stability. The United States' foreign aid program to Jordan started in 1951 and was significantly expanded in 1957, when the United States affirmed its economic and military support for Jordan amid political uncertainty and tensions across its borders.⁶

Meanwhile, the United States and Jordan have maintained close relations and cooperation despite some regional and international issues. The American foreign aid program enabled Jordan to effectively manage its serious vulnerabilities, both internally and externally. It also ensured Jordan's stability in the turbulent region.⁷ Also, it significantly increased Jordan's dependency on the United States.

Michael D. Wormser, the editor of *The Middle East* (1981), explains the major goals of King Hussein foreign policy:

King Hussein's two major foreign policy goals have determined most of his other policies. First, he has tried to maintain strong ties with the United States ... Second, he has had to protect himself against those forces who wish to topple his kingdom.... Jordan has followed a consistently pro-West foreign policy ... [Jordan] has always voiced its support for the Arab cause against the Jewish state. Since the 1967 war, when Israel occupied the West Bank, a primary objective of Jordan's foreign policy has been the recovery of that land.... Hussein's first objective ... [was] to protect his country from any regional conflicts and forces that could threaten his rule.⁸

Notably, the US-Jordan relations were negatively impacted during the Carter administration, when Jordan refused to participate in the Camp David peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel in 1978-1979. King Hussein also refused to join the US-led international coalitions against Iraq in 1990-1991. Overall, disagreements were limited to

⁶ Richard F. Nyrop, ed., *Jordan, a Country Study*, 3th ed. (Washington, DC: The American University; Foreign Area Studies, 1980), 187.

⁷ Jeremy M. Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, CRS Report RL33546 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, March 17, 2015), 6.

⁸ Wormser, *The Middle East*, 174-75.

these prominent, but short-lived, departures from Jordan's general agreement to the United States' policies in the Middle East.

The Importance of Jordan in the United States' Foreign Policy

Despite its size, population, climate, and limited valuable natural resources, the United States has maintained diplomatic relations with Jordan since 1949. Shortly thereafter, the United States government became actively involved in Jordan in order to maintain its national security interests in the Middle East. The significance of the Jordanian state to the United States has gradually increased since the early years of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union due to the following factors: its strategic geopolitical location, its powerful ideology, its moderate and pro-Western regime, its security role in the region against the Soviet Union and anti-terrorism operations, and, lastly, its pivotal role in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Geopolitical Location

Strategic geography is the physical and human geography as it relates to the control of and access to land, water, and air and even outer space that impacts the security and wealth of nations.⁹

Historically, Jordan's significance results from its location at the junction between Christians, Jews, and Muslims in the Holy Land. The desert territory composing present-day Jordan emerged after the division of the Arab world between Britain and France at the conclusion of World War I.¹⁰

⁹ Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 8.

¹⁰ "Jordan Country Profile," BBC, accessed February 18, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14631981>.

Today, the importance of Jordan also stems from its location between the oil-rich Arab peninsula and Israel in the heart of the Middle East. Specifically, Jordan is situated between Syria to the north, Iraq to the east, Saudi Arabia to the south and southeast, and Israel to the west. This critical geopolitical location between numbers of more powerful countries has enabled Jordan to play a larger role in the regional and international politics than its diminutive size would typically command, especially in the Arab-Israeli conflict (see Figure 3).

Rodney Wilson, in his book, *Politics and the Economy in Jordan* (1991), states the following about the importance of the geopolitical location of Jordan:

Jordan is surrounded by five countries, each of which has at least one source of power which Jordan lacks. To the west there is Israel, which is superior to Jordan in military strength and is allied to one of the superpowers, the United States. To the north there is Syria, which has a military, demographic and psychological edge over Jordan and has a friendship treaty with another of the superpowers, the Soviet Union. To the east there is Iraq, known for its military, demographic and economic strength, which also has a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. To the south-west there is Egypt, which enjoys demographic, cultural, and military strength. Finally, to the south there is Saudi Arabia, which possesses financial strength. Moreover, Jordan is geographically the closest Arab country to Palestine and has the longest borderline with it, and thus it has been the most affected by the cause of its people.¹¹

The United States has recognized the geopolitical significance of Jordan since the middle of the twentieth century, given its wealth of fossil fuels, the competition for Arab markets by other industrialized nations, the established trade routes between Europe and the Middle East, and the importance of controlling its sphere of influence during the Cold War. Jordan's size does not speak to its significance; its location is a crucial factor even if it does not have the larger consumer markets of other regional countries like Egypt, Saudi

¹¹ Rodney Wilson, ed., *Politics and the Economy in Jordan* (London: Routledge, 1991), 223.

Arabia, and Iraq. Its strategic geopolitical location is pivotal as an influence on the interests of the major and regional powers and overall regional role.¹²

¹² Wilson, *Politics and the Economy in Jordan*, 224-25.



Figure 3. Map of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and its Neighbors. *Source:* Map adopted from d-maps.com, accessed February 21, 2015, http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=4792&lang=en.

The strategic significance of Jordan is due to various regions: (i) it serves as a buffer between the Arab states and Israel (Jordan is the only Arab state that shares the longest border with Israel and the occupied Palestinian West Bank); (ii) it enhances regional cooperation between the Arab states; (iii) it promotes transit commerce among the Arab states. Iraq, for instance, recognized the importance of Jordan's location specifically, the port of Aqaba. (iv) it improves transit commerce between the Arab states, Turkey, and Eastern Europe. These factors collectively have enabled Jordan to build a relatively steady economy necessary to support its foreign policy.

Jordanian relations with the Arab states experienced tension during and after the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. At the time, the position of King Hussein on the Gulf crisis was perceived as supportive of Saddam Hussein and his regime. This position, consequently, worsened Jordan's relations with some Arab neighbor states, as well as with the Gulf states and the United States, a prime source of foreign aid to Jordan. Following King Hussein's death in 1999, King Abdullah II began to consolidate his efforts to reinforce and reactivate Jordan's relations with the Arab states. Upon his ascension to power and during his first year of rule, he visited all the Gulf states, Syria, and Libya in an attempt to advance relations that had declined during the later years of his father's reign. Since that time, King Abdullah II has continued to maintain cordial relations with the Arab states, the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Israel¹³ in order to ensure their national security interests in an ever challenging region.

¹³ Dessouki and Abdul Kheir, "Foreign Policy as a Strategic National Asset," 269-78.

Ideology

The *Dictionary of the Political Science* defines ideology as “a systematic set of arguments and beliefs used to justify an existing or desired social order.”¹⁴ While *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics* has defined ideology as “any comprehensive and mutually consistent set of ideas by which a social group makes sense of the world ... Catholicism, Islam, Liberalism, and Marxism are examples.”¹⁵

In this study, the researcher will refer to the ideological factor as a set of beliefs, concepts, ideas, perceptions, and views that prevail in a given society or nation-state that affect the outcome of the behavior of the policy makers in a state. The ideological factor has a vital role in defining the national goals, objectives, orientation, and principles of states. It helps the state decision-makers to form their visions and speculations based on this ideology. In general, a compatible ideology among states usually leads to more cooperation, coordination, and prosperity, unlike the incompatible ideologies that might result in real conflict between groups, societies, or states. In this sense, the best example of an ideological conflict is that between the United States and the Soviet Union since the onset of the Cold War.

Marian Doris Irish and Elke Frank, in their book, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Context, Conduct, Content* (1975), explain the role of government:

The basic assignment of any government is to determine the hierarchy of national values, to set the nation's goals in accord with the established values, to allocate the nation's resources in line with its goals, and to prescribe the policies which will move the nation toward those goals. Ideology is a useful instrument for

¹⁴ Dunner, *Dictionary of the Political Science*, 250.

¹⁵ Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, eds., *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 256.

policy makers insofar as it helps to identify the national values and to direct official courses of action in line with the principles to which the nation appears committed.¹⁶

In the post-World War II era, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the world's two leading superpowers, with influence (economic, cultural, ideological, social, and political) that spread across the world before the final collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. The ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union within the context of the Cold War motivated world nations to take sides and align themselves either with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (USSR) communist ideology and practice of socialist style economics or establish themselves as a democracy by aligning with the United States. In response to the ideological conflict between the Eastern and the Western Bloc, King Hussein chose to align with the United States; his motivation was both religious and political.

From a religious perspective, King Hussein was convinced that a communist ideology conflicted with the principles of the Islamic religion and the traditions of Arab values. "As descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, neither [King] Abdullah [I] nor [King] Hussein [I] would have any truck with communism. They believed, as did many Muslims, that communism was an anti-Islamic creed."¹⁷ In addition, King Hussein said, "Our most dangerous enemy is communism and Judaism."¹⁸ This statement illustrates the King's view of communism as the primary enemy of Islam and Arabs even before

¹⁶ Irish and Frank, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 401

¹⁷ Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, *The Cold War and the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1997), 109.

¹⁸ King Hussein I of Jordan, *Hussein of Jordan: My Job as a King*, trans. Ghalib Touqan (n.p.: n.p., 1981), 91. [In Arabic]

Judaism. King Hussein's views toward communism led him to embrace moderate policies in line with the West.

From a political perspective, the King perceived international communism as a real threat to Jordan's unity and to the Arab Solidarity dreams to gain independence. Further, he believed that international communism would not free Arab people stating that, "Imperialism, which is about to die in the Arab East, will be replaced by a new kind of imperialism [international communism]. If we are enslaved by this, we shall never be able to escape or overthrow it."¹⁹ Also, the Soviet Union refused to approve Jordan's entry to the United Nations in June 1946 and used its veto to stop the decision. The Soviet Union continued exercising its veto to challenge Jordan's admission in 1947, 1948, and 1949.²⁰

At the time, the Soviets justified their opposition to Jordan's entry to the United Nations as Jordan was under the British trusteeship. As a result, Jordan passed the *Combating Communism Act* in 1948, under which the Jordanian Communist Party was banned. This sanction was confirmed by the *Political Parties Organizing Law number 3 (1954)* and the *Law of Political Parties number 15 (1955)*. As a result of the Soviet Union position, Jordan was not admitted to the United Nations until 1955.²¹ Thereafter,

¹⁹ King Hussein I of Jordan, *Uneasy Lies the Head: The Autobiography of his Majesty King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan* (New York: Bernard Geis Associates, 1962), 159.

²⁰ Suleiman Mousa, *Figures from Jordan: Glimpses of Modern Arab History* (Amman: Dar Al-Yara'a of Publishing and Distribution, 2008), 28. ['In Arabic']

²¹ *The Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan* (Amman: National Printing Press, May 16, 1948), no. 945, 181; no. 1166 (January 17, 1954), 51-53; and no. 1223 (April 3, 1955), 278-80.

the Jordanian government passed the *Combating Communism Act of 1953* that banned communist newspapers in the country.²²

Benjamin Shwadran, in his book, *Jordan a State of Tension* (1959), stated that Jordan's application to join the United Nations was voted down through the veto of the Soviet Union:

The application was voted down on August 28, 1946 through the veto of the Soviet Union, and the following year it failed again, for the same reason. On November 28, 1947 the Soviet Union served notice that it would vote negatively on the application and consequently it was not brought up.²³

These incidents solidified King Hussein's conviction of the Soviet Union and international communism. As a de facto, the best choice was to establish a relationship with the free world and, specifically, the United States valued the self-determination of self-governing states and reinforced its independence and sovereignty. In addition, the King's impression of the Soviet Union and international communism was indeed compatible with the ideology of American decision-makers and the Western government camp. Compatible ideologies paved the way to formally establishing relations between King Hussein and the United States that had lapsed since President Eisenhower's presidency. The King was also educated in Britain, having attended the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in Camberley, United Kingdom. In fact, many royal family members received their early education and significant military training in the United Kingdom and the United States.

²² King Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, 154.

²³ Benjamin, Shwadran, *Jordan a State of Tension* (New York, Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959), 217.

In the late 1950s, King Hussein expressed his apprehension regarding the infiltration of communist ideology in the Arab countries. By April 1957, the impact of communism was apparent in Jordan. In response, the King sharply denounced communism activities in Jordan by sending a letter to his Prime Minister, Suleiman Nabulsi, emphasizing the danger of communism on Jordan and the entire region. In his letter to Nabulsi, King Hussein outlined his concerns regarding his position on communism:

The present cold war between the two world blocs has brought to our country certain principles and beliefs which are in sharp contrast to our own. Strange views have infiltrated into our midst. Unless these unwarranted principles, beliefs and views are curtailed and stopped within certain limits, they will affect all the glory and prestige for which our nation stands.... We perceive the danger of Communist infiltration within our Arab home as well as the danger of those who pretend to be Arab nationalists while they have nothing to do with Arabism. Our ranks must be free from corruption and intrigues. We will never allow our country to be the field for a cold war which may turn to a destructive hot war if the Arabs permit others to infiltrate their ranks. We firmly believe in the right of this country to live. Its foundations must be strong and built on the glories of the past and the hopes of the future. No gap must be left to allow the propaganda of communism to ruin our country. These are our views which we convey to Your Excellency as a citizen and as our Prime Minister.²⁴

Three years later, in his address before the United Nations General Assembly in New York on October 3, 1960, the young King Hussein confirmed his position of communism stating:

... I wanted to be sure that there was no mistake about where Jordan stands in the conflict of ideologies that is endangering the peace of the world.... In the great struggle between Communism and freedom, there can be no neutrality.²⁵

²⁴ King Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, 159-60.

²⁵ King Hussein I of Jordan, "Address before the United Nations General Assembly," October 3, 1960, quoted in James Lunt, *Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography* (London: Macmillan London Limited, 1989), 65-66.

Overall, ideology was an important factor during the early years of the Cold War.

To a great extent, ideology helped King Hussein identify his country's national interests in the Cold War, in which he took a side with the United States. Similarly, "ideology was the principle instrument of the Cold War which preoccupied U.S. foreign-policy makers for a quarter century following the Second World War."²⁶

The United States recognized early on the importance of Jordan to the Cold War rivalry. The alignment with the King and his position of communism paved the way for the United States to invest more in Jordan to prevent possible expansion of the Soviet Union and the spread of international communism influence in the Middle East. The ideological congruence was an auxiliary factor exploited by both countries, the United States and Jordan, to achieve certain objectives and long-term strategic interests in the region.

Regime

The 1952 Constitution of Jordan remained in force in 2014, declaring that Jordan is a hereditary monarchy with a parliamentary system of government. According to the current constitution, the monarchy is the primary power structure in Jordan. The King has been vested with broad powers over the executive branch, the legislature, and the judiciary. The King is the Head of State and the Supreme Commander of the Land, Naval, and Air Forces. He ratifies the laws and promulgates them, declares war, concludes peace, and ratifies treaties and agreements. He also appoints the Prime Minister, Ministers, the Senate president and members, judges, and other senior

²⁶ Irish and Frank, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 401.

government and military personnel. He exercises his executive power through the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, who are responsible to the elected Chamber of Deputies (Majlis Al-Nuwaab). The Chamber of Deputies, along with the Senate (Majlis Al-Ayan), constitute the legislative branch of the government, which collectively is called the National Assembly. The King convenes the National Assembly and begins, ends, suspends, or dissolves the Chamber of Deputies by the provision of the law; he also may dissolve the Senate or remove a Senator from office. The King also oversees elections to the Chamber of Deputies. Concerning legislative power, the King's veto can only be superseded by a two-thirds vote of each house. The Prime Minister and the Minister or Ministers involved must countersign such a decree, but the King is protected from any liability and responsibility. The judicial branch is an "independent" branch of the government, with the Judges of the Civil and Sharia Courts appointed and dismissed by a royal decree.²⁷

Since 1953, "the Jordanian political system continued to revolve around [King] Hussein who ruled firmly, brooking no opposition."²⁸ The constitutional powers that had been vested in the King enabled him to survive in the midst of crises, to deal with local and foreign policies, and to plan and determine the future of the country during his reign.

King Hussein's frequent international visits also allowed him to learn of crucial developments outside his country and secure financial and technical aid to the Kingdom. Considering Jordan's dependence on external financial aid, the King's aptitude for

²⁷ *The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of 1952*, 19-40.

²⁸ Nyrop, *Jordan, a Country Study*, 166.

maintaining pleasant and practical relationships with other world countries continues to be a valuable asset.²⁹

In April 1957, King Hussein's position on international communism led the Eisenhower administration to assert the importance of "the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital"³⁰ to the United States. Since then, Washington considered the King as a close, loyal, and reliable ally in the Middle East.

During the Jordanian Civil War of September 1970-1971, the United States made noteworthy strategies to save King Hussein's regime. In the aftermath, Henry Kissinger concluded, "Our firm action helped to defuse a potentially very dangerous situation and to keep in power an Arab leader whose policies are moderate. This may well result in improving the chances for a lasting peace in the Near East."³¹ After the crisis, the Nixon administration continued to provide the regime with economic and military aid, including an extra \$15 million to help the Jordanian Budget. The Nixon administration's aid during the crisis significantly helped the survival of the King's regime.³²

In the aftermath of the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, the United States enabled King Hussein to play a central role in the Madrid Conference for Peace in the Middle East. The participation of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation enabled the Palestinian delegates to have a direct-negotiation with Israelis under the Jordanian umbrella which

²⁹ Nyrop, *Jordan, a Country Study*, 168.

³⁰ Ibid., 32.

³¹ Henry Kissinger, "Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon," NSC Country Files: Middle East-Jordan, October 7, 1970, quoted in Clea Lutz Hupp, *The United States and Jordan: Middle East Diplomacy during the Cold War* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2014), 179.

³² Ibid.

led to secret negotiations between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel after that. The unique role of the King in the peace process stemmed from his goal to achieve a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Subsequent to the death of King Hussein in 1999, the Jordanian regime has continued to maintain cordial relations with the surrounding Arab states, the European Union, Israel, Japan, and the United States. The moderate pattern of the foreign policy followed by King Hussein and his successor King Abdullah II has enabled Jordan to be a lynchpin in regional and international issues that far outstrip its diminutive size. According to the United States' Department of State, "[King] Abdullah [II] moved quickly to reaffirm Jordan's peace treaty with Israel and its relations with the United States"³³

In many regional issues, crises, and wars, the United States substantially relies on the Jordanian regime to achieve certain objectives. Specifically, facilitating the Arab-Israeli peace process negotiations, training Iraqi military and police officers, and countering terrorism, for instance combating Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Clea Lutz Hupp, in her book, *The United States and Jordan: Middle East Diplomacy during the Cold War* (2014), notes the dependency of the United States on Jordan:

The United States not only relied on the presence of a moderate regime in Jordan, it had come to depend on Israeli support for the Hashemite monarchy. When Israeli enthusiasm for [King] Hussein waned, US officials scrambled to find ways to strengthen the King.³⁴

³³ "Jordan (05/05): Profile, Political Conditions," US Department of State, accessed February 23, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/jordan/47483.htm>.

³⁴ Hupp, *United States and Jordan*, 180.

Security

Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser was a person of influence in Arab politics of the 1950s and 1960s. In 1952, the Free Officer's coup overthrew King Farouk, clearing the path for President Jamal Abdel Nasser to rise to power as a result of his charisma and excellent speaking skills that inspired the Arab population. Nasser's brand of "pan-Arabism" was transmitted across the Arab world by radio and particularly attracted the displaced Palestinians. In 1956, he successfully withstood pressure from Britain, France, and Israel during the Suez Crisis, further increasing his popularity. Nasser seemed to be the new Salah Eddin, who would join the Arab factions and retake Palestine.³⁵

In the aftermath of World War II, the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over influence, interests, and power ignited the Cold War. In the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union began to gain influence in some Arab states, notably Egypt and Syria. This posture posed a substantial threat to the United States' vital interests in the region. To mitigate this threat, the United States connected the friendly states in the region with military alliances. Specifically, in 1953, John Foster Dulles promoted a security alliance to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union and the spread of international communism in the region. In 1955, the Baghdad Pact was formed by Britain.

Following the conclusion of the pact, Egypt responded by developing an anti-Baghdad pact coalition and signing an arms agreement with Czechoslovakia in

³⁵ "History: Charting a Difficult Course: Jordan in the 1950s," The Hashemite Royal Court, accessed February 27, 2015, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_periods1.html.

September 1955 to continue to foster Arab nationalism. By December of that year, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia enacted a defense pact combining the three countries' militaries under Egypt's authority and offered financial incentives to Jordan to lure them away from Britain and bring them into their coalition. The Egyptian coalition's efforts were viewed as successful when, in January 1956, the Jordanian government refused to join the Baghdad pact.³⁶

In his book, *Diplomacy* (1994), Henry Kissinger, said:

When Great Britain tried to persuade Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact, pro-Egyptian riots broke out, which obliged King Hussein to dismiss Glubb Pasha [Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb], the British commander of the Arab Legion, in March 1956.³⁷

In July 1956, the United States and Britain refused to provide financial assistance to Egypt to help with the construction of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile River leading President Nasser to negotiate for assistance from the Soviet Union. In order to leverage Soviet and Arab support, he nationalized the Suez Canal Company, which united Arab support for Egypt. This action was viewed as another victory for Egypt and Nasser's influence was prevalent in Jordan by this time. For example, his influence was evident in the 1956 parliamentary elections when campaign slogans endorsed various political positions relating to the nationalization of the Suez Canal including: the repeal of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty, the coalition with Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, the association with Iraq, and the call for neutrality of Jordan in Arab relations.³⁸

³⁶ Hatem Shareef Abu-Lebdeh, *Conflict and Peace in the Middle East: National Perceptions and United States-Jordan Relations* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1997), 81.

³⁷ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 529.

³⁸ Abu-Lebdeh, *Conflict and Peace*, 82-83.

Egypt's alliance with the Soviet Union, Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, and Nasser's backing of the Arab resistant movement in Algeria against French occupation constituted a real threat to Western powers and interests in the Arab states. These events eventually led to the alignment of Britain, France, and Israel to oust President Nasser from power in the Suez War of 1956.³⁹

Shortly, after the Jordanian parliamentary elections of October 1956, Jordan entered an agreement with Egypt and Syria. King Hussein requested that Suleiman Nabulsi, the leader of the Nationalist Socialists, create a new government alliance of the Nationalist Socialists, Baath, the National Front, and Independents parties. The government was aligned with Egypt, and its outlook on the relationship between Jordan and Egypt was of the highest of importance regarding Arab unity and Jordanian national interest. This view manifested itself in the desire for the repeal of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty.⁴⁰

Jordan's desire to end the Anglo-Jordan Treaty was especially true for the Jordanian National Socialist Party that won the parliamentary election in October 1956. Several subsequent events also highlighted Egypt's effect in Jordan and in other Arab countries. By November 1956, troops from Syria and Saudi Arabia were stationed in Jordan. Iraq also sent troops to Jordan, ostensibly to secure its armistice line with Israel.

According to the Royal Hashemite Court official online site:

... in 1956, completely free parliamentary elections were held, and radical groups including communists and Ba'thists dominated the new cabinet. In another important development, King Hussein dismissed the British commanders of the

³⁹ Abu-Lebdeh, *Conflict and Peace*, 83-84.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 83.

Arab Legion in 1956, and terminated the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty in March of 1957. However, he thought that his government's leftward drift would eventually lead to a communist infiltration of the Arab world, and consequently he resisted the trend. A number of riots, and an externally-inspired coup attempt which was personally thwarted by King Hussein, forced him to impose martial law in the spring of 1957.⁴¹

In January 1957, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria signed the Arab Solidarity Agreement. This signified a shift in policy, calling for Arab cooperation and providing Jordan with \$36 million annually.⁴² Later, in March 1957, the Anglo-Jordan Treaty was formally ended, leading to several changes, including King Hussein's agreement to join the Egyptian alliance network and Jordan's pro-Egyptian cabinet moving toward establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China. At this time, tension increased significantly between the King and his cabinet, especially when King Hussein showed his interest in assistance from the United States "if offered without political strings." The cabinet replied with a petition of protest. By April 1957, the King relieved Prime Minister Nabulsi of his position. In his view, international communism was threatening Jordan. In support of the King, the United States provided \$10 million in assistance and military equipment. Jordan and Saudi Arabia now shared a common opposition to communism that was increasingly being seen as a threat to the region. King Saud of Saudi Arabia provided troops to Jordan and placed them under King Hussein's command. Also, Iraq placed military personnel along the border to block Syria

⁴¹ The Hashemite Royal Court, "Charting a Difficult Course: Jordan in the 1950s."

⁴² Abu-Lebdeh, *Conflict and Peace*, 81-85.

from moving into the territory and pushing out Syrian forces that had been stationed in Jordan since the Suez War of 1956.⁴³

Hatem Shareef Abu-Lebdeh, in his book, *Conflict and Peace in the Middle East: National Perceptions and United States-Jordan Relations* (1997), stated:

It was at this juncture that U.S.-Jordan relations became defined and a new political alignment began between Jordan and Saudi Arabia, through convergence of their interests to oppose Communist influence in the region. The Sixth Fleet was dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean, under a provision in the Eisenhower Doctrine to provide economic and military assistance to any Middle Eastern country threatened by international communism.⁴⁴

With the dispatch of the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean in exchange for aid, the United States effectively became Jordan's principle source of foreign aid, albeit without any formal declaration. In April 1957, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles acknowledged that "the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital" to the United States. The Eisenhower Doctrine enabled the United States to offer economic and military assistance to countries at risk of falling to communism. Thus, while King Hussein did not request this aid formally; he stated that "Jordan's security was being threatened by communism." As a result of his acknowledgment of Jordan's situation and informal request for aid, Jordan was granted \$10 million in emergency aid. This was the first in a series of grants and current financial aid programs that were extended and the first time military assistance was introduced.⁴⁵

In response to Egypt's merger with Syria in the United Arab Republic, on February 14, 1958, the Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan was announced. The death knell of

⁴³ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 68-69.

⁴⁴ Abu-Lebdeh, *Conflict and Peace*, 88.

⁴⁵ Nyrop, *Jordan, a Country Study*, 32.

the federation was rung with the Iraqi revolution in July 1958. It was formally dismantled on August 2, 1958. This usurping of power by the coup leaders consequently led King Hussein to lay blame on the communists and the United Arab Republic for being in cahoots to undermine Jordanian sovereignty and force a collapse of his regime. The King predictably called for British and American assistance in combating this perceived threat. As a result, British ground forces were on site in Jordan from July 17 through November 20, 1958. American economic assistance was increased to a significant degree as well.⁴⁶

In the 1960s, there was very little change in the political relationships or commitments between the United States and Jordan, and the United States continued to regard Jordan as an ally and client-state. When the Jordanian Civil War of September 1970-1971 (known as Black September) broke out, Syria invaded Jordan's northern borders and deployed more than two hundred tanks in support for the PLO rebels. Iraqi forces began rapidly withdrawing from its 12,000-man outpost near Az Zarka on September 17, 1970. Israel assumed preventative military deployment push back the PLO rebel forces. The United States also publicly reasserted its commitment to protect Jordan and dispatched its Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean to protect Jordanian sovereignty.⁴⁷

Bradley J. Pierson, in his article, "The Power of Presence: Nixon, Israel, and the Black September Crisis," explains:

The United States' handling of the [1970-1971 Black September] crisis was consistent with the Nixon Administration's affinity toward heavy-handed diplomacy. By publicly demonstrating a seeming willingness to intervene

⁴⁶ Wormser, *The Middle East*, 173.

⁴⁷ Nyrop, *Jordan, a Country Study*, 41.

militarily, the United States effectively asserted its commitment to Jordan and deterred a potentially serious military altercation in the Middle East.⁴⁸

In the following decades, there were no significant changes to the US-Jordan security relations until Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 2, 1990. In fact, the region enjoyed a period of relative peace and stability that was not interrupted until the United States' attacked Iraq in 2003. Jordan then again enjoyed relative peace until the erupting of the Syrian Civil War of 2011, when the Obama administration pledged to support Jordan's security and promote regional stability.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States, Jordan promised tangible support to the Bush administration's War on Terrorism and "was officially designated a combat zone for U.S. personnel on Sep. 19, 2001."⁴⁹ Jordan played a significant role in fighting the terrorism by providing valuable information about Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively. In fact, after the emergence of ISIS, Jordan continued to share valuable intelligence with the United States about ISIS to maintain its national security interests and to ensure the stability of the ever-turbulent Middle Eastern region.

To shore up stability, more than 1,500 United States' military personnel have been stationed in Jordan to protect its northern borders from the ongoing Syrian Civil War. The military has provided security measures including general monitoring, border

⁴⁸ Bradley J. Pierson, "The Power of Presence: Nixon, Israel, and the Black September Crisis," *Primary Source* IV, no. I, (n.d.): 35.

⁴⁹ William M. Arkin, "Keeping Secrets in Jordan," *Washington Post*, November 16, 2005, accessed March 3, 2015, <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article11031.htm>.

security, and the screening of refugees.⁵⁰ Economically, the United States has supported Jordan by preventing it from being overwhelmed by the Syrian Refugees. According to Congressional Research Service, since the commencement of high volume economic aid to Syrian refugees began, the United States set aside over \$467 million in multilateral humanitarian assistance to enable Jordan to manage the Syrian refugee crisis.⁵¹

On June 21, 2013, President Barack H. Obama, in his letter to Congress regarding the War Powers Resolution, stated the following about the deployment of American troops to Jordan:

The deployment of this detachment has been directed in furtherance of U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, including the important national interests in supporting the security of Jordan and promoting regional stability, pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations.⁵²

During the Arab Spring of 2010-2011 the United States government recognized that a stable Jordan was significant to its regional interests understanding that any protests that might overthrow the regime in Jordan could bring an anti-Western government. Thus, the United States intensified its efforts to support the monarchy.

The United States has an active interest in helping Jordan, considering the country's alignment with Western politics, the promise of peace with Israel, and collaboration on security and counterterrorism efforts. Political uncertainty could result in

⁵⁰ As quoted by Adam Nicky, "Western Troops in Jordan to Protect Country from Syria Civil War Spillover," *National Post*, October 15, 2012, accessed March 5, 2015, <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/world/israel-middle-east/western-troops-in-jordan-to-protect-for-from-syria-civil-war-spillover>.

⁵¹ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, 3.

⁵² Barack Obama, "Letter from the President -- Regarding the War Powers Resolution," The White House, June 21, 2013, accessed March 7, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/21/letter-president-regarding-war-powers-resolution>.

the removal of King Abdullah II or an altered or defunct monarchical system that might bring about an anti-Western form of government. Instability in Jordan is not inevitable, and the United States understands that policies and efforts now can prevent objectionable changes in the future.⁵³

Overall, the stability of the Middle East remains very significant to the United States' national security interests, and Jordan's security constitutes a priority in the United States' foreign policy. Thus, maintaining security and stability and strengthening Jordan is key to the prevention of the penetration of radical Islamists guerrillas, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and others from crossing the Jordanian borders and constituting a major threat to Israeli and Jordanian security. Thus, the United States, Israel, and the West will continue to support the Kingdom from any possible attacks by those guerrillas.

Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, in his statement, "The Peace Process and Arms Sales to Jordan," (1985), before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the following about Jordan's significance to Israel's security:

... Jordan has proven,... that it is determined to ensure that terrorists do not attack Israel from Jordanian territory. The border that it shares with Israel—the longest Israel has with any of its neighbors—has been incident free for many years. Israel has been able to place confidence in Jordan to prevent infiltration along their common border. In fact, Prime Minister Peres,... said that Jordan worked actively to prevent terrorist acts from being launched from or through Jordan.⁵⁴

⁵³ Robert Satloff and David Schenker., "Political Instability in Jordan: Contingency Planning Memorandum no. 19," *Council on Foreign Relations* (May 2013): 1.

⁵⁴ George Pratt Shultz, "The Peace Process and Arms Sales to Jordan," (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, October 10, 1985), 2.

In October 2014, the *Friends of Israel Initiative* newsletter stated in its issue

“Dispatch,” that Israel is committed to protect Jordan:

... Israel has definitely committed to act accordingly if ISIS reaches Jordan, in accordance with diplomatic sources recently quoted on Israel’s Channel 2.... The Israeli commitment to the stability of the region is once more an unquestionable guarantee for the West....The Friends of Israel Initiative has always claimed that Israel is a strategic asset for the West, the last frontier for freedom and democracy in the Middle East; the Israeli support to the anti-ISIS international coalition is just one more proof. Once again the struggle of Israel is the struggle of the West.⁵⁵

To summarize, since the onset of the Cold War, the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East has focused on containing the Soviet Union’s influence in the region. Jordan’s significance to the United States emerged from King Hussein’s opposition to the Soviet Union expansion and the penetration of communist ideology in Jordan and the Arab states. In fact, King Hussein publicly asserted, on a number of occasions, his opposition to international communism and its incompatibility with Islam and traditional Arab values. The national security interests of the United States in the Middle East are convergent with King Hussein’s perspective, which has led the United States to consider Jordan as a strategic ally in the face of international communism. In 1957, the increased communist threat to the Hashemite monarchy led the Eisenhower administration to plead publicly to support the King and regarded “the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital” to the United States. Emergency financial aid of \$10 million was given to maintain the security of the monarchy, with additional funding to continue throughout the years.

⁵⁵ “Israel Is a Strategic Asset in the Struggle against the Islamic State,” *Friends of Israel Initiative*, October 2014, accessed March 9, 2015, <http://www.friendsofisraelinitiative.org/uploads/alerts/pdfs/26.pdf>.

Peace Process

The term the Middle East “peace process” is fairly new, coming into use in the mid-1970s to characterize American-led efforts to arbitrate peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.⁵⁶

William B. Quandt, in his book, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (1993), discusses peace as a process. Specifically, he indicates that since 1967, the United States has come to understand that peace is more of a process than a state of being. America’s legalistic and practical approach to diplomacy and peace is representative of its political culture. By approaching peace as a set of procedures, the United States is better able to compromise, allowing politicians to more flexibility achieve long-term goals. In fact, a large part of the United States constitutional theory addresses how issues should be resolved rather than what should be done. In terms of Arab-Israeli peace, American involvement in the peace process combines both process and substance, providing both direction and mechanism. “That, at its best, is what the “peace process” has been about. At worst, it has been little more than a slogan used to mask the marking of time.”⁵⁷

After the Six-Day War in June of 1967, the United States’ view toward the Arab-Israeli conflict significantly altered to the benefit of Israel. American officials came to the conclusion that “... the United States should support Israel’s retention of the territories occupied in the 1967 war until the Arab parties were prepared to offer peace, recognition

⁵⁶ William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), 1.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

and security to Israel.”⁵⁸ This new view would shape American foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict for many decades to come.

In the months following the Six-Day War of June 1967, the United States used its influence in the United Nations Security Council to broker a peace settlement that would substantiate its view of the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Subsequently, the United States’ intensive efforts led the Security Council to pass Resolution 242, adopted on November 22, 1967.⁵⁹ The resolution called for the:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.⁶⁰

The resolution was accepted by Israel, Egypt, and Jordan but rejected by Syria. No peace, negotiations, or recognition of Israel marked this period. Consequently, the United States’ support of Israel has continued in an attempt to convince the Arab states to accept the status quo and offer peace or recognition to Israel.⁶¹ The United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 have provided a framework for subsequent Arab-Israeli peace settlement negotiations.

In the late 1970s, President Carter and his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, led active efforts to bring about a peace settlement between Egypt and Israel. In September

⁵⁸ William B. Quandt, “American Proposals for Arab-Israeli Peace,” in *Middle East Peace Plans*, ed., Willard A. Beling (New York: St. Martin’s Press Inc., 1986), 70.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁶⁰ “Decisions: Resolution 242 (1967),” United Nations, accessed March 15, 2015, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/242\(1967\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/242(1967)).

⁶¹ Quandt, “American Proposals for Arab-Israeli Peace,” 71.

1978, President Carter, Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, signed the Camp David Accords. On March 26, 1979, Egypt officially signed a peace treaty with Israel.⁶² The historical Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, to some extent, has significantly undermined Arab perceptions toward Israel, isolated Egypt from the Arab states' perspective, and paved the way for peace negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Following the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, the United States and the Soviet Union sponsored the Madrid Conference for Peace in the Middle East. The conference was attended by Egyptian, Israeli, Lebanese, Syrian, and joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegations. This event marked the first time that conflicting Arab-Israeli parties met to participate in direct negotiations. Following the conference, Israeli, Syrian, Jordanian, and Palestinian representatives continued to meet for bilateral and multilateral talks in Washington, DC and Moscow. By 1993, the Washington talks were at a stalemate and were then superseded by secret Palestinian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli negotiations. These secret negotiations between Israel, the PLO, and Jordan resulted in the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo I) of September 13, 1993, The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of October 26, 1994,⁶³ and, later, The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II) of September 28, 1995. Jordanian efforts to bring about a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict was mainly

⁶² "Camp David Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," US Department of State Office of the Historian, accessed March 17, 2015, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david>.

⁶³ "The Madrid Conference, 1991," US Department of State Office of the Historian, accessed March 23, 2015, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/madrid-conference>.

based on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and the Arab Leagues Summits Resolutions.

Madiha Rashid Al Madfai, in her book, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974-1991* (1993), explains Jordan's strategy on the Arab-Israeli peace settlement stating:

The framework for Jordan's diplomatic strategy for peace [in the Middle East] is based on the following factors: Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 and 338 of 22 October 1973; the 1974 Rabat Summit Resolution; and the 1982 Fez Peace Plan. The ultimate aim is to secure Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories including East Jerusalem and to restore the national rights of the Palestinian people in return for a permanent, just and comprehensive peace in the region.⁶⁴

Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, the Jordanian government became actively involved in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. In the early 1990's King Hussein determined that peace with Israel was in Jordan's best interests, given their military prowess, the development of the Palestinian national movement, and the need to regain Western support and secure the region. These factors together led to the signing of The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty in October 1994. After King Abdullah II took power in 1999, he continued a semi-cordial relationship with Israel in order to maintain the United States, Western, and international financial institutions' foreign assistance upon which the Kingdom is heavily dependent.⁶⁵

The previously referenced, George P. Shultz made a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in regard to Jordan's vital role in the Middle East peace

⁶⁴ Madiha Rashid Al Madfai, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974-1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 12.

⁶⁵ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, March 17, 2015, 3.

process. In his statement, “Jordan and the Middle East Peace Process,” (1985), Shultz clarifies:

Jordan has been actively preparing the Arabs to engage in a process leading to a comprehensive peace.... Jordan reestablished diplomatic relations with Egypt, thereby reducing Egypt’s isolation, underscoring once again Jordan’s moderate role and reinforcing the principle that no state should be ostracized or penalized for making peace. This strengthened the Arab moderates. At about the same time, Israeli Prime Minister Peres announced his willingness to enter into negotiations with Jordan without preconditions.... Jordan hosted a Palestine National Council session in Amman—in defiance of Syrian opposition. At that session, King Hussein publicly challenged the PLO ... to accept UN Security Council Resolution 242, to abandon the call for an independent Palestinian state, and to embark with Jordan on a path of peace negotiations.⁶⁶

Finally, it is important to point out that Jordan has retained a key role in advancing the peace process between the Palestinians and Israeli based on the two-state solution. Resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict remains one of the highest priorities of the Jordanian foreign policy. Jordan’s vision toward the Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement has converged with the key Western powers. This is especially the case with the American and the British, who gave Jordan a unique role in any peace talk, negotiation, or accord since the Madrid Conference of 1991. In recent times, “The United States and Jordan share the mutual goals of a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East.”⁶⁷

Moreover, to promote a peaceful settlement between Palestinians and Israelis, Jordan has endorsed Arab, non-Arab, regional, and international peace initiatives that may restore the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people. Peace initiatives

⁶⁶ George Pratt Shultz, “Jordan and the Middle East Peace Process,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, June 19, 1985), 2.

⁶⁷ “U.S. Relations with Jordan,” US Department of State, July 3, 2014, accessed March 27, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3464.htm>.

presented by the United States include, but are not limited to: The 1991 Madrid Conference for Peace in the Middle East, The 2000 Camp David Summit, The 2003 Road Map for Peace, and The 2010 Middle East Peace Talks.

CHAPTER V

THE UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

The foreign policy of the United States toward Jordan has been shaped since the early years of the Cold War. On January 31, 1949, the United States established its diplomatic relations with the newly independent Kingdom. Since that time, the United States has appreciated the distinctive role of the Jordanian leadership in advancing peace and promoting democracy, as well as modernization in the Middle East region. Furthermore, the United States and Jordan share mutual visions, objectives, and interests toward achieving just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in the region. In April 1957, the White House stated that “the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital,”¹ to the United States. Immediately, the Eisenhower administration provided Jordan with \$10 million of emergency financial aid, military assistance, and diplomatic support to ensure sustainability of Jordan and its regime.

This chapter provides contemporary analyses of the most crucial political and economic issues impacting the United States and Jordan's relations during the past four American presidents: the Republicans George H. W. Bush (1989-1993) and George W. Bush (2001-2009) and the Democrats, Bill Clinton (1993-2001) and Barack H. Obama (2009-2014).

¹ Nyrop, Jordan a Country Study, 32.

The United States' Foreign Policy toward Jordan
during the George H. W. Bush Presidency (1989-1993)

On January 20, 1989, George H. W. Bush was inaugurated as the forty-first President of the United States. The Republican President previously served as the United States House of Representative Congressman from Texas, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Chief of the United States Liaison Office to China, the director of Central Intelligence, and Vice President from 1981-1989 under President Reagan. Following his inauguration, President Bush spent a large part of his efforts on foreign affairs as Presidents generally have more control in this arena than in domestic affairs.²

The years of Bush's presidency witnessed dramatic changes in world affairs. The most prominent world events that took place during Bush's term in office included Panama, the ending of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany with Eastern Europe, break of the Gulf War, the formation of an unprecedented military coalition of 32 nations to liberate Kuwait, the reduction of the threat of nuclear war, a democratic Russia replaced the Soviet Union, the Baltic states became free, US-Soviet relations changed, the New World Order was announced, the world system transformed from bipolar to unipolar, and the United States became the world's sole economic, military, and political superpower.³

² "George H. W. Bush: Foreign Affairs," Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, accessed March 29, 2015, <http://millercenter.org/president/biography/bush-foreign-affairs>.

³ "George Herbert Walker Bush Biography," George Bush Presidential Library and Museum, accessed March 31, 2015, <http://bush41.org/biography>.

The Political Arena

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, King Hussein immediately placed a phone call to President Saddam Hussein of Iraq in an initial attempt to reach a settlement to resolve the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis. Saddam assured the King that if the Arab states were tolerant to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he would endeavor to begin a gradual recall of troops and complete his pullout of the emirate within weeks. After speaking with Saddam, the King met with the Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, to convene a mini-summit of the Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, Kuwaiti, and Saudi leaders to resolve the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis. In the meantime, both the King and President Mubarak spoke by phone to American President Bush, who regarded the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as totally unacceptable and voiced his opposition. They asked that he delay any American action and to allow the Arabs time to resolve the crisis within the Arab League. Further, they told Bush that it was just a matter of days that Saddam Hussein would withdraw his military troops from Kuwait.⁴

On August 3, 1990, King Hussein met with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. In that meeting the King ensured two objectives: first, he persuaded Saddam to participate in a mini-summit in Jeddah on August 5. Second, he convinced Saddam to withdraw his military troops from Kuwait within hours if the Arab League did not put down the Iraqi invasion - the last point was deemed important for Saddam because any direct censure of Saddam by the Arab League would create a sense of embarrassment for him. This condemnation could change the perception of withdrawal to that of a humiliating defeat.

⁴ Nigel Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 267-68.

The King believed he had successfully advanced the goal of containing the crisis.

Unfortunately, although the King's diplomacy was to some extent successful, it was undermined when the Egyptian government first, and later the Arab League Foreign Ministers, met on August 3 in Cairo and unexpectedly condemned the Iraqi invasion. Marwan Al-Qassim, the Jordanian Foreign Minister and Representative to the Arab League meeting of Foreign Ministers in Cairo, abstained from voting due to his concern that this would be promoting intervention by outside parties. Jordanian officials were suspicious of the United States, convincing Egypt and Saudi Arabia to relinquish hope of a negotiating a permanent solution. Following the adoption of a resolution condemning the Iraqi invasion, Saddam abandoned any plans for withdrawal, whether real or otherwise, and refused to attend the Arab Summit in Jeddah.⁵

The Egyptian President called an emergency Arab Summit, to be convened in Cairo on August 10th, to discuss the ongoing Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis. The Jordanian King participated in the summit in an attempt to bring about a peaceful solution. As a result of this summit, the Arab League officially adopted a resolution (Resolution 195) condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It further called for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, reasserted Kuwait's sovereignty, and additionally responded to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states' requests to shift Arab forces to defend Saudi Arabia and the regional security of the Gulf states. Jordan and some other Arab states abstained from the vote.⁶ The Jordanian neutral

⁵ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 268-69.

⁶ *White Paper: Jordan and the Gulf Crisis August 1990-March 1991* (Amman: The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1991), 6-24.

position was interpreted as an expression of sympathy for Saddam Hussein from both the Arab states, especially the Gulf states, and also the United States.

The Arab League “Resolution 195” adopted at the Extraordinary Arab Summit in Cairo on August 10, 1990, decided the following:

... (3) To condemn Iraqi aggression against the brotherly state of Kuwait and not to recognise the Iraqi decision to annex Kuwait or any consequences arising from the invasion of Iraqi troops of Kuwait territory. (4) To call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the return to the state it was in before 1 August. (5) To reaffirm Kuwait sovereignty, its independence and regional security ... (6) To respond to Saudi Arabia’s and other Gulf States’ request to transfer Arab forces to support their armed forces to defend their territories and regional security against any outside invasion.⁷

Nigel Ashton, in his book, *King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life* (2008), states the following about King Hussein’s position of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait:

... although the King genuinely sought a withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, his expressions of sympathy for Iraq, and his belief that Iraq would have to be offered concessions to secure a settlement, made his position unacceptable both to the United States and to the majority of the Arab states.⁸

After the Arab League adopted a resolution condemning the Iraqi invasion, Jordan found itself isolated from the majority of the Arab states. Subsequently, on August 16, 1990, King Hussein met with President Bush in Kennebunkport, Maine to discuss the ongoing Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis. The King tried to persuade Bush to keep the crisis within the Arab framework, find a diplomatic solution to the entire crisis, and avoid the military option. Ultimately, the King’s attempt to convince Bush and his administration to reach a peaceful settlement of the crisis was unsuccessful. Furthermore, American officials argued that the King was defending Saddam Hussein. In his memoirs, Bush recorded that

⁷ *White Paper*, 23-24.

⁸ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 270-71.

the King “Pressed for some middle ground that could solve the problem, and I kept saying, there isn’t any – it’s got to be withdrawal and restoration of the Kuwaiti regime.”⁹ The meeting damaged relations between the two nations and displayed how far apart the United States and Jordan’s policies were from each other at that time. The Bush administration was disappointed with the King’s position and tension between the two countries grew.

In the months following the crisis, the Jordanian King continued to persuade all the parties involved in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis to find a diplomatic resolution to the crisis within the Arab framework instead of war. While King Hussein played a significant role in the Iraq-Iran War of 1980-1988 as a mediator between the Iraqi government and the United States, the King’s efforts to resolve the Iraqi-Kuwait crisis reached a dead end. His prior efforts were completely forgotten and crucially undermined during the Iraqi invasion. Jordanian efforts to stop the war were effectively rejected by both Arabs and Americans.

As the internationally-led airstrike campaign against Iraq started, the Jordanian government expressed more sympathy for the Iraqi people. On February 6, 1991, King Hussein delivered a firm speech to his nation, which was brought about by the death of Jordanian truck drivers by an American airstrike while on the Baghdad-Amman highway. In his speech, the King sharply denounced the United States and its allies’ war against Iraq, declaring that the allied war effort was “against all Arabs and all Muslims and not

⁹ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 271.

against Iraq alone.”¹⁰ Further, he indicated that the allied forces were seeking to exercise a foreign hegemony in the Middle East, stating that the Western alliance intention was to “destroy Iraq and reorganize the area in a manner far more dangerous to our people than the Sykes-Picot agreement.”¹¹ Disappointed, the United States responded to this speech by suspending aid to Jordan and promising to review plans for future aid as well.¹² In addition, Secretary of State, James A. Baker III told *The Washington Post*, “Although the United States ‘fundamentally disagrees’ with King Hussein of Jordan’s harsh criticism of the war against Iraq, alternatives to Hussein are not ‘particularly pretty’ and it is important to keep communications with the king open.”¹³

Three days later, President Bush swiftly sent a personal, harsh letter to King Hussein articulating his dissatisfaction:

I am not going to hide my deep disappointment with your speech of February 6. I had not expected ... to read such a vitriolic attack on the intentions and actions of the multinational coalition that is liberating Kuwait ... your words exculpate Saddam Hussein for the most serious and most brazen crime against the Arab nation by another Arab in modern times ... If we do not agree on these matters, so be it. But we must understand that a public, political posture that takes Jordan so far from the international and Arab consensus has damaged very seriously the prospects for eliciting international help for Jordan. If I am circumspect in my own public views on your accusations, it is only because I continue to place value, however unrequited, in your nation’s well-being and stability.¹⁴

¹⁰ Alan Cowell, “Jordan; Jordanian Ends Neutrality, Assailing Allied War Effort,” *New York Times*, February 7, 1991.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Garfinkle, “Jordanian Policy,” 311-12.

¹³ John M. Goshko, “Jordan Aid Reviewed after Criticism; Baker Cites Need for Communication,” *Washington Post*, February 8, 1991.

¹⁴ George H. W. Bush, “President George H. W. Bush’s Letter to King Hussein I of Jordan,” February 9, 1991, quoted in Nigel Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 280.

The Economic Arena

The Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 negatively impacted the Jordanian economy, perhaps the most of any country outside of Iraq and Kuwait. By the time the crisis broke out, Jordan was hosting more than a million refugees. Approximately 300,000 of these returnees from the Gulf states became permanent residents in the Kingdom. The tremendous influx of returnees placed a significant strain on the already limited Jordanian sectors such as education, health care, housing, and transportation. In addition, the influx of returnees increased the demand on the country's limited water supplies and infrastructure, causing an increase in the cost of living. These factors led to an increase in poverty and around 30% unemployment,¹⁵ compared to United States unemployment 25% during the great depression 1929-1941.

The Gulf crisis and its subsequent United Nations' economic trade sanctions against Iraq created serious trade difficulty for the Jordanian state. Jordan's political position on the crisis, and later its hesitation to implement the United Nations trade embargo sanctions on Iraq, paved the way for the United States to threaten to close the Gulf of Aqaba, Jordan's only port outlet to the external world. Two weeks after the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, President Bush told the *Los Angeles Times* that he would block Jordan's only seaport if they did not join in the embargo.¹⁶ This seriously damaged

¹⁵ "History: Seeking Peace: Jordan's Stand in the Gulf Crisis," The Royal Hashemite Court, accessed April 1, 2015, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_peace.html.

¹⁶ David Lauter, "Bush Threatens Jordan Port, Will Meet King in U.S.," *Los Angeles Times*, August 15, 1990.

Jordan's trade relations with the world community, and Jordan was most especially concerned as "nearly 40 percent of Jordan's economy depended on Iraq."¹⁷

According to the *Los Angeles Times*, Bush's statement marked the first direct threat to Jordan:

The [Bush's] statement marked the first direct threat during the current [Gulf] crisis of hostile American action against an Arab country other than Iraq, and it demonstrated the tremendous pressure being exerted on Middle Eastern nations to choose sides in the 12-day-old confrontation.¹⁸

Undoubtedly, the first six months of the Gulf crisis was a very difficult period in the modern history of Jordan, damaging its relations with traditional Arab and Western allies as well as creating severe economic difficulties. In fact, the crisis may have cost Jordan as much as three billion dollars considering the impact on trade and declining revenues. Despite the negative impact on Jordanian relations and economy through the interruption of commerce, Jordan ultimately adhered to the mandated United Nations' sanctions against Iraq.¹⁹

In addition to the economic difficulties that Jordan faced as a result of the Gulf crisis, the United States suspended foreign aid to Jordan as a response to King Hussein's speech on February 6, 1991. In this regard, James A. Baker III told *CBS's Face the Nation* that the United States may cut its foreign aid to Jordan, stating, "[We] must allocate our foreign aid in a way that makes the most sense from the national interest

¹⁷ Abu Jaber, "Jordan and the Gulf War," 370.

¹⁸ Lauter, "Bush Threatens Jordan Port."

¹⁹ The Royal Hashemite Court, "Seeking Peace."

standpoint.”²⁰ The United States Senate also expressed its deep resentment of the King for supporting the Iraqi regime during the Gulf crisis. On March 20, 1991, the Senate voted to rescind \$55 million in economic and military assistance to Jordan. Moreover, Senator Don Nickles of Oklahoma said the following regarding Jordan: “After billions of dollars of aid from the United States, Jordan actively opposed the United States and the United Nations by giving political and moral support to Saddam Hussein.”²¹

In a letter to the Senate, President Bush warned of the impact of the recession on the Jordanian government stating “Jordanian stability remains important to the region and to U.S. interests -- and indeed to Israel’s interests -- and Jordan could play a significant role in postwar diplomacy, especially in the Arab-Israeli peace process.”²² In response to Bush’s letter, the Senate approved resuming aid to Jordan on a conditional basis as long as the President agreed to certify and report to congressional committees on Jordan’s progress in advancing the peace process in the Middle East. Alternatively, if it could be shown that the aid would contribute to the peace process then the aid would be restarted. The President signed a waiver allowing Jordan to receive eventually all of the FY 1991 and FY 1992 aid funds after the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli agreement to a bilateral agenda on September 17, 1993.²³

²⁰ “Feb. ‘91 WSJ Article on Jordan King Hussein and Saddam,” IMRA, March 16, 2003, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=16173>.

²¹ Martin Tolchin, “Senate Backs Bill that Withholds \$55 Million Aid Plan for Jordan,” *New York Times*, March 21, 1991.

²² Ibid.

²³ Knowles, *Jordan since 1989*, 124.

Impact on the Peace Process in the Middle East

As the Gulf crisis came to an end, the Bush administration transitioned quickly toward sponsoring peace diplomacy to mend the Arab-Israeli conflict. On March 6, 1991, President Bush informed Congress that he intended to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli dispute.²⁴ Consequently, Bush's speech was followed by an intensified diplomatic campaign by James A. Baker III, culminating in the convening of the Madrid Conference for Peace in the Middle East at the end of October 1991.

King Hussein was similarly motivated to repair the strained relations with the United States. On February 28, 1991, the King wrote a letter in which he congratulated President Bush for liberating Kuwait. In his letter the King stated:

... well done my friend and you will find me more than ever determined to contribute my utmost to the healing of wounds and to the opening of a new and bright chapter in the history of this region for the benefit of its future generations. We shall commit ourselves to the renewal of the best Jordanian/American and Arab/American relations on sound, clear and solid foundations.²⁵

On April 20, 1991, James A. Baker III paid a visit to Aqaba to discuss the Middle East peace process with King Hussein. According to *The Washington Post*, "The meeting was the first high-level U.S. contact with Hussein since he visited President Bush in Kennebunkport, Maine, shortly after Iraq invaded Kuwait last August."²⁶ In his meeting with the King, Baker indicated that Washington hoped that Amman would play a key role

²⁴ US Department of State Office of the Historian, "The Madrid Conference, 1991."

²⁵ King Hussein I of Jordan, "King Hussein's Letter to President George H. W. Bush," February 28, 1991, quoted in Nigel Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 282.

²⁶ John M. Goshko, "Baker Predicts Saudis Will not Join Peace Bid: Israeli Support May Be Affected if Riyadh Declines Negotiations," *Washington Post*, April 21, 1991.

in the peace process. The Baker-Hussein meeting marked a new beginning in American-Jordanian relations.

According to the previously referenced Nigel Ashton book, *King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life* (2008), the American peace process allowed King Hussein to show his commitment to the region:

The American-led peace process which followed the [Gulf] war, and which was to culminate in the convening of the Madrid peace conference at the end of October 1991, was soon to give [King] Hussein the opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to this new beginning in the [Middle East] region.²⁷

In short, US-Jordan relations which were damaged during the first six months of the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, contributed to Jordan's isolation because of its stand on the Gulf War. Subsequently, its relations with the Arab states that were against Saddam Hussein worsened and its ties with Washington were also negatively impacted. United Nations sanctions against Iraq significantly affected the fragile Jordanian economy. As the Gulf War came to a close, US-Jordan relations began to warm. Baker visited Aqaba in late April 1991, and his meeting with King Hussein to discuss the peace process in the Middle East was considered a turning point in American-Jordanian relations. The Bush administration, like the previous ones, asserted that the stability of the Jordanian state is in the best interest of the United States and its allies in the region. Furthermore, it recognized the importance of the King's role, specifically, in any peace initiative in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

It is important to point out that King Hussein and President Bush had a strong personal friendship dating back to 1976 when Bush was the director of Central

²⁷ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 282.

Intelligence. Since 1976, the relationship between the two grew significantly. However, during the Gulf crisis of 1990 -1991, both leaders had a different view of the crisis and were both disillusioned by the course of events. After the Gulf crisis had come to a close, the relationship between them was recharged and consequently impacted their countries positively. In fact, after King Hussein's death, President George H. W. Bush accompanied Presidents Clinton, Carter, and Ford on a trip to Amman to pay tribute to the King.

The United States' Foreign Policy toward Jordan during the Bill Clinton Presidency (1993-2001)

The first inauguration of William Jefferson Clinton (Bill Clinton) as the forty-second President of the United States was on January 20, 1993. In 1996, after President Clinton won reelection, becoming the first Democratic President since Franklin D. Roosevelt to be elected twice. Following his inauguration, Clinton was credited with the most extensive economic expansion in the country's history, creating over twenty-two million jobs.²⁸

In international affairs, Clinton focused on promoting American interests abroad and encouraged democracy in less developed countries. In addition, his administration devoted much of its efforts toward expanding international trade, launching peace and trade initiatives in Africa and the Middle East, promoting a framework for peace aimed at

²⁸ "President Clinton," Clinton Foundation, accessed April 5, 2015, <https://www.clintonfoundation.org/about/president-clinton>.

ending the strife in Northern Ireland, and intervening in Bosnia²⁹ and other former parts of Yugoslavia to end ‘ethnic cleansing.’

The Political Arena

Clinton’s foreign policy was centered on broadening the peace process in the Middle East. He played an important role in mediating the peace negotiations between Israel, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Jordan. Clinton’s efforts resulted in the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo I) of September 13, 1993, The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of October 26, 1994, and The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II) of September 28, 1995. However, Clinton was unable to bring about a peace agreement between Israel and Syria.

The Madrid Conference of 1991 represented the foundation for all peace talks in the Middle East. Thereafter, bilateral talks between Israel and Jordan continued in Washington, DC. On September 14, 1993, the bilateral talks resulted in the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian Common Agenda that addressed security, water, refugees and displaced people, borders, and territorial matters. It also paved the way for intensive negotiations leading to a formal peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. On July 25, 1994, the continuous efforts of Clinton culminated in the official signing of the Washington Declaration between King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel.³⁰

²⁹ Clinton Foundation, “President Clinton.”

³⁰ Ahmed Abukhater, *Water as a Catalyst for Peace: Transboundary Water Management and Conflict Resolution* (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 94-95.

Mohammad Ali Al-Rousan, in his article, “American-Israeli Relations during President Bill Clinton’s Reign,” (2013), reiterates Mahmoud Ulayyan Oleimat’s sentiment (2000) about President Clinton role in The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of October 26, 1994:

Clinton’s efforts resulted in the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli agenda on 14 September, 1993 as a continuity of the application of what resulted from a trilateral summit which included King Hussein, Clinton and Rabin in Washington on July 25, 1994 who signed “Washington Statement” which confirmed a comprehensive peace agreement based on resolutions 242 and 338.³¹

Furthermore, in his news conference with King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin on July 26, 1994, President Clinton stated:

... history has been made in Washington, and a brighter future has been built, a future that offers more peace and security, not only for the people of Israel and Jordan but also for the people of the United States. With great courage and foresight, the King and the Prime Minister have united in their conviction that it is time to end more than four decades of bloodshed and loss.... They have declared an end to the state of war between their two countries and have determined to secure a lasting peace. They have personally committed to making sure that a treaty is concluded as rapidly as possible.³²

Following the Washington Declaration of July 25, 1994, the tireless efforts of Clinton quickly turned into a permanent peace agreement. On October 26, 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty in a historic ceremony held at the bordering Wadi Arabah (Arabah Valley) crossing between Jordan and Israel. The signing ceremony garnered a large attendance from Jordan, Israel, the United States, and some Arab states. The ceremony was also attended by President Clinton, who signed the treaty next to the Prime

³¹ Mahmoud Ulayyan Oleimat, quoted in Mohammad Ali Al-Rousan, “American-Israeli Relations during President Bill Clinton’s Reign,” *European Scientific Journal* 9, no. 11 (April 2013): 208.

³² William J. Clinton, “The President’s News Conference with King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel,” July 26, 1994, The American Presidency Project, accessed April 7, 2015, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50546>.

Ministers from Jordan and Israel. By signing this historic treaty, Jordan became the second Arab state to have signed a peace treaty with Israel.

In his statement, “Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty at the Border between Israel and Jordan,” (1994), Clinton indicated that there was proof of peace between Jordan and Israel:

Today we see the proof of it, for peace between Jordan and Israel is no longer a mirage. It is real. It will take root in this soil. It will grow to great heights and shelter generations to come.³³

Clyde Haberman, in his article, “Israel and Jordan Sign a Peace Accord,” (1994), discussed the relief experienced that day:

For King Hussein, the day brought full rehabilitation with the United States, after the isolation he had brought on himself four years ago by seeming to side with Iraq in the Persian Gulf war.³⁴

In addition, during the Clinton presidency, Jordan’s outlook on Iraq changed in 1995 after it committed to a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. This achievement relieved a primary security stressor and allowed for a stronger relationship with the United States, a reliable source of financial assistance. Jordan also committed to provision of sanctions and refuge to individuals who defected in 1995 including Hussein Kamil (President Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law) and his family. King Hussein also publicly highlighted the Hashemite association with Iraq, accused Baghdad of undermining the Arab world by its invasion of Kuwait and praised Kamil. The King not only made public statements, but also visited the Iraqi opposition; he even went so far as to meet with some of the

³³ William J. Clinton, “Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty at the Border between Israel and Jordan,” *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, (October 26, 1994): 1877-78.

³⁴ Clyde Haberman, “Israel and Jordan Sign a Peace Accord,” *New York Times*, October 27, 1994.

opposition's leaders in London in late 1995 and early 1996. The King supported the Iraqi National Accord (INA) effort to overthrow Saddam in 1996 and permitted them to open a bureau and a radio transmission location in Amman.³⁵ The United States was also allowed to deploy planes in Jordan "to help patrol the no-fly zone and undertake training exercises with the Jordanian air force.[Finally] Jordan restricted its barter exchange with Iraq to \$220 million in 1996."³⁶

On September 25, 1996, Clinton notified Congress of his intent to designate Jordan as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the United States. On November 12, 1996, Congress approved the President's request and Jordan became officially an MNNA of the United States. The MNNA status made Jordan more eligible for much needed, vast United States' military assistance, defense articles, and equipment.³⁷

Immediately following the signing of The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty in October 1994, Capitol Hill backed the Clinton administration's recommendation to forgive Jordan's debt to the United States (nearly \$700 million). Forgiveness of this debt and increase in Economic Support Fund (ESF) and Excess Defense Articles (EDA), underlined the United States' commitment to Jordan. ESF increased from \$7 million to \$10 million annually and \$100 million in EDA. In addition, there was also a \$15 million

³⁵ Beth K. Dougherty and Edmund A. Ghareeb, *Historical Dictionary of Iraq*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press Inc., 2013), 350.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Deborah K. Jones, "Major Non-NATO Ally Status for Jordan: National Security or Peace Process Politics?," Washington, DC, U.S. Army National Defense University Library, 1998, accessed April 10, 2015, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a441460.pdf>.

increase in Jordan's annual Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance.³⁸ In FY 1996, Jordan received \$200 million in FMF and \$1.2 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET).³⁹

The Economic Arena

After The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty was signed in 1994, the US-Jordan economic relations flourished significantly. The Clinton administration took considerable steps toward enhancing the economic growth of Jordan as a result of the peace treaty with Israel and demonstrated to the regional Arab countries the benefits of peace. Since the mid-1990s, both the United States and Jordan began taking vast steps toward expanding their economies, trades, and investments. Since then, several trade agreements have been signed to enhance the Jordanian economy which was deeply weakened during the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. On July 2, 1997, the United States and Jordan signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with an effective date of June 13, 2003. The BIT secured the United States' economic interests and aid for Jordan to foster its economy by forming an advantageous environment for their investment by the private sector. This private sector revenue stream further stimulated Jordan's economic development.⁴⁰

In November 1997, Jordan entered into a Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) agreement with the United States, which enabled the export of duty-free products to the United States and to expand and enhance its trade relations. The Jordanian QIZs played a

³⁸ Jones, "Major Non-NATO Ally Status for Jordan," 3-4.

³⁹ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, March 17, 2015, 19.

⁴⁰ "Jordan Bilateral Investment Treaty," The White House, May 23, 2000, accessed April 12, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43565.pdf>.

significant role in improving the economic growth of Jordan. Over the next five years, shifts in trades resulted in a substantial increase in exports from Jordan to the United States, growing from less than \$5 million in 1997 to \$164 million in 2001, while imports remained similar over the same term.⁴¹ According to the United States' Census Bureau, the United States imports from Jordan increased from \$18.8 million in 1993 to \$73.3 million in 2000. The United States exports to Jordan averaged \$334.55 million during the same period.⁴²

Between 1998 and 2005, Jordan was ranked as the eighth largest exporter to the United States, moving from the thirteenth spot among the twenty Middle-East-North African (MENA) entities.⁴³ On March 15, 1999, the United States and Jordan signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). The US-Jordan TIFA became the first one in the Middle East. The TIFA's primary role was to develop a Trade and Investment Council consisting of representatives from each government that met for its inaugural meeting in June 2000. Since then, Jordan has made noticeable advancements in adopting legislation that secures intellectual property rights and goes a long way toward fulfilling the requirements of the TRIPS* Agreement of the World Trade Organization

⁴¹ Royal Scientific Society, 2013, *The Future of Jordan's Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs)*, Amman: Royal Scientific Society, 6.

⁴² "Foreign Trade: Trade in Goods with Jordan," US Census Bureau, accessed April 15, 2015, <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5110.html>.

⁴³ Mary Jane Bolle, Alfred B. Prados, and Jeremy M. Sharp, *Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan and Egypt*, CRS Report RS22002 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Services, July 5, 2006), 3.

* The Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was negotiated in 1994, near the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). An international agreement, TRIPS is overseen by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and calls for a minimum standards for various types of intellectual property (IP). The regulations are applicable to nationals and WTO Members

(WTO). As a result, on December 10, 1998, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced the results of its out-of-cycle review and removed Jordan from the watch list during a Special 301 out-of-cycle review.⁴⁴

On December 17, 1999, the WTO General Council approved Jordan's accession package; on April 11, 2000, Jordan became an official member of the WTO. A few months later, on October 24, 2000, the United States and Jordan signed the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (USJFTA) with an effective date of December 17, 2001. These rapid subsequent trade agreements between the United States and Jordan came as a direct result of the signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Clearly, The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, the QIZs, the USJFTA, and the King's crucial role in the peace process significantly improved the Jordanian economic growth and attracted many foreign investors to the Kingdom.

The previously referenced Mohammad Ali Al-Rousan, in his article, "American-Israeli Relations during President Bill Clinton's Reign," (2013), credits Bill Clinton:

... Clinton was able to accomplish the file of Jordanian-Israeli settlement which included agreements that comprised economic, political and security dimensions that guaranteed secure borders for Israel and its entrance in the Arab market via the Jordanian gate represented in the economic interrelations and the establishment of Israeli economic installations in Jordanian free zones.⁴⁵

In the wake of the Clinton reign, the annual United States' foreign aid to Jordan increased significantly. Between FY 1998 and FY 2002, the United States' foreign aid to Jordan was roughly \$150 million and \$75 million, respectively. In addition to annual aid

⁴⁴ *Economic Impact on the United States of a U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement: Investigation No. 332-418* (Washington, DC: US International Trade Commission, 2000), 4-6.

⁴⁵ Mohammad Ali Al-Rousan, "American-Israeli Relations during President Bill Clinton's Reign," *European Scientific Journal* 9, no. 11 (April 2013): 209.

funds, Jordan received \$300 million as part of a singular package spread over FY 1999 and FY 2000 in order to support the Wye River Agreement (which was a US-sponsored Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement that the late King Hussein helped negotiate in 1998).⁴⁶

Deborah K. Jones, in her white paper, “Major Non-NATO Ally Status for Jordan: National Security or Peace Process Politics?,” (1998), states President Clinton was thorough in his search for peace:

... What is clear, however, is that the [Clinton] Administration during this period was seeking every possible means to bring “the fruits of peace” to Jordan and to reward King Hussein for having signed a treaty of peace with Israel in October 1994.⁴⁷

The United States’ Foreign Policy toward Jordan during the George W. Bush Presidency (2001-2009)

Following a difficult presidential campaign against Vice President Albert Gore, George W. Bush became the forty-third President of the United States. His first term in office survived the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States. This attack was the first ever deadly terrorist attack on American soil by foreign nationals. In response to this attack, President Bush declared a War on Terrorism that morphed into a broad range attack on terrorists and any entities that buoyed terrorism anywhere in the

⁴⁶ Alfred B. Prados, *CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues*, CRS Report IB93085 (Washington DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, updated April 26, 2006), 11.

⁴⁷ Jones, “Major Non-NATO Ally Status for Jordan,” 3-4.

world. Born out of this effort, the War in Afghanistan began in October 2001 and the War in Iraq in March 2003.⁴⁸

After the September 11th events, President Bush reorganized much of the federal government, establishing a National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Council. In addition, the position of Director of National Intelligence and the USA Freedom Corps were also created. Some of the changes made were in an effort to stimulate American citizens to support humanitarian causes and look beyond themselves.⁴⁹ Internationally, President Bush immediately declared a global “War on Terrorism.” On September 20, 2001, before a joint session of Congress, Bush stated “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there.... we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”⁵⁰ On October 7, 2001, the United States launched its War on Terrorism by bombing significant Taliban and Al-Qaeda targets across Afghani soil. Almost two years later, Bush announced the war against Iraq on March 19, 2003. It should be noted that the September 11th events greatly expanded the presidential power to an unprecedented level. Subsequently, the Bush internationally-led campaign on

⁴⁸ “The President & Family: George W. Bush,” George W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum, accessed April 19, 2015, <https://www.georgewbushlibrary.smu.edu/en/The-President-and-Family/George-W-Bush.aspx>.

⁴⁹ George W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum, “The President & Family: George W. Bush.”

⁵⁰ George W. Bush. “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,” *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, (September 20, 2001): 1141-42.

terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq was backed by Congress to maintain the national security interests of the United States around the world.

The Political Arena

In response to the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States, the Bush administration immediately began assembling a multi-nation task force against the global terrorist threat personified by Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban on September 12, 2001. The United States was joined by over sixty nations supporting the campaign against the global War on Terrorism including significant military support deployed to the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility.⁵¹

On September 13, 2001, President Bush contacted the United States' allies including Jordan's King Abdullah II in order to gain international consensus in support of his campaign against terrorism. The King expressed Jordan's condolences to President Bush and the American people and pledged full support to the US-led campaign against the global War on Terrorism. Shortly after the attacks, the King was the first Arab leader who traveled to Washington, DC. In a joint press conference with the President on September 28, 2001, King Abdullah II pledged "full, unequivocal support" for the United States' policy against terrorism. At the beginning of the press conference, Bush stated that "Jordan is a strong, strong friend of America. And right after September 11th, one of the early messages I received was from His Majesty, expressing the condolences of the

⁵¹ "Fact Sheet: International Contributions to the War against Terrorism," US Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs, June 7, 2002, accessed April 23, 2015, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/May2002/d20020523cu.pdf>.

Jordanian people, as well as his own personal condolences.”⁵² Further, the President praised the Jordanian cooperation with the United States and assured the King that the United States “war is against evil, not against Islam.” King Abdullah II told the President that “... we will stand by you in these very difficult times.... true friends must stand with each other, and we’ll be by your side and we’ll be there to support you.”⁵³

Since the September 11, 2001 events, Jordan took several steps to support the US-led campaign against global terrorism. In December 2001, Jordan sent a mine-clearing unit and military personnel to clear mines in Bagram and Qandahar, dispatched a military medical field hospital to Mazar-e-Sharif to provide medical care for Afghan people, and provided allowed all United States and coalition forces to base in and fly over Jordan.⁵⁴

Patricia Skinner, in her book, *Countries of the World: Jordan* (2003), observes the following about King Abdullah II role in supporting US-led campaign against terrorism:

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, King Abdullah II pledged Jordan’s support for the U.S.-led coalition against global terrorism and was the first Arab leader to travel to the United States after the attacks.⁵⁵

According to the *Jordanian Embassy* in Washington, DC:

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Jordan stood with the U.S. in its effort to combat the common threat of terrorism and radical ideology. The two sides have worked together and with the international community to rid the world

⁵² George W. Bush, “Remarks Prior to Discussion with King Abdullah II of Jordan and an Exchange with Reporters,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents vol. 37, no. 39, October 1, 2001, 1386.

⁵³ Ibid., 1387.

⁵⁴ US Department of Defense, “International Contributions,” 7.

⁵⁵ Patricia Skinner, *Countries of the World: Jordan*, 1st ed. (Milwaukee, WI: Gareth Stevens Publishing, 2003), 78.

of the scourge of terrorism and end the threat posed to the national security of both countries.⁵⁶

In 2003, Jordan publicly opposed the American invasion of Iraq, denying the presence of United States Personnel in the Kingdom. Quietly, Amman denounced the invasion, fearing that a civil war could impact Iraq, but given its financial dependence on the United States and its neutrality in the Gulf War of 1991, felt forced to cooperate with the United States' war effort. Reportedly, several thousand American special operations forces operated out of western Jordan. Initially, Iraq also stopped exporting oil to Jordan, but Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states supplied Jordan for the next several years.⁵⁷

Politically, Jordan maintained its position against military action on Iraq; however, it covertly supported the US-led campaign against Saddam Hussein.⁵⁸ In addition, Jordan continued providing valuable intelligence about Al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups in both Iraq and Afghanistan to the United States. In 2006, these intelligence efforts resulted in the locating and killing of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq.⁵⁹

In response to the request of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Jordan accommodated a training program for Iraqi military and police from late 2003 through early 2007. This program resulted in the training of over 54,000 police. During the same

⁵⁶ "Jordan-US Relations Overview," Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, accessed April 27, 2015, <http://www.jordanembassyus.org/page/jordan-us-relations-overview>.

⁵⁷ Dougherty and Ghareeb, *Historical Dictionary of Iraq*, 351.

⁵⁸ Jeremy M. Sharp, *WikiLeaks Document Release, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, CRS Report RL33546 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, updated October 17, 2008), 13.

⁵⁹ Lasensky, "Iraq and Its Neighbors," 1-2.

period, Al-Zarqawi, carried out attacks against Jordan, including the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad in 2003 and hotels in Amman in 2005. Jordan did everything in its power to stop militants trying to move into Iraq, including growing its intelligence operations inside Iraq. After the hotel bombings, Jordan was able to provide allies with important information about Al-Zarqawi's location, leading to the 2006 airstrike that led to his death.⁶⁰

The Economic Arena

Economic relations between the United States and Jordan increased significantly during Bush's presidency. The US-Jordan trade agreements that were concluded in the wake of the Clinton administration remained active. On September 28, 2001, President Bush signed the USJFTA into public law. On December 17, 2001, the agreement went into force. By 2010, the United States and Jordan's duties on almost all products were eliminated after agreeing to a period of phased tariff reductions.⁶¹

In his press conference at the White House with King Abdullah II on September 28, 2001, President Bush told the King:

... as a welcoming gift, it is my honor to present you with a pen. This is no ordinary pen, since it's the pen I used to sign the Free Trade Agreement with Jordan this morning. At long last, we have, together, accomplished one of your main objectives in terms of economic cooperation, which is the Free Trade Agreement. I'm proud of the actions of our leadership in the House and the Senate from both political parties that recognize the importance of trade with Jordan.⁶²

⁶⁰ Dougherty and Ghareeb, *Historical Dictionary of Iraq*, 351.

⁶¹ "Jordan," Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed April 30, 2015, <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/middle-east/north-africa/jordan>.

⁶² Bush, "Remarks Prior to Discussion with King Abdullah II," 1387.

In 2007, trade relations between the United States and Jordan increased to an unprecedented level of seventy-eighth in overall trade volume as compared to others with whom the United States trades.⁶³ According to the United States Census Bureau, Jordan's imports from the United States increased from \$339 million to \$1,191.8 billion between 2001 and 2009 and Jordan's exports to the United States increased even more from \$229.2 million to \$924.1 million during the same period.⁶⁴

Following the September 11, 2001 events, the United States increased its foreign aid to Jordan. In FY 2002, Jordan received \$151.6 million in economic aid and \$77 million in military assistance. In addition, Jordan received \$100 million and \$25 million respectively in economic and military assistance as part of the FY 2002 Supplemental Fund. In FY 2003, Jordan received \$251 million in economic aid and \$200.4 million in military assistance. In addition, Jordan received an additional \$700 million and \$406 million respectively in economic and military assistance as part of the FY 2003 Emergency Supplemental Assistance. In FY 2004, Jordan received \$252.3 million in economic aid and \$208.9 million in military assistance. In addition, Jordan received an additional \$100 million in economic aid as part of the FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental Assistance. In FY 2005, Jordan received \$251.6 million in economic aid and \$209 million in military assistance. In addition, Jordan received an additional \$100 million and another \$100 million, respectively, in economic and military assistance as part of the FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental Assistance. In FY 2006, Jordan received \$249.1 million in economic aid and \$210.9 million in military assistance. In addition, Jordan received an

⁶³ Sharp, *WikiLeaks Document Release*, October 17, 2008, 18.

⁶⁴ US Census Bureau. "Foreign Trade: Trade in Goods with Jordan."

additional \$50 million in economic aid as part of the FY 2006 Supplemental Fund. In FY 2007, Jordan received \$245 million in economic aid and \$209.1 million in military assistance. In addition, Jordan received an additional \$10.3 million and \$45 million respectively in economic and military assistance as part of the FY 2007 Supplemental Fund. In FY 2008, Jordan received \$361.4 million in economic aid and \$301.2 million in military assistance. In addition, Jordan received an additional \$200 million and \$50 million, respectively in economic and military assistance as part of the FY 2008 Supplemental Fund. In FY 2009, Jordan received \$263.5 million in economic aid and \$238.1 million in military assistance. In addition, Jordan received an additional \$150 million and \$100 million, respectively in economic and military assistance as part of the FY 2009 Supplemental Fund. Jordan received this significant amount considering its support of United States' military operations in Iraq and to help defray the financial impact on Jordan's economy because of the war with Iraq. It was also hoped that the additional funds would strengthen its security and be applied to any logistical expenses resulting from supporting the United States' military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁶⁵

Overall, the US-Jordan relations remained strong during the era of George W. Bush. The United States' foreign aid to Jordan almost tripled from \$228.4 million in 2001 to \$651.6 million in 2009. The United States' foreign aid to Jordan during FY 2008 totaled circa \$10.23 billion, illustrating the Bush administration's gratitude for Jordan's participation in combating terrorism and rebuilding Iraq. A case may also be made that it

⁶⁵ Sharp, *WikiLeaks Document Release*, October 17, 2008, n. pag.

was in acknowledgment of Jordan's vulnerabilities considering the unstable and unpredictable region.⁶⁶

Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso, the editors of *Beyond the Facade: Political Reform in the Arab World* (2008), stated:

After the [US] war in Iraq [of 2003] began, Washington doubled its annual grants to Jordan to around \$450 million (\$250 million in economic aid and \$200 million in military assistance), in addition to more than a \$1 billion supplement to offset the effects of the [Iraqi] war on Jordan's economy and bolster its security.⁶⁷

The United States' Foreign Policy toward Jordan during the Barack H. Obama Presidency (2009-2014)

On January 20, 2009, Barack H. Obama was inaugurated as the forty-fourth President of the United States. He was the first ever African-American president and had the biggest winning percentage (79%) of any president in the past twenty years. He also enjoyed the support of having a strong Democratic majority in Congress. In November 2012, Obama won reelection for a second term after a tough competition with his Republican challenger, Mitt Romney.⁶⁸

During his election campaign for the presidency, Obama vowed to repair the United States' relations with the Islamic world and its image abroad, mend ties with Russia, limit possession of nuclear weapons throughout the world, become more selective

⁶⁶ Sharp, *WikiLeaks Document Release*, October 17, 2008, n. pag.

⁶⁷ Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso, eds., *Beyond the Facade: Political Reform in the Arab World* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 65.

⁶⁸ Kenneth Jost and the CQ Researcher Staff, "The Obama Presidency," *CQ Researcher* 19, no. 4 (January 2009): 73-77.

and strategic in choosing battles, and address climate change concerns.⁶⁹ After he had assumed power, Obama's policy was centered on fighting global terrorism through respective campaigns against the Afghani Taliban and various parts of the Al-Qaeda organization. At the same time, Obama's administration searched for ways to successfully extricate itself from large scale conflict and occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to these goals, President Obama struggled to limit nuclear proliferation by Iran, mediate the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and contain the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The Political Arena

Under the Obama administration, the United States has continued its global War on Terrorism. In his remarks in an address to the nation on "The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan" on December 1, 2009, Obama announced that he would send an additional 30,000 United States' military troops to Afghanistan by the first part of 2010. The President concluded that these troops were necessary to target the insurgent terrorists, to secure larger populated areas, to improve Afghan security force training, and to embed effective combat troops with them so more indigenous troops could pull their own weight. This would prepare for a successful transfer of responsibility to the Afghans at some point in the future. As a result of the Obama administration's efforts in Afghanistan, the United States has achieved notable progress on some significant objectives and increased the pressure on Al-Qaeda worldwide. These successes included

⁶⁹ Michael O'Hanlon, "Obama the Carpenter: The President's National Security legacy," The Brookings Institution, accessed May 3, 2015, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2015/05/obama-carpenter-national-security-legacy-ohanlon>.

neutralizing high-ranking Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, as well as preventing the Taliban from stopping a presidential election. This was instrumental in producing a new government that is consistent with Afghanistan's laws and constitution.⁷⁰ In his 2012 re-election campaign, Obama pledged to end the war in Afghanistan during 2014 and, indeed, on December 28, 2014, a formal ceremony marked the end of the United States' combat mission in Afghanistan.⁷¹

In February 2009, President Obama set a timetable for United States' military troops to be withdrawn from Iraq. In his remarks, Obama indicated that about 35,000 to 50,000 troops would stay in Iraq until the close of 2011. Their focus would be on providing advice and training Iraqi security forces. Moreover, they would be called upon to protect foreign diplomats and civilians with business in Iraq. The fight against Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups would continue, but with Iraqi forces taking a greater role.⁷²

US-Jordan military and intelligence relations remained strong during the Obama presidency. Cooperation over fighting Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other insurgent groups has continued to be a top priority for both countries. In 2009, extensive collaboration between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Jordan Intelligence Directorate (JID) culminated in recruiting a Jordanian physician, Humam Khalil Mohammed Abu-Mulal Al-Balawi, as a double agent. Subsequently, Al-Balawi was "taken to Afghanistan to

⁷⁰ Barack Obama, "Remarks at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York," *Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Special section, (December 1, 2009): 1748-49.

⁷¹ Lauren Carroll, "Combat Mission in Afghanistan Ends," *Tampa Bay Times*, December 29, 2014.

⁷² Karen DeYoung, "Obama Sets Timetable for Iraq," *Washington Post*, February 28, 2009.

infiltrate Al-Qaeda by posing as a foreign jihadi.”⁷³ Shortly thereafter, Al-Balawi was used by both countries’ intelligence services to provide information about high-value targets such as Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the second-ranking Al-Qaeda official to Osama bin Laden. Then, on December 30, 2009, Al-Balawi was invited to a meeting at the CIA’s Forward Operating Base Chapman in the southeastern province of Khost, Afghanistan to help the CIA to capture or kill Al-Zawahiri. Instead, Al-Balawi detonated himself inside the meeting, killing seven CIA operatives and the Jordanian Captain Sharif Ali bin Zaid, a relative of Jordan’s King Abdullah II.⁷⁴

According to the *USA Today* article, “Jordan Used Jail to Coerce Bomber of CIA Base,” published on January 5, 2010:

The Jordanian Intelligence Directorate wanted al-Balawi, who was respected among al-Qaeda and other militants for his Web writings, to help them and their CIA allies capture or kill Ayman al-Zawahri, Osama bin Laden’s right-hand man.⁷⁵

Nasser Judeh, the Jordanian Foreign Minister, during his press conference with Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, explained the following about Jordan’s role in Afghanistan:

... our presence in Afghanistan today is ... to combat terrorism and the root causes of terrorism ... to help out in the humanitarian effort that is needed there.... our presence in Afghanistan will be enhanced and increased in the coming phase. This is something that is ongoing. Jordan was one of the first countries there. We are not only part of a network of countries that are trying to assist Afghanistan and Afghans, but also trying to combat terror and terrorism....

⁷³ Richard A. Oppel Jr., Mark Mazzetti, and Souad Mekhennet, “Suicide Bomber in Afghanistan a Double Agent,” *New York Times*, January 5, 2010.

⁷⁴ “Jordan Used Jail to Coerce Bomber of CIA Base,” *USA Today*, last modified January 5, 2010, accessed May 7, 2015, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-01-05-cia-bomber-deception_N.htm.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

we're also there to defend Jordan's national interests and ... to defend Jordanians and safeguard them against this growing threat.⁷⁶

Since the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, Jordan has helped the United States restore stability and security to Iraq by providing valuable intelligence regarding Al-Qaeda and its leaders and other insurgent groups, training Iraqi police in Jordan, hosting several hundred thousand Iraqi refugees, and working closely with donors agencies and international organizations to address the Iraqi refugees humanitarian needs, dispatching a military medical field hospital, and, in August 2008, sending an ambassador to Iraq to enhance the bilateral relations.⁷⁷

Following the 2011 Syrian Civil War broke out, the United States and its allies worked closely with the Syrian moderate rebels to fight the Islamic State. The Obama administration lacked a clear strategy for the war in Syria and finally concluded that Syrian moderate rebels were uniquely poised to fight the Islamic State.⁷⁸ In September 2014, Congress approved an aid package of \$500 million for training up to 5,000 Syrian moderate rebels. In May 2015, Jordan began training prescreened moderate Syrian rebels on its soil. "Currently, just 400 rebels are being trained in Jordan out of 3,750 potential volunteers."⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Remarks with Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh after their Meeting," US Department of State, January 8, 2010, accessed May 11, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/134972.htm>.

⁷⁷ "Jordan," accessed May 15, 2015, http://www.almc.army.mil/ALU_INTERNAT/CountryNotes/CENTCOM/JORDAN.pdf.

⁷⁸ Ben Hubbard, "U.S. Goal Is to Forge Syrian Force Equal to Task," *New York Times*, September 19, 2014.

⁷⁹ Ben Jacobs and Sabrina Siddiqui, "US Begins Training Syrian Rebels in Jordan to Become anti-ISIS Force," *Guardian*, May 7, 2015.

On September 4-5, 2014, King Abdullah II of Jordan attended the NATO Summit in Newport, Wales, the United Kingdom to discuss the latest developments in Iraq and Syria and the threat ISIS poses to regional security and stability.⁸⁰

Following the onset of US-led international coalition airstrikes against ISIS, Jordan joined the coalition and the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) conducted airstrikes against ISIS targets near Al-Raqqah, Syria. However, after Jordanian pilot, Captain Muath Al-Kasassbeh, was captured by ISIS militants near Al-Raqqah on December 24, 2014, Jordan suspended its airstrikes. On February 3, 2015, ISIS distributed a video displaying Al-Kasassbeh burning alive inside a metal cage. The capture and then killing of the pilot attracted the attention of all Jordanian people, especially the King, who vowed to wipe out ISIS. On February 5, 2015, shortly after the immolation of Al-Kasassbeh, the RJAF waged a rigid airstrike campaign against many key targets of ISIS in Syria. Pentagon records indicate that Jordan dropped as many as 72 bombs in just this leg of its campaign.⁸¹

On February 3, 2015, President Obama condemned ISIS for burning the Jordanian pilot to death. Obama commented that “it’s just one more indication of the viciousness and barbarity of this organization.”⁸² According to the *USA Today* website, Obama

⁸⁰ Raed Omari, “Jordan’s Potential Role in anti-ISIL Alliance to Be Discussed at NATO Meeting,” *Jordan Times*, September 2, 2014.

⁸¹ “Jordan to Get more US Weapons to Fight ISIS – Report,” RT, last modified February 14, 2015, accessed May 23, 2015, <http://www.rt.com/news/232343-jordan-us-weapons-supply/>.

⁸² David Jackson, “Obama Condemns Islamic State ‘Barbarity,’” *USA Today*, February 3, 2015, accessed May 25, 2015, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/02/03/obama-islamic-state-burning-death-jordan-pilot/22801383/>.

believed that the death of the pilot would only lead the US-led coalition to redouble its efforts to defeat the Islamic State.⁸³

During King Abdullah II's visit to Washington, DC, which coincided with the killing of the Jordanian pilot, the King met with key Congress committee members, lawmakers, and the President to request an increase in arms sales to fight the Islamic State. Senator John McCain, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, pledged support "to help Jordan obtain the sophisticated weaponry it needs to ramp up its fight against ISIS."⁸⁴

The Economic Arena

US-Jordan economic relations have remained strong throughout Obama's presidency. The non-binding five-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that was signed on September 22, 2008, has remained in force during the Obama presidency. The MOU pledged that the United States would provide \$660 million annually from FY 2009 through FY 2014. In reality, during that period, Congress furnished Jordan with \$290.6 million beyond what they agreed to ameliorate for the overall unrest, regional security, and vast influx of neighboring refugees.⁸⁵

⁸³ Jackson, "Obama Condemns Islamic State 'Barbarity'."

⁸⁴ Jeremy Diamond, "McCain Vows to Help Jordan Secure Advance Weapons," CNN, last modified February 4, 2015, accessed May 28, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/04/politics/john-mccain-jordan-weapons-king-abdullah/>.

⁸⁵ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, March 17, 2015, 12.

The United States' Department of State Archive indicates that the MOU reinforces the relationship:

Th[e] MOU is a step forward in our already strong bilateral relationship and reinforces our commitment to work together on a range of important issues – including advancing security and stability in the region, and encouraging economic development and political reform. Moreover, the MOU sets forth our intent to establish a bilateral economic framework and pledges to continue our active dialogue on security, economic policy, and political reform and performance, in accordance with the priorities established in Jordan's National Agenda.⁸⁶

Under the USJFTA enacted in 2001, the United States and Jordan completed systematic tariff reductions. By 2010 Jordan was no longer imposing any duties on most United States' products. Additionally, Jordan supported the United States-Jordan Joint Principles on International Investment and Joint Principles for Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Services.⁸⁷

Following the ending of tariffs on most goods from the United States, the US-Jordan bilateral trade relations flourished. According to the United States Census Bureau, the imports from Jordan increased from \$924.1 million to \$1,400.5 billion between 2009 and 2014, and exports to Jordan increased even more, from \$1,141.8 billion to \$2,050.4 billion during the same period.⁸⁸ In addition, the United States' Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Jordan (stock) increased from \$189 million in 2012 to \$217 million in 2013⁸⁹

⁸⁶ "The United States and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Sign Memorandum of Understanding on Assistance," US Department of State Archive, September 22, 2008, accessed May 31, 2015, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/sept/110116.htm>.

⁸⁷ "Jordan," Foreign Trade Barriers, accessed June 3, 2015, <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2015/NTE/2015%20NTE%20Jordan.pdf>.

⁸⁸ US Census Bureau, "Foreign Trade: Trade in Goods with Jordan."

⁸⁹ Foreign Trade Barriers, "Jordan."

and by 2014; Jordan was ranked as the sixty-sixth largest export market for United States' goods.⁹⁰

Further improvements resulted when the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) signed a five-year \$275.1 million agreement with Jordan to improve the availability of water, delivery, and water sanitation services to one million Jordanian citizens and businesses in Amman and Zarqa in 2010.⁹¹

On March 22, 2013, President Obama and King Abdullah II held a press conference in Amman that was focused on the Syrian crisis. During the conference, to aid Syrian refugees and Jordanian communities impacted by the crisis, President Obama pledged an additional \$200 million in aid money.⁹²

In FY 2014, United States' foreign aid to Jordan exceeded \$1 billion, including \$360 million in economic aid and \$303.588 million in military assistance. Jordan also received \$340 million as part of the FY 2014 Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funds. Then, the total amount of the United States' foreign aid to Jordan through FY 2015 was nearly \$15.833 billion.⁹³ In an effort to increase Jordan's fighting capability against ISIS, on February 3, 2015, the Obama administration signed a new three-year MOU in

⁹⁰ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, March 17, 2015, 17.

⁹¹ Ibid., 13.

⁹² Samantha Stainburn, "Obama Announces an Additional \$200 Million to Help Jordan with Syrian Refugees," *Mint Press News*, March 23, 2013, accessed June 7, 2015, <http://www.mintpressnews.com/obama-announces-an-additional-200-million-to-help-jordan-with-syrian-refugees/54835/>.

⁹³ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, March 17, 2015, 12.

which the United States increased its overall foreign aid to Jordan from \$660 million to \$1 billion annually from FY 2015 through FY 2017 period.⁹⁴

Finally, following the immolation and murder of the Jordanian pilot, Congress moved quickly to pressure senior Obama administration officials to provide Jordan with military materials such as parts, smart weapons, devices for night vision, and other weapons to keep air strike pressure on ISIS.⁹⁵

Donna Cassata, in her article, “Lawmakers Support more Military Aid to Jordan Fight IS,” published on February 4, 2015, stated:

[Following a February 3, 2015 meeting with King Abdullah II] All 26 members of the Senate Armed Services Committee wrote in a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel that Jordan’s situation and the unanimity of the coalition battling the extremists “demands that we move with speed to ensure they receive the military materiel they require.”⁹⁶

Furthermore, United States Senator John McCain, quoted by Kevin Baron, in his article, “Jordan’s Revenge and the Arab World’s ISIS Awakening,” (2015), published in *The Fiscal Times* indicated:

America has no greater ally in the fight against terrorism than Jordan. And, as we made clear to King Abdullah [II] ... this committee’s immediate concern is to ensure Jordan has all of the equipment and resources necessary to continue taking the fight directly to [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] ISIL.”⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, March 17, 2015, 12.

⁹⁵ Donna Cassata, “Lawmakers Support more Military Aid to Jordan Fight IS,” *MilitaryTimes*, last modified February 4, 2015, accessed June 11, 2015, <http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/capitol-hill/2015/02/04/lawmakers-support-more-military-aid-to-jordan-fight-is/22877177/>.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Kevin Baron, “Jordan’s Revenge and the Arab World’s ISIS Awakening,” *Fiscal Times*, February 6, 2015, accessed June 15, 2015, <http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/02/06/Jordan-s-Revenge-and-Arab-World-s-ISIS-Awakening>.

According to the United States Defense Secretary Cooperation Agency (DSCA),
in response to Congress, in March 2015, the Obama administration approved the sale of
two coastal patrol boats and associated weaponry to Jordan:

This proposed sale [to Jordan] will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a partner which has been, and continues to be, an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.⁹⁸

Despite the numerous obstacles, the United States has continued to make every effort possible to hold its commitments to Jordan under the current Obama administration.

⁹⁸ “US Approves Sale of Patrol Boats, Weapons to Jordan to Fight ISIL,” Sputnik, last modified March 17, 2015, accessed June 21, 2015, <http://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20150317/1019622898.html#ixzz3jO1XAm24>.

CHAPTER VI

THE UNITED STATES' FOREIGN AID TO THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

Following World War II, both the United States and the Soviet Union viewed the Middle East, South, and Southeast Asia as prime regions to compete for influence in the Third World.¹ In the very early years of the Cold War, foreign aid became a principal instrument of the United States' foreign policy, especially in the Third World. In 1947, Truman's Doctrine provided economic aid and military advice to Greece and Turkey to prevent Soviet expansion and the spread of international communism into the Middle East region. In April 1957, Jordan was threatened by communism, necessitating receipt of aid from the United States and invigorating the relationship between the two nations.

The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the United States' foreign aid (economic and military) to Jordan from 1990-2014. This chapter seeks to explain the role of the United States' foreign aid in advancing the mutual relations between the United States and Jordan. Moreover, this chapter discusses US-Jordan military cooperation, especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This chapter also examines the role of the Jordanian Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) and the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (USJFTA) in enhancing trade relations with the United States and on the Jordanian economy.

¹ Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert, *Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 130.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) defines the United States' interests, goals, and objectives in extending aid to Jordan as follows:

Surrounded by Israel, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Jordan is geographically and politically important. Jordan has long supported a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement. Jordan continues to seek a formula which will permit Jordanians and Palestinians to seize the opportunity for peace. The primary objective of Aid's program in Jordan is to assist the continued development of a moderate, Western-oriented state that is socially and politically stable. For [six]ty years, US economic assistance has been an important component of the US presence in Jordan, contributing to the formation of both the physical and human infrastructure which helped foster the rapid socio-economic growth of recent years.²

The United States' Foreign Economic Aid to Jordan

United States' foreign aid to Jordan dates back decades to the Cold War. The United States government has provided economic aid to Jordan since 1951 and this aid intensified in the late 1950s with the growing fear of the spread of communism in the Middle East and Jordan, in particular. According to the Congressional Research Service, over time the amount of aid that Jordan has received varies depending on various threats at a particular time, political perspectives, and worldwide cuts on funding.³ Today, Jordan is in the top ten of aid recipients in the world, and in the Middle East Jordan is third only behind Israel and Egypt, receiving \$15.833 billion through FY 2015.⁴

The United States' economic aid to Jordan is given in two primary ways. The first is Cash Transfer, which accounts for 40-60% of Jordan's allocated aid and is used by the

² Bichara Khader, and Adnan Badran, eds., *The Economic Development of Jordan* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 18-20.

³ Jeremy M. Sharp, *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2011 Request*, CRS Report RL32260 (Washington DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, June 15, 2010), 7.

⁴ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, March 17, 2015, 12.

Jordanian government to pay its foreign debt. The second source is the USAID program in Jordan. This program focuses on a plethora of sectors including democracy assistance, water preservation, and education. In the democratic sector, the United States' economic aid has provided support for government building programs for the parliamentary offices, the Jordanian Judicial Council, Judicial Institute, and the Ministry of Justice. The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute, respectively, have received grants to train Jordanian political parties and some members of parliament. In the economic sector, most of the United States' economic aid is earmarked for efficiently managing Jordan's scarce water resources, given Jordan's high needs in this area resulting from its extremely limited access to fresh water. USAID is also providing subsidies to numerous waste treatment and water distribution projects in the cities of Amman, Aqaba, Irbid, Mafraq.⁵

The United States' economic aid to Jordan consists primarily of four types: Economic Support Fund (ESF); Food Assistance ("FA"); Development; and the Peace Corps. In FY 1990, Jordan received \$3.7 million in ESF and \$137 million in loans to import food from the United States under FA.⁶ Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United States' foreign aid to Jordan sharply declined due to Jordan's refusal to join the US-led international coalition against Iraq. The King's position was viewed as pro-Saddam Hussein and his regime subsequently damaged Jordanian relations with the Gulf states and the United States, (the major foreign aid provider to the Kingdom since the early 1950s).

⁵ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, March 17, 2015, 12.

⁶ Knowles, *Jordan since 1989*, 127.

After the US-led international coalition against Iraq began, King Hussein delivered a firm speech on February 6, 1991, in which he accused the United States of attempting to assert hegemony over the Middle East. In response to the king's speech, the George H. W. Bush administration froze the release of all economic and military assistance to Jordan. In fact, in March 1991, Congress approved a bill officially blocking all aid to Jordan, including \$50 million for 1990 and \$57.2 million for 1991.⁷

Warwick Knowles, in his book, *Jordan since 1989: A Study in Political Economy* (1995), states that the aid would not be resumed, unless:

... the President certified and reported to appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Jordan has taken steps to advance the peace process in the Middle East, or that furnishing assistance to Jordan would be beneficial to the peace process in the Middle East.⁸

In FY 1991 Jordan received \$35 million in ESF. In FY 1992 Jordan received \$30 million in ESF and \$20 million in FA. In FY 1993, Jordan received \$5 million in ESF and \$30 million in FA. In FY 1994, Jordan received \$9 million in ESF, \$15 million in FA, and \$4 million in Development. In FY 1995, Jordan received \$7.2 million in ESF, \$15 million in FA, and \$6.7 million in Development. In FY 1996, Jordan received \$7.2 million in ESF, \$21 million in FA, and \$7.9 million in Development (*see Table 3*).

In the early 1990s, the United States' foreign aid to Jordan was very low because of its stands on the Gulf War. In addition, foreign aid from the Gulf states was cut off and it experienced an influx of Iraqi refugees. These factors collectively impacted Jordan's economy and dramatically increased unemployment. Official unemployment records

⁷ Knowles. *Jordan since 1989*, 123-24.

⁸ Ibid., 124.

showed increases ranging between 15-20% and the gap between the poor and the wealthy was rapidly increasing. Following the signing of The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty on October 26, 1994, Jordan received additional money from the United States. Further, some financial burden on Jordan was reduced by the United States, who canceled its debt amounting to \$705 million.⁹ The relationship between the United States and Jordan economically, militarily, and politically improved during this period. By FY 1997, Jordan's economic aid increased to \$112.2 million in ESF, \$2.6 million in FA, \$4.5 million in Development, and \$1.1 million in the Peace Corps.

The United States' economic aid to Jordan notably increased again following a November 1997 visit by King Hussein to Washington, DC in an attempt to alleviate the declining economic situation. Prior to that, USAID noted that Jordan was on the verge of turning into a "limited presence country." However, during the visit, the King was able to make a case for increased aid by leveraging a number of the country's positive deeds and good-will. The King offered to allow the allies' access to Hussein Kamil, President Saddam Hussein's son-in-law. King Hussein was also given recognition for playing a role in achieving the Hebron agreement between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and Israel in January 1997. Prior to the King's visit, on June 17, 1997, President Clinton reiterated the importance of providing financial support to countries that supported the peace process. Funding was increased at that time from a budget of \$7 million in FY 1996 to \$200 million in FY 1999 when the United States' aid budget to other countries was being reduced. Thus, from 1997 forward, Jordan received a

⁹ Amaney A. Jamal, *Of Empires and Citizens: Pro-American Democracy or No Democracy at All?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 49.

significant boost of increased funding that supplemented the previously agreed upon 1997-2001 program. In fact, more than 25% of total United States' aid to Jordan over the fifty years was received between 1997 and 2000.¹⁰

In FY 1998, Jordan received \$150 million in ESF and \$1.2 million in Peace Corps. Jordan received \$150 million in ESF, \$1.4 million in Peace Corps, and an extra \$50 million in ESF in FY 1999, as part of the Wye River Agreement Fund of 1998. In FY 2000, Jordan received \$150 million in ESF, \$1.7 million in Peace Corps, and an extra \$50 million as part of the Wye River Agreement Fund of 1998. In sum, the United States dramatically increased economic support to Jordan throughout the mid-1990's, supporting Jordan in strengthening its economy, maintaining domestic stability, and pursuing normalization of its relations with Israel.¹¹

In the years following 2000, Jordan experienced further increases in economic aid. In FY 2001, Jordan received \$150 million in ESF and \$1.7 million in Peace Corps funding. In FY 2002, Jordan received \$150 million in ESF and \$1.6 million in Peace Corps funding as well as \$100 million in ESF as part of the FY 2002 Supplemental Funding. In FY 2003, Jordan received \$250 million in ESF and \$1 million in Peace Corps funding, plus an extra \$700 million in ESF as part of the FY 2003 Emergency Supplemental Funding to help reduce the economic impact of the Iraqi War of 2003. Since the September 11th events, the United States' economic aid to Jordan has increased markedly, from \$151.7 million in FY 2001 to \$700 million in FY 2014. In FY 2004,

¹⁰ Knowles, *Jordan since 1989*, 124-25.

¹¹ Richard N. Dralongo, ed., *Economics and Geopolitics of the Middle East* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2008), xi.

Jordan also received \$250 million in ESF, \$2.3 million in Peace Corps funding, and an extra \$100 million in ESF as part of the FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental Funding. By FY 2005, Jordan was receiving \$250 million in ESF, \$1.6 million in Peace Corps funding, and an extra \$100 million in ESF as part of the FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental Assistance. In FY 2006, the amount of aid Jordan received was \$247.5 million in ESF, \$1.6 million in Peace Corps funding, and \$50 million in ESF as part of the FY 2006 Emergency Supplemental Funding. Also, between FY 1999 and FY 2006, Jordan received \$238.52 million in FA from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) for the purchase of wheat.¹²

In FY 2006, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) categorized Jordan in the lower middle-income bracket, which led the MCC's Board of Directors to approve an additional \$25 million of Threshold Program assistance.¹³

This assistance was distributed by USAID and used primarily to increase political reforms and qualify Jordan for larger funding programs offered by MCC. According to MCC, the Threshold Program to Jordan was intended to spur participation in elections and develop programs to improve relations between municipalities, the population, and private business.¹⁴

In FY 2007, Jordan received \$245 million in ESF as well as an extra \$10.3 million in ESF as part of the FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Assistance. By FY 2008,

¹² Jeremy M. Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, CRS Report RL33546 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 2, 2014), 12-18.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁴ Sharp, *WikiLeaks Document Release*, October 17, 2008, 20.

Jordan received \$361.4 million in ESF and \$200 million in ESF as part of the FY 2008 Emergency Supplemental Assistance.

On September 22, 2008, the United States agreed to provide Jordan with a total of \$660 million in annual foreign aid for a five-year period (FY 2010-FY 2014). Although a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), this committed the United States to providing \$360 million per year in ESF and \$300 million per year in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for the next five years. The Jordanian government felt the agreement “reaffirms the strategic partnership and cooperation between the two countries.” Indeed, at this time, when the budget for foreign aid was impacted by United States operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the agreement was an example of strong US-Jordan relations.¹⁵

In FY 2009, Jordan received \$263.5 million in ESF and an extra \$150 million in ESF as part of the FY 2009 Emergency Supplemental Assistance. For FY 2010, Jordan received \$363 million in ESF and an additional \$100 million in ESF as part of the FY 2010 Emergency Supplemental Assistance. In addition, the MCC committed another \$275.1 million to increase water supply and delivery, as well as the treatment and collection of waste in the cities of Amman and Zarqa.¹⁶

In FY 2011, Jordan’s aid was increased to \$362 million in ESF and \$19 million in FA to purchase 50,000 metric tons of wheat. In FY 2012, Jordan received \$460 million in ESF and 50,000 metric tons of wheat (\$17 million value).¹⁷ Aid continued to increase in FY 2013 to \$564.404 million in ESF. In FY 2014, Jordan received \$700 million in ESF.

¹⁵ As quoted in *Jordan Country Study Guide Volume 1 Strategic Information and Developments* (Washington, DC: International Business Publications, 2013), 141.

¹⁶ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, December 2, 2014, 12.

¹⁷ Ibid.

In fact, the average United States' economic aid to Jordan between 2011 and 2014 reached approximately \$521.601 million.

According to the United States' Department of State, both the United States and Jordan are committed to fostering the security and stability of the region by improving Jordan's economy and fostering economic, political, and social reform in Jordan. The United States is able to understand and accept Jordan's increasing and imperative needs born out of regional unrest and their fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other extremist ideologies and terrorism. In addition, they bear the economic brunt of the influx of displaced people from Iraq and Syria, disturbance of foreign energy supplies, and other unparalleled strains endemic to the region.¹⁸

¹⁸ US Department of State, "U.S. Relations with Jordan."

Table 3. The United States' Foreign Economic Aid to Jordan 1990-2014 (US\$ million)

Fiscal Year (FY)	Economic Support Fund (ESF)	Food Assistance	Development Assistance	Peace Corps	Total
1990	3.7	0a	0	0	3.7
1991	35.0	0	0	0	35.0
1992	30.0	20.0	0	0	50.0
1993	5.0	30.0	0	0	35.0
1994	9.0	15.0	4.0	0	28.0
1995	7.2	15.0	6.7	0	28.9
1996	7.2	21.0	7.9	0	36.1
1997	112.2	2.6	4.5	1.1	120.4
1998	150.0	0	0	1.2	151.2
1999	150.0+(Wye)b 50.0	0	0	1.4	201.4
2000	150.0+(Wye)b 50.0	0	0	1.7	201.7
2001	150.0	0	0	1.7	151.7
2002	150.0+(Suppl.)c 100.0	0	0	1.6	251.6
2003	250.0+(Suppl.)c 700.0	0	0	1.0	951.0
2004	250.0+(Suppl.)c 100.0	0	0	2.3	352.3
2005	250.0+(Suppl.)c 100.0	0	0	1.6	351.6
2006	247.5+(Suppl.)c 50.0	0	0	1.6	299.1
2007	245.0+(Suppl.)c 10.3	0	0	0	255.3
2008	361.4+(Suppl.)c 200.0	0	0	0	561.4
2009	263.5+(Suppl.)c 150.0	0	0	0	413.5
2010	363.0+(Suppl.)c 100.0	0	0	0	463.0
2011	362.0	0	0	0	362.0
2012	460.0	0	0	0	460.0
2013	564.404	0	0	0	564.404
2014	700.0	0	0	0	700.0

Source: Data adopted from the following sources: (i) Knowles, *Jordan since 1989*, 127; (ii) Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, March 17, 2015, 19.

a. In FY 1990, Jordan received \$137 million in soft loans from United States to import food commodities.

b. Wye: The Wye River Agreement Fund Assistance of 1998; United States sponsored Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement that the late King Hussein helped negotiate in 1998 to provide Jordan additional United States economic and military assistance in FY 1999 and FY 2000.

c. Suppl.: Supplemental Emergency Assistance (Supplemental fund).

The United States' Foreign Military Assistance to Jordan

Since the early years of the Cold War, the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration pledged to protect the independence and integrity of Jordan from the Soviet Union and national communist threat in the Middle East. Military assistance has been given to Jordan since April 1957, replacing the British subsidies when they were withdrawn. After the Jordanian Civil War broke out in September 1970, the Richard M. Nixon administration publicly pledged support to save the Jordanian regime. On September 17, 1970, while standing with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, President Nixon pledged that the United States would intervene if any power threatened Jordan.¹⁹ Consequently, the United States' Sixth Fleet was dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean to protect Jordan, due to its importance to the entire region's security and stability. Since then, Jordan began to rely heavily on the United States for military assistance and security and thus, the United States has been happy to play the role of primary guarantor of Jordan's security.²⁰

The United States' foreign military assistance to Jordan has fluctuated depending on domestic, regional, and international events. In the early 1990s, the United States' military assistance to Jordan began to dramatically decline due to two reasons: (i) the Soviet Union threat to the Middle East decreased and completely collapsed in late December 1991; (ii) Jordan's unwillingness to join the US-led international coalitions against Saddam Hussein and his regime in 1990-1991 was negatively viewed.

¹⁹ Fry, Goldstein, and Langhorne, *Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy*, 350.

²⁰ Jamal, *Of Empires and Citizens*, 47.

According to the *Los Angeles Times* on June 20, 1991, the United States House of

Representatives voted to halt military assistance to Jordan:

The [US] House [of Representatives] voted [on June 20, 1991] to cut off American military aid to Jordan in reprisal for its support of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf War. The lawmakers gave President Bush the authority to waive the cutoff if certain conditions are met, principally bilateral negotiation with Israel.²¹

In the aftermath of the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, and in response to King Hussein's crucial role in the Madrid Conference of 1991, the United States' foreign military assistance was restored by the mid-1990s. By November 1996, US-Jordan military relations warmed to a point that Jordan was declared a 'Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA)' of the United States in the Middle East. This title has significantly enabled Jordan to obtain priority status when it comes to military assistance. This classification made Jordan eligible for surplus United States defense items and systems, training, and equipment loans necessary for research.²² In addition, in FY 1996, Jordan received \$200 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and \$1.2 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET), the primary types of military assistance provided to Jordan.

The United States' military assistance has increased dramatically since Jordan became an MNNA. In FY 1997, Jordan received \$30 million in FMF and \$1.7 million in IMET, increasing to \$75 million in FMF and \$1.6 million in IMET in FY 1998. In FY 1999, Jordan received \$70 million in FMF and \$1.6 million in IMET, as well as \$50 million in FMF as part of the Wye River Agreement Fund. In FY 2000, Jordan received

²¹ Times Staff and Wire Reports, "World in Brief: House Votes to Halt Jordan Military Aid," *Los Angeles Times*, June 20, 1991.

²² Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, December 2, 2014, 13.

\$75 million in FMF, \$1.6 million in IMET, and \$150 million in FMF as part of the Wye River Agreement Fund (*see Table 4*).

During the early 2000s, Jordan's aid increased exponentially. In FY 2001, Jordan received \$75 million in FMF and \$1.7 million in IMET. In FY 2002, Jordan received \$75 million in FMF and \$2 million in IMET, as well as \$25 million in FMF as part of Emergency Supplemental Funding. In FY 2003, Jordan received \$198 million in FMF, \$2.4 million in IMET, and an extra \$406 million in FMF as part of Emergency Supplemental Funding to help reduce the effects of the Iraqi War of 2003 on Jordan's economy and to enhance its security and stability.

In March 2003, Jordan joined what was identified as the "Coalition of the Willing."²³ As a result, it was the second largest funding recipient, receiving \$295 million of additional United States' support to Non-US Coalition Troops from March 2003 through March 2007 for border operations. Since 2003, Jordan has received about \$1.34 billion in security assistance from the United States.²⁴

²³ In March 2003, 48 nations were deemed a "Coalition of the Willing" and provided with political, military, and financial aid for supporting US efforts in Iraq. Of these countries, 38 besides the US provided troops. Quoted in Joseph A. Christoff, *Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Coalition Support and International Donor Commitments*, GAO Report GAO-07-827T (Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Office, May 9, 2007), 1.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 11-12.

Table 4. The United States' Foreign Military Assistance to Jordan 1990-2014 (US\$ million)

Fiscal Year (FY)	Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	International Military Education & Training (IMET)	Total
1990	67.8	2.1	69.9
1991	20.0	1.3	21.3
1992	20.0	0.6	20.6
1993	9.0	0.5	9.5
1994	9.0	0.8	9.8
1995	7.3	1.0	8.3
1996	200.0	1.2	201.2
1997	30.0	1.7	31.7
1998	75.0	1.6	76.6
1999	70.0+50.0 (wye)a	1.6	121.6
2000	75.0 + 150.0 (wye)a	1.6	226.6
2001	75.0	1.7	76.7
2002	75.0 + (Suppl.)b 25.0	2.0	102.0
2003	198 + (Suppl.)b 406.0	2.4	606.4
2004	206.0	2.9	208.9
2005	206 + (Suppl.)b 100.0	3.0	309.0
2006	207.9	3.0	210.9
2007	206 + (Suppl.)b 45.0	3.1	254.1
2008	298.3 + (Suppl.)b 50.0	2.9	351.2
2009	235 + (Suppl.)b 100	3.1	388.1
2010	300 + (Suppl.)b 50.0	3.8	353.8
2011	299.4	3.7	303.7
2012	300.0	3.7	303.7
2013	284.829	3.608	288.437
2014	300.0	3.588	303.588

Source: Data adopted from the following sources: (i) Knowles, *Jordan since 1989*, 127; (ii) Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, March 17, 2015, 19.

a. Wye: The Wye River Agreement Fund Assistance of 1998.

b. Suppl.: Supplemental Emergency Assistance (Supplemental Fund).

Amaney A. Jamal, in her book, *Of Empires and Citizens: Pro-American*

Democracy or No Democracy at All? (2012), stated the following:

After the events of 9-11, Jordan has also grown more dependent on the United States for security. As [King] Abdullah [II] turned to the United States to energize the Jordanian economy further, Amman also became more useful to the United States, providing intelligence on al-Qaeda after 9-11. Further, Jordan served as a key site from which the U.S. military could launch its devastating attack on Iraq in 2003.²⁵

Additionally, Jordan has received not only large military assistance grants toward conventional weapons and funding for antiterrorism efforts from the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs account (NADR).²⁶ Since FY 2002, Jordan has received an average of about \$2 million a year in NADR appropriations from Congress. NADR funding is earmarked to aid training of civilian security and law enforcement personnel from “friendly governments” in police maneuvers to more effectively deal with terrorism.²⁷

As a result of supplemental appropriations acts (a total of \$1.78 billion since FY 2003), annual United States’ military assistance to Jordan has increased significantly from a total of \$69.9 million in FY 1990 to \$303.588 million in FY 2014. In addition to the noted funds specified for Jordan, the country has also received funds from emergency supplemental bills passed to reimburse Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperation states for logistical expenses for supporting United States’ military operations. Increased aid is a direct reflection of the Bush administration’s gratitude for Jordan’s role in fighting

²⁵ Jamal, *Of Empires and Citizens*, 51.

²⁶ Jeremy M. Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, CRS Report RL33546 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 9, 2010), 23.

²⁷ Sharp, *WikiLeaks Document Release: Jordan*, October 17, 2008, 20.

terrorism and renovation of Iraq. It also may be an indirect nod to Jordan's exposure in a volatile region so near the instability in Iraq and conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians.²⁸

Overall, it is important to point out that the annual United States large-scale military assistance grants to Jordan considerably helped upgrade its military weapon systems and increase its military's qualification and readiness. On the other side, Jordan contributes significantly to the United Nations, hailing as the top supplier of police personnel. They additionally provide 57,000 military troops to eighteen peacekeeping missions around the world.²⁹

The US-Jordan Military Cooperation

US-Jordan military cooperation has included several aspects such as Military Sales, Military Exercises, Military Training, and Intelligence Exchange. To a great extent, the various forms of United States' military support has significantly contributed to developing and modernizing the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) that has, in turn, strengthened the United States' commitment to Jordan's security and stability in the region. It has also simultaneously created substantial dependency on the United States.

Military Sales

The United States' military sales to Jordan go back decades. However, in the years following the signing of The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of 1994, the United States

²⁸ Sharp, *WikiLeaks Document Release: Jordan*, October 17, 2008, n. pag.

²⁹ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, April 9, 2010, 23-26.

helped Jordan develop and modernize its military forces “which have been the traditional mainstay of the regime.”³⁰

In 1996, Congress approved \$100 million for ground force equipment (including 50 M60A3 tanks) to augment Jordan’s ability to secure their border and uphold the peace treaty with Israel.³¹ On July 29, 1996, the United States signed a \$220 million agreement authorizing the lease of sixteen fighter jets to Jordan. The F-16 Peace Falcon Program provided funds for structural upgrades, engine modifications, support equipment, spare parts procurement, and maintenance training of aircraft and pilots.³² Most of this equipment was delivered in December 1996 (*see Table 5*).

According to the website F-16.net:

The country which might be most directly affected by the whole deal, Israel, was an enthusiastic supporter of the transfer of 16 F-16s to Jordan and has been one of the principal advocates in urging the US Government to go forward with the deal.³³

Before the 2003 Iraqi War, the United States delivered three Patriot anti-missile batteries to Jordan to help protect it against possible attacks. Recently, Jordan has utilized annual United States’ military assistance grants and other military supplemental appropriations funds to buy Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), radar systems, upgrades for its fleet of 70 to 80 F-16 fighters, and to provide financing for the purchase of the United States’ Blackhawk helicopters. Also, the large-scale military

³⁰ Prados, *Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues*, April 26, 2006, 14.

³¹ Ibid.

³² “Jordan: Royal Jordanian Air Force – RJAF,” F-16.net, accessed June 27, 2015, http://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article11.html.

³³ Ibid.

assistance grants were primarily directed toward upgrading the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) and other military units to enable improved border monitoring and counterterrorism readiness capabilities.³⁴

Table 5. The United States' Foreign Military Sales to Jordan 2006-2010 (US\$ million)

Fiscal Year	Weapon System	Prime Contractor	Value of Sale
2006	National Command & Control System	Northrop Grumman Corporation	450.0
2006	Black Hawk Helicopters	Sikorsky Co. and General Electric	60.0
2006	Armored Personnel Carriers	BAE Company	156.0
2008	Border Security System	DRS Technologies Corp	390.0
2009	AMRAAM Missiles	Raytheon	131.0
2009	Artillery Rocket Systems	Multiple Companies	220.0
2010	Repair of F-16 Engines	Pratt & Whitney	75.0
2010	JAVELIN Anti-Tank Guided Missiles	Javelin Joint Venture	388.0

Source: Data adopted from Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, April 1, 2013, 14.

Military Exercises

In 1974, a joint US-Jordan military commission was formed to coordinate military concerns between the two countries. In the period following the 1991 Gulf War, the military forces of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and the JAF continued to conduct many annual and biennial combined training exercises in Jordan. The United States and Jordan had a vibrant and, mainly open, combined exercise program. Annual exercises and regular visits by the United States' naval vessels to Aqaba demonstrated this relationship since 1993.³⁵

³⁴ Jeremy M. Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, CRS Report RL33546 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 1, 2013), 13.

³⁵ Arkin, "Keeping Secrets in Jordan."

Since the early 1990s, several combined military exercises have taken place in Jordan such as the Early Victor (since 1994), Eager Tiger (since 1996), Infinite Moonlight (since 1996), Infinite Acclaim (since 1997), Eager Light (since 1998), and Eager Lion (since 2011). The primary objective of conducting these mutual US-Jordan military exercises is to increase interaction and function between the United States and the JAF, exhibit the strong partnership, encourage cooperation in participating forces, prepare for crises, and heighten military readiness.³⁶

Spencer C. Tucker and Prescilla Mary, the editors of *The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts* (2010), state the following:

A joint U.S.-Jordanian military commission has coordinated a number of important military concerns since 1974, and Jordanian cooperation with the West usually includes at least one major U.S.-Jordanian military exercise per year as well as Jordanian participation in multilateral exercises organized by the United States.³⁷

Military Training

Military training is a critical component of US-Jordan military cooperation. To enhance the military partnership between the two countries, the United States trains approximately three hundred Jordanian military personnel each year. Further, Jordan has been among the top three recipients of IMET funding from the United States in recent years. Nearly 257 Jordanian officers participated in this program in FY 2013. Beyond the

³⁶ “Jordanian Armed Forces Announce Exercise Eager Lion 2014,” US Central Command, accessed June 30, 2015, <http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/jordanian-armed-forces-announce-exercise-eager-lion-2014>.

³⁷ Spencer C. Tucker and Prescilla Mary, eds., *The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2010), 665.

expected military education, IMET also provides funding for English language labs in Jordan.³⁸

In 2002, the Bush administration endorsed King Abdullah II's initial plan to build an international advanced military training center in Jordan. In 2005, the United States provided \$99 million as part of the FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental Assistance to help support the construction of King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC). Later, on May 19, 2009, KASOTC officially opened in Yajooz, near Amman, Jordan, to serve as a regional headquarters for counter-terrorism training and included a state-of-the art training center for the United States' forces and its partners. KASOTC, partially financed by the United States government, was intended to demonstrate the United States' commitment to Jordan and to support it as an "anchor state," contributing to regional security. Further, it would shore up Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) objectives, interaction, and functionality, and build counterterrorism competencies for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). The DSCA enhanced "consequence management and civil defense capabilities" of the OCO partners.³⁹

In late 2003, the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) was established in Al-Muwaqqar, northeast of Amman, Jordan, to house the American-backed Iraqi police training program. In November of that year, the first class of 456 Iraqi cadets began training. Since then, the Center has trained more than 50,000 Iraqi police officers

³⁸ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, April 1, 2013, 14.

³⁹ LTC Rod Aleandre and SGM David Lanham, "King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC) Provides Capabilities for Coalition Forces," *ARMY AL&T*, October-December 2009, 63-65.

in eight-week courses.⁴⁰ During its operation, the Center accommodated police officers, border guards, and corrections officers from nineteen countries at various times:

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Poland, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States all participated in the JIPTC mission at various times.⁴¹ Further, Jordan rebuilt its Special Operations Command, known in Jordan as ‘Brigade 71 Anti-Terrorism’ in 2001, and the Anti-Terrorism Center as well, in order to oppose terrorism in 2004.

Intelligence Exchange

According to several articles related to the subject, US-Jordan intelligence relations date back decades. Following the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, Iraqi population and commerce expanded, spurring the need for “cooperative intelligence.” All sectors of the population were recruited to provide anti-Saddam intelligence. In response, the United States increased aid, technical support, and signals intelligence maintenance via (SIGINT) monitoring stations for Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID).⁴²

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Jordan pledged concrete support to help the United States in its global War on Terrorism and served as a combat zone for United States’ personnel. Jordan also allowed the United

⁴⁰ Howard J. Krongard and Joseph E. Schmitz, *Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training*, DOS Report ISP-IQO-05-72 and DOD Report IE-2005-002 (Washington, DC: Inspectors General of U.S. Department of State and Defense, July 15, 2005), 24-40, accessed July 5, 2015, http://www.npr.org/documents/2005/jul/iraq_police_oig.pdf.

⁴¹ “Public Library of US Diplomacy: JIPTC Returned to GOJ, Will Continue as JIPTC,” WikiLeaks, September 27, 2007, accessed July 9, 2015, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07AMMAN4019_a.html.

⁴² Arkin, “Keeping Secrets in Jordan.”

States' intelligence staff to operate covertly to eject Saddam Hussein. This level of military relations between the two countries traces back to March 1995. At that time, there were approximately 1,200 United States' personnel, and 34 American F-15s and F-16s based in Muwaffaq Salti Airbase and Prince Hassan Airbase for several months in order to protect the Iraqi no-fly zone.⁴³

As the 2003 Iraqi War approached, other Australian and British special and intelligence forces also manned the facilities that “eventually became part of the secret network of U.S. facilities in the Gulf region.” Jordan also allowed aircraft carriers to fly over, enabling the United States forces and their partners to carryout airstrikes on Iraq.⁴⁴

Five Patriot missile units were set up around Jordan's capital, and the Florida and Rhode Island National Guards were deployed to protect the United States' bases, expand infrastructure, and support special operations on the Iraqi border. In addition, the United States flew Army intelligence reconnaissance planes alongside the Iraqi border. Britain and Australia also helped by providing aircraft and personnel in support of the Western Iraqi operations in Western Iraq. In fact, by the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, there were over 5,000 United States and coalition forces in Jordan, designated as “Joint Task Force-West” and overseen by Major General Jonathan S. Gration.⁴⁵

On January 4, 2010, *The Washington Post* staff writer, Joby Warrick, in his article, “In Jordan, U.S. Finds Quiet Ally in Arab World,” (2010), reports that:

Current and former U.S. intelligence officials said the special relationship with Jordan dates back at least three decades and has recently progressed to the point

⁴³ Arkin, “Keeping Secrets in Jordan.”

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

that the CIA liaison officer in Amman enjoys full, unescorted access to the GID's fortress-like headquarters. The close ties helped disrupt several known terrorist plots, including the thwarted 2000 "millennium" conspiracy to attack tourists at hotels and other sites. Jordanians also provided U.S. officials with communications intercepts in summer 2001 that warned of terrorist plans to carry out a major attack on the United States.⁴⁶

The United States, Jordan, and Terrorism

After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Jordan was among the first Muslim nations to condemn the terroristic acts against the United States. Jordan issued a statement that "... accused Osama bin Laden, the United States' chief suspect in the Sept. 11 attacks, of trying to destabilize Jordan as well."⁴⁷ They offered their assistance to the United States and publicly pledged concrete support to the Bush administration. Two weeks later, King Abdullah II was the first Arab leader welcomed at the White House. In his visit, the King reasserted his pledge to President Bush's 'War on Terrorism' policy. This furthered the relationship and, subsequently, Jordan developed and shared crucial intelligence resources with the United States.⁴⁸

Robert J. Bookmiller indicated in his article, "Abdullah's Jordan: America's Anxious Ally," that public support and intelligence sharing were seen publicly after 9/11. Amman and Washington agreed that the war on terrorism and military strikes against the Al-Qaeda organization were justifiable self-defense for the United States, but Jordan was

⁴⁶ Joby Warrick, "In Jordan, U.S. Finds Quiet Ally in Arab World," *Washington Post*, January 4, 2010.

⁴⁷ The Associated Press, "Jordanian Troops Head to Afghanistan," *Southeast Missourian*, December 24, 2001.

⁴⁸ Bookmiller, "Abdullah's Jordan: America's Anxious Ally," 175.

concerned that “these military operations not be a ‘war on the Islamic world’ nor be used as a pretext to target Arab countries such as Iraq.”⁴⁹

Jordan has provided support in several different ways to the United States’ campaign against terrorism. On October 9, 2001, Jordan banned any banking operations “linked to terrorism activities,” by amending existing terrorism laws. This same amendment also outlawed “infiltration and attacks on industry, shipping, telecommunications, and computer systems.” In addition, authorities detained and prosecuted those affiliated with Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda organization as well as Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi who was linked with multiple acts of terrorism in Jordan. According to the Congressional Report Service, Jordan continued to back the global war on terrorism into 2004.⁵⁰ Militarily, as noted previously, Jordan established several advanced military training centers to cope with terrorism phenomena and augment counter-terrorism abilities of the military personnel. These military training centers established between 2003 and 2009 include the JIPTC, the Anti-Terrorism Center, and the KASOTC.

Jordan’s Role in Afghanistan, 2001

According to the United States Department of Defense’s Fact Sheet of 2002, Jordan’s military contributions to the War on Terrorism included a mine-clearing unit and necessary personnel in Qandahar. They are credited with eliminating mines covering over 70,000 square meters in Bagram and Qandahar. Jordan also contributed land and air use

⁴⁹ Bookmiller, “Abdullah’s Jordan: America’s Anxious Ally,” 178.

⁵⁰ Alfred B. Prados, *CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues*, CRS Report IB93085 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, updated March 14, 2006), 4.

by United States and coalition forces. Additionally, they provided vital military field hospital support, serving 68,811 patients by June 6, 2002 in Mazar-e-Sharif alone. Specifically, they served 1,055 troops, 26,763 civilian women, 22,930 civilian men, and 18,063 children. 798 surgeries were also concluded.⁵¹

According to the NATO Wales Summit 2014 Declaration on Afghanistan:

Jordan demonstrated its support for NATO military operations through its deployment of troops in Kosovo, support for NATO efforts in Libya and its steadfast contribution to the NATO International Security Assistance Forces [ISAF] in Afghanistan. One of the top five nations in troop contribution to ISAF, the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) has also provided a unique asset to NATO's mission through the use of the female soldiers and specialized training for women in Afghanistan's national security forces.⁵²

Jordan's Role in Iraq, 2003

As part of its support to the US-led global War on Terrorism, in the post-Saddam Hussein regime, Jordan pledged to train more than 30,000 Iraqi military and police in Jordan to help Iraqi citizens defend and rebuild their country. In *Defense News*' interview with King Abdullah II published on February 9, 2004, the King explained, "Iraqi army personnel are being trained by the Jordanian Army while Iraqi police training is a joint venture with private sector companies."⁵³

In addition, in the post-2003 Iraqi War, Jordan provided valuable intelligence information about Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in Iraq. In 2006, Jordanian intensive intelligence efforts in Iraq helped locate the most essential leaders of Al-Qaeda

⁵¹ US Department of Defense, "International Contributions," 7.

⁵² "NATO Partner Makes Key Contribution to ISAF: The Role of Jordanian Servicewomen," NATO Wales Summit 2014, September 4, 2014, accessed July 21, 2015, <http://natosummit2014-usnato.squarespace.com/afghanistan/>.

⁵³ As quoted by Prados, *Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues*, March 14, 2006, 8.

in Iraq including Abu Mousab Al-Zarqawi, the leader who claimed responsibility of many terrorist actions in Jordan and Iraq. Subsequently, on June 8, 2006, Al-Zarqawi was killed in a United States' airstrike on a house in Baquba, thirty miles northeast of Baghdad.⁵⁴

According to *Time* magazine article, "How They Got Zarqawi: The Manhunt that Snared Him," Tony Karon, notes that the Jordanians received intelligence about Zarqawi's meeting place:

A well-placed intelligence source in Jordan told TIME that the CIA was tipped off after Jordanian intelligence learned of a meeting that Zarqawi planned to hold in the town of Baquba, north of Baghdad. His safe house was targeted in an air attack, and, says the same source, the Jordanian-born leader of the group al-Qaeda in Iraq was killed in the bombing.⁵⁵

Jordan's Role in Syria, 2014

As part of its commitment to the US-led campaign against terrorism, Jordan joined the international coalition airstrikes campaign against the Islamic State in Syria. Former Jordanian Foreign Minister, Marwan Muasher stated publicly on *CNN* that he did not think Jordan would go so far as to commit ground troops in the fight against ISIS. "The U.S. will have to take the lead in providing military strikes," he said. Furthermore, he adds, "One of Jordan's key roles would be providing intelligence to the West as Jordan's intelligence on ISIS is "second to none."⁵⁶

⁵⁴ "Iraq, Timeline: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," *Guardian*, June 8, 2006, accessed July 23, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jun/08/iraq.alqaida1>.

⁵⁵ Tony Karon, "How They Got Zarqawi: The Manhunt that Snared Him," *Time*, June 08, 2006.

⁵⁶ Ashley Fantz, "Who's Doing What in the Coalition Battle against ISIS," *CNN*, last modified October 9, 2014, accessed July 27, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/09/world/meast/isis-coalition-nations/>.

After the Jordanian pilot, Muath Al-Kasassbeh, was captured by the ISIS militant members in Al-Raqqah at the end of December 2014, Jordan halted airstrikes against ISIS in an attempt to negotiate the return of the pilot. However, hopes of negotiations ended with ISIS on February 3, 2015, when ISIS released a horrific video revealing the execution by burning of the Jordanian pilot. After the video had been released to the media, King Abdullah II pledged to wage an aggressive campaign of airstrikes against ISIS in retaliation the pilot. According to *Time* magazine, Jordan “Bombed 56 ISIS targets in Syria in a three-day campaign to avenge the death of the 26-year-old Jordanian air force pilot.”⁵⁷

As mentioned previously, in September 2014 Congress authorized the United States’ military to arm and train moderate Syrian rebels. This authorization provided \$500 million for the training of about 5,000 fighters over the next year. Subsequently, in May 2015, moderate Syrian rebels began to train in Jordan, augmenting existing troops and form a force capable of fighting Islamic State extremists.

Mohammed Al-Momani, a Jordanian government spokesman, indicated to The Associated Press that the Syrians training program had only recently begun. Al-Momani also added, “Jordan confirms that the war against terrorism is our war, and it’s the war of the Muslims and Arabs, first and foremost, to protect our interests and the security of our countries, peoples and the future of our children, and to defend our tolerant religion.”⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Suha Ma’ayeh, “How Jordan Got Pulled into the Fight against ISIS,” *Time*, February 26, 2015, accessed July 30, 2015, <http://time.com/3721793/jordan-fight-against-isis/>.

⁵⁸ Lolita C. Baldor, “Syrian Rebel Training Has Started in Jordan,” *Washington Times*, May 7, 2015, accessed August 1, 2015, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/7/us-says-syrian-rebel-training-starting-in-jordan/?page=all>.

The US-Jordan Trade Agreements

The Jordanian economy was not deemed significant to the United States until Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. In the following years, the Clinton administration and Congress established initiatives that have since developed to economically reward the Jordanian government for its peace treaty with Israel.

In 1993, Jordan attempted to join the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), but was advised to wait to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) that was slated to replace it.⁵⁹ In January 1994, Jordan began negotiations to join the GATT. In January 1995, after the WTO was founded, Jordan's accession application was transferred to the WTO working party. In October 1996, the working party met for the first time and held five formal meetings, approving Jordan's accession package on December 17, 1999. Thereafter, Jordan became the one hundred thirty-sixth member of the WTO on April 11, 2000.⁶⁰

In 1996, Congress instituted the QIZs initiative to support the peace process in the Middle East. On November 21, 1996, Presidential Proclamation 6955 created the QIZs in Jordan, with the Al-Hassan Industrial Estates in Irbid designated to be the first QIZ in Jordan. The QIZs initiative empowered the President (Clinton at the time) to eliminate duties on items manufactured in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and QIZs in Jordan and Egypt. This enabled Jordan to export products to the United States duty-free, so long as these products include contributed products from Israel. Prior to 2004, all QIZs had been

⁵⁹ Katherine Blue Carroll, *Business as Usual? Economic Reform in Jordan* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003), 88.

⁶⁰ "Jordan Becomes 136th Member of the WTO," World Trade Organization, April 11, 2000, accessed August 3, 2015, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres00_e/pr174_e.htm.

founded in Jordan. Currently, there are numerous QIZs in all over Jordan's governorates.⁶¹

According to the United States Office of Textile and Apparel (OTEXA), products manufactured in QIZs must comply with strict rules of origin:

- 1) 35% Jordanian content, of which 11.7% must come from a Jordan QIZ; 8% from Israel (7% for high tech goods); the remainder of the minimum may be fulfilled by content from a Jordan QIZ, Israel, USA or West Bank / Gaza. 2) 20% Jordanian content + 15% U.S. content. Furthermore, the U.S.-Jordan FTA rules of Origin require that Jordanian exports to the United States must have 35 percent Jordanian content in order to receive FTA duty benefits. The duty free benefits provided by QIZs remain particularly important for Jordanian products for which duty free treatment has not yet been phased-in under the United States-Jordan FTA.⁶²

Last, it is important to emphasize that the idea behind establishing such QIZs in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan, and Egypt was to encourage economic development and thereby normalize relationships between Israel and its Arab neighbors and promote peace. Further, the QIZs were also established to promote Jordan's economic growth and to promote US-Jordan trade relations. QIZs were designed to subsidize regional support for the Middle East peace process by providing economic benefits to Egypt and Jordan, the only two Arab states to sign peace treaties with Israel. They also were designed to deliver a clear economic boost for Egypt, Jordan, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip by providing economic stimuli and reducing unemployment.⁶³

⁶¹ "Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ)," Office of Textiles and Apparel, accessed August 5, 2015, <http://web.ita.doc.gov/tacgi/fta.nsf/7a9d3143265673ee85257a0700667a6f/196ed79f4f79ac0085257a070066961d>.

⁶² Office of Textiles and Apparel, "Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ)."

⁶³ Bolle, Prados, and Sharp, *Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan and Egypt*, July 5, 2006, n. pag.

On October 24, 2000, President Bill Clinton and King Abdullah II were in power at the signing of the USJFTA, a compact that intended to encourage trade of goods and services in the United States and Jordan by eliminating duties and commercial barriers. It also helped both nations by freeing markets and encouraging new business for working people and farmers in both countries.⁶⁴

Marwa Al Nasa'a and others, in their study, "The Jordan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Eight Years Later," (2008), explain USJFTA's advantages:

... [The USJFTA] provide[s] the country with a comparative advantage in a large export market and boost foreign direct investment from the United States.... [The USJFTA] signify the strong U.S. commitment to Jordan. It demonstrated U.S. support for the recently ascended King Abdullah II at a personal level, the Jordanian economic reform program at a national level, and Jordan's role in promoting political stability and economic openness at a regional level.... [The USJFTA] was a culmination of the previous years of U.S.-Jordan joint economic initiatives.⁶⁵

Following the initial signing of the USJFTA on May 9, 2001, the Jordanian Parliament ratified it. During King Abdullah II's visit to Washington, DC after the September 11, 2001 events, President Bush signed the USJFTA on September 28, 2001, as a reward for Jordan's role in supporting the United States' policy against fighting terrorism. Almost three months later, the USJFTA came into force on December 17,

⁶⁴ "United States and Jordan Sign Historic Free Trade Agreement," The White House, accessed August 7, 2015, http://clinton5.nara.gov/textonly/WH/new/html/Tue_Oct_24_163554_2000.html.

⁶⁵ Marwa Al Nasa'a et al., "The Jordan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Eight Years Later," The University of Michigan, March 21, 2008, 4, accessed August 11, 2015, <http://www.umich.edu/~ipolicy/Policy%20Papers/jordanusfta.pdf>.

2001.⁶⁶ By signing the USJFTA, Jordan became the first Arab and fourth country (after Canada, Mexico, and Israel) to sign a free trade contract with the United States.

According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR):

[The] QIZ products still account for more than half of Jordanian exports to the United States, but the QIZ share is declining relative to total products shipped under the [USJ] FTA. This shift toward exporting products manufactured outside of the QIZs demonstrates the important role the [USJ] FTA plays in helping Jordan diversify its economy.⁶⁷

The US-Jordan trade relations have flourished since the mid-1990s. According to the USTR, the key elements of the US-Jordan economic partnerships are (i) the formation of QIZs which allow goods made in Jordan to be imported to the United States duty-free; and (ii) the USJFTA, which was enacted on January 1, 2010.⁶⁸

In 2003, according to Jordan's Ministry of Finance, QIZ exports totaled \$582 million.⁶⁹ After the USJFTA had been signed, Jordan experienced a rapid increase in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which almost doubled from nearly \$8.5 billion in 2001 to \$16 billion in 2007.⁷⁰ Further, bilateral trade between the two countries also led to a notable increase and the United States became Jordan's largest trading market. In 2000, the United States exported \$306 million to Jordan, while in the same year, Jordan exports

⁶⁶ "United States-Jordan," SICE, accessed August 15, 2015, http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/USA_JOR/USA_JOR_e.asp.

⁶⁷ "Jordan Free Trade Agreement," Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed August 21, 2015, <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/jordan-fta>.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ As quoted by Prados, *Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues*, April 26, 2006, 12-13.

⁷⁰ Al Nasa'a et al., "Jordan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement," 4-9.

to the United States were \$73 million.⁷¹ In 2001, Jordan's exports to the United States grew to approximately \$229 million, while in 2007 Jordan exports to the United States reached almost \$1.3 billion. It is undeniable that the USJFTA has had a more considerable impact on Jordanian's economic growth than on the United States' economy. Since the USJFTA was enacted in 2000, United States experts put the United States' economic impact of the agreement into context, "as U.S.-Mexico trade was larger in an average day than U.S.-Jordan trade was in an entire year. [Further] annual US exports to Jordan were less than \$300 million, or about the value of two Boeing jumbo jets."⁷²

By 2007, the United States was Jordan's largest market, making up nearly one-third of its yearly exports.⁷³ United States exports to Jordan amounted to \$1.2 billion in 2009, an increase of 27% over 2008.⁷⁴

After the USJFTA signing, Jordan moved to 66th in rank compared to other United States trading partners in 2014. In fact, the United States Trade Commission reports that in 2014 Jordan shipped more than a billion dollars in products and services to the United States, mostly apparel and clothing accessories. In the same year, the United States exported two billion dollars to Jordan, primarily aircraft parts, machinery and appliances, vehicles, and grain. The USJFTA and QIZs-have both contributed to the

⁷¹ "U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA)," The White House, September 28, 2001, accessed August 27, 2015, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010928-12.html>.

⁷² Al Nasa'a et al., "Jordan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement," 4.

⁷³ Rami M. Olwan, *Intellectual Property and Development: Theory and Practice* (Berlin: Springer Heidelberg, 2013), 141.

⁷⁴ Office of the United States Trade Representative, "Jordan Free Trade Agreement."

expansion of US-Jordan trade ties and could produce more opportunities for the United States to benefit from its investment in Jordan.⁷⁵

It is important to point out that US-Jordan trade relations have been enhanced dramatically as a result of the peace treaty with Israel. Further, it might be argued that the American-Jordanian economic relations are a direct reflection of the political relations between Washington and Amman, developing positively when there is an agreement over political issues and declining when there is disagreement, especially when it comes to security and stability matters. In addition, Jordan's economic reform program that King Abdullah II adopted has impacted the Jordanian economy and has attracted many foreign investors to the Kingdom.

Finally, it should be noted that the USJFTA was not lightly made:

... [The USJFTA] comes as a result of the impressive steps Jordan has taken under King Abdullah's [II] leadership to modernize its economy and to open its markets to foreign investors. It also is a tribute to the courageous role Jordan has played over the past several years to promote stability and peace in the region.... It is also the first U.S. free trade agreement to include both labor and environment obligations in the body of the text.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, December 2, 2014, 14-15.

⁷⁶ The White House, "United States and Jordan Sign Historic Free Trade Agreement."

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION AND THEORIES

The United States' political presence in the Middle East did not commence until the beginning of the Second World War. At the close of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the only two superpowers. After World War II, the traditional world powers in the Middle East (Britain and France) faced substantial economic crises and were no longer capable of exercising their historical leadership role in the region. In response to the increasing ambitions of the Soviet Union for the oil-rich Middle East region, the United States found itself compelled to assume Britain's long-standing involvement which ratcheted up tension significantly, leading to what came to be known as the Cold War.

In response to the Cold War rivalry, Arab countries separated into two camps, one camp supporting the Soviet Union such as Egypt (until 1976 when they switched to support the United States) and Syria and the other camp including Iraq (until 1959 when they switched to the Soviet Union), Jordan, and Saudi Arabia that supported the United States.

In 1952, the Egyptian Revolution brought President Jamal Abdel-Nasser, an Arab nationalist military officer, to power. Nasser's policies were centered on nationalism, self-determination, and eliminating the Western influence and interests in the Arab countries. Nasser's policies attracted many Arab nationalists at the time.

In the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union began to gain influence in Egypt and Syria. To limit any possible Soviet Union expansion in the Middle East region, the Baghdad Pact was established with the support of both the United States and Britain in 1955. In response, in an attempt to build Arab cohesiveness, Egypt created an “anti-Baghdad pact coalition” among Arab countries. Due to Egypt’s position, the Jordanian government refused to join the Baghdad Pact.¹

By this time, the influence of Egypt and Syria began to increase in Jordan. In July 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company. In response to Nasser’s actions, the Suez War of 1956 broke out. Arab countries, including Jordan, supported Nasser at the time. Following the Suez War, Egypt took control of the Suez Canal, and the popularity of Nasser increased significantly within the Arab countries. This is especially the case in Jordan as the Jordanian parliamentary elections of October 1956 resulted in a pro-Nasser government. A few days after the elections, in response to King Hussein’s request, Suleiman Nabulsi, the leader of the Nationalist Socialists formed a government that represented all of the Jordanian political parties. The Nabulsi government valued Jordan’s alliance with Egypt, believing that it would enhance Arab Unity and promote Jordan’s national interests. Further, it called for the ending of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty.²

By late 1956 and early 1957, the influence of Egypt, Syria, and the communists were clear in Jordan. Shortly thereafter, the bond between King Hussein and Prime Minister Nabulsi became stressed as the cabinet became more involved in formulating significant policies such as moving toward establishing diplomatic relations with the

¹ Abu-Lebdeh, *Conflict and Peace*, 80-85.

² Ibid.

Soviet Union and Communist China. This led to the King's decision to write Nabulsi formally about his unease over potential communist penetration. The King's letter emphasized his commitment to preserving Jordan's solidarity and preventing outside interference.

By April 1957, considerable tension ignited between the cabinet and monarchy. This eventually led King Hussein to dismiss the Nabulsi government and announce concerns of the infiltration by international communism. The United States viewed these anti-communist and anti-Soviet Union efforts as being in alignment with its interests in the region. The White House announced that "the independence and integrity of Jordan [w]as vital" to the United States. Immediately, the United States provided \$10 million emergency assistance to Jordan and dispatched its Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean to defend the King's regime.³

Although the US-Jordan diplomatic relations were officially established in 1949, Jordan's significance to the United States was not understood until 1957 when the interests of the two countries converged. It can be argued that the United States' foreign policy toward Jordan was developed under President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Successive American administrations confirmed throughout the following decades that Jordanian security and stability were deemed significant to the national security interests of the United States. This attitude toward Jordan still remains true.

³ Nyrop, *Jordan, a Country Study*, 32.

In response to the primary and secondary questions that characterize this study, there are several conclusions that can be drawn.

The United States' foreign policy toward Jordan stemmed mainly from the following five factors: its strategic geographical location in the heart of the Middle East region, its powerful ideology, its moderate, pro-Western regime, its regional security role, and its vital role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The study revealed that these factors reflect the continuously significant role of Jordan to the United States' administrations beginning with President Dwight D. Eisenhower and ending with the current President, Barack H. Obama.

The study shows that Jordan's strategic importance to the United States mainly derives from its geopolitical location in the center of the Middle East. Since the late 1950s, the United States has recognized how significant Jordan's location is to achieve its foreign policy interests in the region. Additionally, it has also realized that Jordan's location constitutes a buffer between the Arab countries on one side and Israel on the other. Geographically, Jordan is the closest Arab state to Israel and has the longest border with it. Finally, Jordan's geopolitical location maintains a strategic significance to the United States and other countries in the region as well.

The study also shows that ideology was a primary factor in the US-Jordan relationship. During the very early years of the Cold War, both President Eisenhower and King Hussein shared a similar negative view of the Soviet Union and international communism. Their opposition to the Soviet Union and international communism led to more cooperation and coordination economically, militarily, and politically. Further, it seemed logical that the King aligned his country with the free world; he received his

early education in Britain. Later, as an adult, he attended the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in Camberley, United Kingdom.

In the late 1950s, King Hussein recognized the impact of international communism on the Arab countries in general, and Jordan, in particular. His apprehensions led him to oppose the communist principles. The King felt that “as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad ... would have ... [no] truck with communism,” as he, like many Muslims in the Arab world, thought that Islam and communism were inherently incompatible.⁴ Also, King Hussein considered communism as a major foe of Islam and Arabs even before Judaism. Furthermore, the King believed that communism would not free Arab people stating that “... imperialism, which is about to die in the Arab East, will be replaced by a new kind of imperialism [international communism].”⁵

This King’s disposition toward communism and its principles and values motivated him to move quickly toward building strong relations with the United States. The unified vision of King Hussein and the United States’ policy-makers over the Soviet Union and communism, especially in the early years of the Cold War, has significantly strengthened US-Jordan ties and the United States has regarded the King as a close friend and ally in the Middle East. This contentment with King Hussein and his position on communism paved the way for the United States to invest more in Jordan to prevent the Middle East region from experiencing the spread of communist influence. Thus, ideology congruence was an auxiliary factor exploited by both the United States and Jordan to achieve certain objectives and a long-term strategic partnership.

⁴ Sayigh and Shlaim, *Cold War and the Middle East*, 109.

⁵ King Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, 159.

This study also reveals that security is of major importance in the mutual relationship between the United States and Jordan. This was first recognized when King Hussein publicly announced that international communism was a threat to Jordan. Subsequently, the King's efforts to challenge the communist influence in Jordan were greatly seen as compatible with United States interests. The United States began to consider Jordan as a strategic ally in the face of international communism. Therefore, Jordan's stance against the Soviet Union helped prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union and the spread of international communism in the Middle East region.

The study shows that the security and stability of Jordan were very significant to keeping a balance between the Arab states and Israel. Lastly, it should be noted that since the late 1950s, the United States has provided all necessary means to maintain and sustain the permanency of Jordan. The United States has provided substantial diplomatic, economic, and military assistance necessary to the survival of the Jordanian state. The study found the United States correlated Jordan's security with Israeli security. The United States' policy-makers came to the conclusion that any threat to Jordan's safety would significantly constitute a substantial threat to Israel.

The study confirms that the Jordanian regime is a parliamentary system of government with a hereditary monarchy, in the dynasty of King Abdullah ibn Al-Hussein. In this system, the monarchy is the primary political institution, and the parliament is secondary. The King has been vested with broad powers over the executive branch, legislature, and judiciary. The King is the Head of State and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The King is exempt from any liability and responsibility; therefore, there can be no amendment to the Constitution that might affect

his rights as king without his approval. These vast constitutional powers significantly enable the King to play a vital role in both domestic and foreign policies. Since 1953, “the Jordanian political system continued to revolve around [King] Hussein, who ruled firmly, brooking no opposition.”⁶ This philosophy continues to be true today.

The study illustrates that the Jordanian regime holds a moderate, pro-Western orientation and embraces moderate policies in accordance with the Western party line, especially the United States and the United Kingdom. “The fate of its pro-Western regime holds more [significant] consequences for American interests than any Arab state not named Egypt and Saudi Arabia — something better ruminated now than at the eleventh hour.”⁷ Moreover, as a result of his willingness to engage with other leaders, King Hussein was able to keep up with developments outside his country, ensuring uninterrupted financial and technical assistance for his Kingdom. He was able to be cordial with foreign states, something that continues to be a critical advantage for Jordan, considering its dependence on external support.⁸

Furthermore, the study finds that the significance of the Jordanian regime to the United States emerged from the crucial role of King Hussein in regional and international politics. His moderate policies significantly increased his creditability within the Arab and Western world alike. In addition, among Arab countries, Jordan is considered the country that has the most democratic principles including democratic elections, human

⁶ Nyrop, *Jordan, a Country Study*, 166.

⁷ Sean L. Yom, “Foreign Policy: Don’t Forget about Jordan,” NPR, last modified February 3, 2011, accessed September 21, 2015, <http://www.npr.org/2011/02/03/133459153/foreign-policy-dont-forget-about-jordan>.

⁸ Nyrop, *Jordan, a Country Study*, 168.

rights, political parties, syndicates and civil society foundations, and women's political participation. The study also shows that King Abdullah II, since he assumed power in 1999, has kept cordial relations with Arab countries, the United States, Britain, Japan, Israel, and other foreign governments. After the events of September 11, 2001, the King was the first Arab leader welcomed in the White House. He was also the first Arab leader to visit President Obama in April 2009.

The study shows that Jordan is a vital participant in the Middle East peace negotiations. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, Jordan became actively involved in the Arab-Israeli peace process negotiations. In late 1991, King Hussein played a crucial role in the Madrid Conference for the Peace in the Middle East to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time, all the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict came together in direct negotiations. As a result of the Madrid Conference, three peace accords were clinched with Israel: the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo I) of September 13, 1993, The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of October 26, 1994, and The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II) of September 28, 1995.

The study further reveals that after the Palestinian-Israeli peace agreements concluded in September 1993, King Hussein determined that peace with Israel was in Jordan's best interests given Israel's military prowess, the initiation and progress of the Palestinian national movement that endangered Jordanian and Israeli security, and the need to regain Western support of Jordan following its decision to back Iraq in the Gulf War of 1991.⁹ Finally, in October 1998, at the Wye River Summit in the United States, King Hussein played a role in easing tensions between the Israeli Prime Minister

⁹ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, March 17, 2015, 3.

Benjamin Netanyahu and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader, Yasser Arafat to join the talks.

As a result of his sound character, the participation of King Hussein in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process negotiation significantly raised Jordan's position, prestige, respect, and creditability. After King Abdullah II assumed the throne in February 1999, he also kept a semi-cordial relationship with Israel to maintain positive relationships with the United States, the West and international financial institutions to ensure continued foreign assistance upon which Jordan depends on heavily.¹⁰ Jordan's primary goal was, and is, to ensure Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, including the Old City of Jerusalem (East Jerusalem). It also hoped to secure a permanent and spreading peace in the region while restoring the national rights of the Palestinian people. To this day, the Jordanian state continues to support resolving the "Palestinian-Israeli" dispute based on the two-state solution and the United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338.

The study reveals that following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Jordan was among the first Muslim countries to pledge support to help the United States in its global War on Terrorism. Jordan has taken multiple approaches to support the United States' campaign against terrorism.

At the domestic level, Jordan banned any banking activities "linked to terrorism activities," and banned any assaults on shipping, industry, communications, and computer

¹⁰ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, March 17, 2015, 3-4.

systems. Those related Osama bin Laden, his Al-Qaeda organization, or to bin Laden's associate, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi were arrested and prosecuted.¹¹

At the military level, Jordan established several advanced military training centers, partially funded by the United States government. This helped boost anti-terrorism capability within its military forces to cope with the ongoing regional terrorism threats. The Jordanian training centers also provide training to neighboring Arab and non-Arab countries to rebuild their military forces' capacity to counter-terrorism. Also, to help the US-led global campaign against terrorism, Jordan was instrumental in training Afghan and Yemeni forces. In the post-2003 Iraqi War, Jordan trained over 54,000 Iraqi security and police officers in an attempt to help US-led construction efforts to rebuild Iraq in the post-Saddam Hussein regime.

At the regional level, Jordan has provided valuable intelligence information on Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in the region. Furthermore, Jordan supported and participated in the US-led international coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in September 2014. Finally, in May 2015, Jordan played an active role in training prescreened moderate Syrian rebels to defend its national security interest and to maintain the stability of the entire region.

The study found that the United States' annual foreign aid (economic and military) to Jordan has fluctuated depending on the regional and international political events. Specifically, foreign aid increases during the time of crises and declines when there is no threat to Jordan. For instance, in response to the King's stance on the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, the United States' foreign aid to Jordan declined and was suspended

¹¹ Prados, *Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues*, March 14, 2006, 11.

until 1993. In the period followed the signing of the peace treaty with Israel, the United States' foreign aid, both economic and military to Jordan, increased from a total of \$73.6 million in 1990 to \$237.3 million in 1996.

Following the September 11, 2001 events, the American war in Afghanistan in 2001, and the Iraq War in 2003, the United States significantly increased its foreign aid to Jordan as a reward for its vital role in the war against terrorism. Specifically, the United States' foreign aid to Jordan increased from \$228.4 million in FY 2001 to 1,557.4 billion in FY 2003. Clearly, this high figure was given to Jordan to soften the impact of the Iraq War on Jordan's economy and to maintain its border security. The United States' foreign aid to Jordan through FY 2008 totaled approximately \$10.23 billion.¹² Between FY 2009 and FY 2014, annual United States' foreign aid to Jordan was \$660 million (\$360 million in economic aid and \$300 million in military assistance). In reality, the average United States' foreign aid to Jordan reached almost \$1 billion. In February 2015, the United States and Jordan signed a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in which the United States pledged to provide Jordan \$1 billion annually in foreign aid from FY 2015 to FY 2017. Through FY 2015, the United States' foreign aid to Jordan reached approximately \$15.83 billion.¹³

The study reveals that US-Jordan economic relations were enhanced significantly after Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Jordan's economy was not deemed significant to the United States' at that time. As a direct result of the peace treaty with Israel, the United States took considerable initiatives to boost the Jordanian economy.

¹² Sharp, *WikiLeaks Document Release*, October 17, 2008, 18.

¹³ Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, March 17, 2015, 12.

These initiatives included the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) in 1997, the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in 1997, the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 1999, and the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (USJFTA) in 2001. These agreements had positive impacts on the US-Jordan trade relations. By 2007, as a direct result of these agreements, the United States was Jordan's chief market making up nearly one-third of all exports in the country.¹⁴ In 2014, Jordan rated sixty-sixth out of all of United States trading partners in terms of volume of trade. After the USJFTA had gone into effect, Jordan experienced a rapid increase in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which almost doubled from nearly \$8.5 billion in 2001 to \$16 billion in 2007.¹⁵

Marwa Al Nasa'a and others, in their study, "The Jordan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Eight Years Later," stated:

... [The USJFTA] provide[s] the country with a comparative advantage in a large export market and boost foreign direct investment from the United States.... [USJFTA] signify the strong U.S. commitment to Jordan.¹⁶

It is important to point out foreign aid has been utilized as a vital tool to exercise political pressure by the United States on Jordan. Foreign aid and mutual trade agreements have markedly helped Jordan by enhancing its economy and limiting its ability to make independent political decisions.

The study explores how the members of the United States Congress have significantly influenced US-Jordan relations. First, the most notable occurrence in this regard was Congress' suspension of the United States' foreign aid to Jordan until 1993

¹⁴ Olwan, *Intellectual Property and Development*, 141.

¹⁵ Al Nasa'a et al., "Jordan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement," 4-9.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

following King Hussein's unwillingness to join the US-led international coalition against Iraq in 1990-1991. Second, Congressional approval of the USJFTA in 2001, despite the fact that experts concurred that the agreement would have a negligible effect on the United States, further influenced US-Jordan relations. Third, in 2015, the United States Senate Foreign Committee, led by Senator John McCain exercised its influence over the Obama administration to authorize the sale of more sophisticated weapons to Jordan to defend itself from the threat of ISIS.

The study found that the primary interests of the United States' foreign policy in the Middle East include: securing strategic access to oil in the Gulf region; supporting and protecting Israel's sovereignty; maintaining the United States' military bases, particularly in the Gulf states, defending client-states and friendly regimes in the region to maintain its stability and subordination; and resisting Islamic movements and terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and many others that might pose a major threat to American interests in the region.

Examining the hypotheses of the study shows:

Hypothesis One: Jordan's stability is crucial to the United States to maintain its national security interests in the Middle East.

Largely, Jordan's stability and security remained significant to the United States. Since the very early years of the Cold War until today the United States government pledged its support to the Jordanian state. In addition, the successive American administrations from Eisenhower to Obama regarded "the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital" to the United States.

Hypothesis Two: Jordan's instability might lead to the spread of radical Islamic movements, which might pose a substantial threat to the United States' national security interests in the Middle East.

To some degree, the study revealed that the United States had some apprehensions that Jordan's instability would destabilize the entire region. Thus, Jordan's stability correlates with regional security. The study also reveals that any threat to the Jordanian regime might result in a new government consisting of anti-US Islamic parties, national movements, or radical forces that would pose a substantial threat, de facto, to the United States national security interests in the region.

Moreover, the Jordanian state believes that resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict can be achieved throughout peaceful negotiations, based on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. At the same time, various Islamic parties (including the Islamic parties in Jordan) believe that resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict can be achieved through resistance and military means, which contradicts Western foreign policy. It is unlikely that the Western governments would accept any Islamic leadership given that their underlying philosophies are so opposed. The former Hamas government in the Palestinian occupied territories and the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt are just two examples.

Hypothesis Three: Foreign aid and economic agreements have been utilized as principal instruments of the United States' foreign policy to exercise influence over Jordan to achieve certain political objectives.

Foreign aid, QIZs, USJFTA, and other economic agreements have markedly helped the Jordanian government to overcome its serious economic barriers and rebooted

the country's economy. On the other hand, successive American administrations have exploited foreign aid and economic agreements as principal tools to achieve its foreign policy objectives. This posture, however, led to linking the Jordanian economy, and even the currency, with the United States' economy and subsequently created a situation of subordination of the Jordanian state to the United States.

This study presents some final speculations:

- If Jordan becomes a totally democratic state in the future, it could conceivably count on increased aid from the United States, both economic and military, which could perhaps be an even closer collaboration in the Middle East.
- If the Muslim Brotherhood Party comes to power, there could be a significant cooling in relations with the United States in the current political climate. The United States support of such a government would be considered supporting a potential 'Islamist' regime. In this regard, the example of the short-lived Hamas government of 2006 and the Muslim Brotherhood government led by former President Mohammad Morsi in 2012 are illustrative of the approach of the West to Islam in general.
- If the Jordanian government abrogated the peace treaty it has with Israel, there would be a swift shift in relations between the United States and Jordan. Although Jordan is a significant ally in the Middle East region, the Israelis are by far more interwoven into short and long-term United States goals.
- Continuous regional instability could be either improved or declined, depending upon Jordan's relations with the United States as well as considering their position on any given issue causing the instability. If Jordan is part of a solution, it could receive increased foreign aid up to, and possibly including, military support. However, the result

could be the exact opposite if Jordan was part of the cause of the instability and it would be economically and militarily punished by the United States. The Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 is a clear example.

Based on my research, it appears both countries will continue to have a strong relationship for years to come.

APPENDIX A

Address to the Nation by His Majesty King Hussein Amman, February 6, 1991^{1*}

Brother citizens, Brother Arabs, Brother Muslims, you who uphold your faith and refuse to see your nation humiliated; you who are truly sincere within yourselves and in your hearts and minds, and in your objectives, ideas and attitudes; you who are concerned for the present as well as the future generations of our nation, I greet every one of you with all affection.

I choose to address you at this very difficult moment, motivated by Arab honour and religious duty. Iraq, fellow Arabs and Muslims, now pays the price in pure and noble blood of belonging to its nation. Iraq had always hastened, without hesitation, to make sacrifices in all the battles which the Arabs land in Palestine, Syria, Egypt and Jordan. Arab blood was always dear to Iraq and shouldn't the blood of Iraqi men, women and children be dear to us?

The world has known cruel wars, but never one like this that is waged against Iraq and the likes of which may never happen again. The armies of the biggest and most powerful nations have gathered and unleashed their modern and dangerous weapons on the land, in the sea, and in the sky. These weapons had originally been arrayed by the present international military alliance against an opposing alliance led by another super power. They are all now arrayed against the Baghdad of Haroun Al Rashid, the Basra of Islamic studies and poetry, the Kufa of Ali, May God's peace be upon him, the Holy Najaf, Karbala, Al Diwaniyeh, Mosul, Kerkouk, and every Iraqi city and village. Fire rains down upon Iraq from airplanes, from battleships, from submarines and rockets, destroying mosques, churches, schools, museums, hospitals, powdered milk factories, residential areas, Bedouin tents, electricity generating stations, and water networks. This bombing started from the first hours and took the form of a war that aims to destroy all the achievements of Iraq and return it to primitive life, by using the latest technology of the destruction. The first victims of this war were justice, righteousness and peace. Its first casualties were aspirations of all humanity since the end of the Second World War, hoping that that war would be the last human tragedy, and that man would no longer be killer or victim. All the hopes of our nation and the world community were thwarted the day the land of Iraq was turned into the arena of the Third World War.

[*] Original text in Arabic.

¹ *White Paper*, 61-66.

Brother Citizens, Brother Arabs, Brother Muslims,

The irony of this war is that it is waged under the cloak of international legitimacy, and in the name of the United Nations, which was created to preserve peace, security and justice, and to resolve disputes through dialogue, negotiations and diplomacy. If this is an example of the future role of the United Nations in the New World Order, what an ominous future lies before all nations! What international legitimacy will there be to protect the less powerful against the more powerful who seek to subjugate them, humiliate them, kill them, and usurp all their rights that were granted by God and protected by the Charter of the United Nations? We now realise fully the real reason why we, the Arabs, were deprived of our right to solve our problems.

By contrast the Arab-Israeli conflict remained far from any honest and real attempt to resolve it justly. The Arab Palestinian people and the Arab nation still await the implementation of a single United Nations resolution, which rejects Israeli occupation and calls for an end to it. Twenty four years have passed since the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights, and nine years have passed since the occupation of South Lebanon, but none of our hopes were fulfilled. Nevertheless, we did not despair of the United Nations. The major powers persisted in assuring us that a peaceful solution was possible. Because the real purpose behind this destructive war, as proven by its scope, and as attested to by the declaration of the parties, is to destroy Iraq, and rearrange the area in a manner far more dangerous to our nation's present and future than the Sykes-picot agreement. This arrangement would put the nation, its aspirations and its resources under direct foreign hegemony and would shred all ties between its parts, thus further weakening and fragmenting it.

The talk about a new world order, whose early feature is the destruction of Iraq, and the persistence of this talk as the war continues, lead us to wonder about the identity of this order and instill in us doubts regarding its nature.

The New World Order to which we aspire holds equal in their right to freedom, progress and prosperity. It deals with their causes with the same standards and under the same principles, regardless of any consideration or influence. The required new order would not mete out injustice to any one nation. It would not discriminate between nations but draw them together within the framework of mutual respect and fruitful cooperation for the benefit of our planet and all people on it. It must be an order that believes in public freedom and protects private freedoms, respects human rights and strengthens the principles of democracy. It should not deny the Arab people their right to all this.

The nature of the military alliance against Iraq betrays its near and long-term objectives. For when Israel supports this alliance; when two countries, one Arab the other Islamic, both of which have normal political relations with Israel, whose leaders compete for prominence in this alliance and reiterate their desire and enthusiasm for the destruction of Iraq. When Arab and Islamic lands are offered as bases for the allied armies from which to launch attacks to destroy Arab Muslim Iraq, when Arab money is financing this war with unprecedented generosity unknown to us and our Palestinian brothers, while we

shoulder our national responsibilities; when this takes place, I say that any Arab or Muslim can realise the magnitude of this crime committed against his religion and his nation.

Brothers Citizens,

From the very beginning we have shouldered our responsibilities to the Arab nation and Islam, as well as towards international peace and security. We have made every effort to fulfill these responsibilities. We are not hurt because our rewards have been successive punishments to our country and people. It has become clear to the World that these punishments are the price which we must pay because we tried to avert the disaster which was planned and premeditated in the dark. As a new form of punishment there are now attempts to deprive us of our basic needs, even oil, as a new form of punishment, and one of the most severe, for no other reason than our principled stand. We would not forsake this right because it is equal in importance to our human right to breathe air that is not yet rationed. Nevertheless, Jordan's leadership and people will remain firm in their position and belief that the opportunity for peace still exists. Resources to peace remains less costly and would reflect more truly the commitment to principles and values that the continuation of this devastating war.

The voices of millions can be heard in every country, including those of the alliance. They all call for peace and an end to the killing of children, the destruction of homes, and the withholding of medicine from the sick. I know just as you do that against these voices stand political and military leaders, alas with Arabs in their forefront, calling for the continuation of this war. Which voices will win in the end? The voices of reason, peace and justice, or the voices of war, hatred and insanity?.

We and other brothers have made a loud call to stop military action and open the way for diplomatic political action to resolve the problem, but the call fell on deaf ears. Many a time before the war had started we warned against its effects, the deep wounds which it would open, and its repercussions which would grow and include human, economic and ecological tragedies. We warned that war is a measure of last resort, launched only after all efforts to avert it have been exhausted. Our calls and warnings were in vain.

Justice will be victorious, God willing, Brothers, and our nation will prevail because, through its victory humanity will prevail against its enemies. Life will prevail over death. Love among nations will prevail over hatred. It will become clear to all those who gambled that our nation would be divided, like its leaders, that it is a dead nation, they will be proven wrong. Our nation will remain, God willing, a strong, proud and vibrant nation. "These your people are one people and I am your God, so worship Me alone" (Surat Al Anbiya' No. 92). Let us have fear of God and remember that. If this situation continues it will only benefit those who covet our hands and resources, with Israel at their forefront. There are already signs that the spoils are being divided. We hear and read every day of plans to control our resources, limit our freedom of decision, strangle our aspirations and usurp our rights. There is talk of proposed military alliances and foreign troops that will stay on Arab soil; of conditions that will handicap our progress; of a

solution for the Palestinian problem which has been prepared or which will be prepared by others according to what they see, and according to the will of the powerful that is imposed on the weak. We cannot imagine that this solution would fulfill the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people on their national soil.

Let us join our efforts to stop this catastrophe and save the people of Iraq from the fate that is planned for them. Let us save our nation from the plans that are designed for it. Let us bring that war to an end.

The starting point in all this is immediate and serious work to make the alliance accept a cease-fire, in preparation for a responsible dialogue between the antagonists: an Iraqi American dialogue and an Arab-Arab dialogue that resort to reason and balance interests against international legitimacy, the legitimacy of security, peace, justice and equality.

So where is the United Nations now? The alternative to a cease-fire is the destruction of Arabs and Muslims, their humiliation, their exploitation, the trampling on their honour, pride and legitimate hopes, and hatred and strife between nations. We in Jordan will stay the Arabs of all Arabs, the noblest of the noble, the men of all men. We shall always stay united, army and people, alert to defend our country. If the fight is forced upon us we shall be up to it and gain one of God's two favours (victory or martyrdom). Our hearts are full of faith, and we thank God for everything.

From Amman of the Arabs I send to our people in Palestine our great pride in them, in their steadfastness, in their resilience against their suffering where a whole nation is under house arrest, without work, without a source of earning, without medicine. But it is a nation that believes in God and stands fast by the Aqsa mosque and the Church of the Holy sepulcher.

We send a special salute to His Holiness Pope John Paul II for his prayers and continuous calls for peace in the Middle East, and to all people and international figures everywhere who decry war and call for peace. A salute of pride to all our Arab and Muslim brothers in the five continents who came out from the first moments of war to make a stand for life and peace against death, destruction and aggression.

I pray a special debt of thanks to all those who search for truth and who work to spread it because they respect and care for truth. To all newsmen, academics, and politicians who live along us and do their duty in honesty and professionalism.

“Most of their conferrings together are devoid of good, except such as enjoin charity, or the promotion of public welfare or of public peace; and on him who strives after these, seeking the gratification of God, shall we soon bestow a great reward.” (Surat Al-Nisa’ No. 114).

May God's peace and blessings be upon you.

APPENDIX B

Fact Sheet

International Contributions to the War against Terrorism, June 7, 2002 (revised June 14, 2002)¹

Coalition partners from across globe are fighting against evil of terrorism.

The terrorism of September 11th was not just an attack on the United States; it was an attack on the world. Citizens from more than 80 countries died that day – innocent men, women and children from across the globe. Within hours of the tragedy, coalitions involving many nations assembled to fight terrorism – literally hundreds of countries have contributed in a variety of ways – some militarily, others diplomatically, economically and financially. Some nations have helped openly; others prefer not to disclose their contributions.

The United States began building the coalition on September 12, 2001, and there are currently 69 nations supporting the global war on terrorism. To date, 20 nations have deployed more than 16,000 troops to the U.S. Central Command's region of responsibility. This coalition of the willing is working hard every day to defeat terrorism, wherever it may exist.

In Afghanistan alone, our coalition partners are contributing more than 8,000 troops to Operation Enduring Freedom and to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul – making up over half of the 15,000 non-Afghan forces in Afghanistan. The war against terrorism is a broad-based effort that will take time. Every nation has different circumstances and will participate in different ways. This mission and future missions will require a series of coalitions ready to take on the challenges and assume the risks associated with such an operation.

Below is a partial list of military contributions to the war on terrorism from some of the countries that have lent their support. This list is not intended to be all-inclusive but to give the reader a sense of the important role played by the coalition of coalitions in the global war on terrorism. This list will be updated monthly.

¹ US Department of Defense, "International Contributions," 1-7.

Jordan

An “Aardvark” mine clearing unit and personnel are currently deployed to Qandahar, and has cleared mines from more than 70,000 square meters in both Bagram and Qandahar. Jordan has provided basing and overflight permission for all U.S. and coalition forces. As of June 6, 2002, the Jordanian hospital in Mazar-e-Sharif helped 68,811 patients:

Military: 1,055

Civilian:

Women – 26,763
Men – 22,930
Children – 18,063

Performed 798 surgeries

Kazakhstan

Has provided overflight rights and allowed transshipment of supplies to U.S. forces in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Kenya

Has continuously offered support to OEF operations, including access, overflight, basing and supporting MIO.
Sending LNO to CENTCOM in June 2002.

Kuwait

Kuwait has provided basing and overflight permission for all U.S. and coalition forces. Country representatives arrived at CENTCOM on Feb.14, 2002. There are currently three personnel at CENTCOM to support current operations in OEF.

Kyrgyzstan

Has provided basing and overflight rights for U.S. and coalition personnel.
Under the United Nations World Food Program, Kyrgyzstan -- along with Russia and Tajikistan -- has delivered 16,500 tons of flour and wheat to the northern provinces of Afghanistan.

APPENDIX C

The United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)¹

Security Council resolution 242, adopted on 22 November 1967, and resolution 338, adopted on 22 October 1973, are considered basic instruments in all subsequent discussions of a Middle East peace settlement.

1. Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967:

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

¹ "Security Council Resolutions," United Nations, accessed October 23, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>.

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.

2. Resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973:

The Security Council,

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the ceasefire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Adopted at the 1747th meeting by 14 votes to none.¹

¹ One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

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